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The Curse of Corporate Control: A Mutual
Insurance Company
A Brief on Behalf of Societyt
David Cowan Bayne, S.J. *
The phenomenon of "control" is perhaps the most important single fact in the American corporate system. As the corporation increasingly is recognized as an institution of primary
significance (even Mr. Justice Brandeis called it "a master instrument of the American economy"), the importance of control
will grow in law as it has grown in economic and social fact.'

Mr. Berle was right. The core concept of the American corporation is corporate control. All other considerations are subsidiary
or peripheral. The philosophy and law governing corporate control are pivotal to all else. If the mores, attitudes, and conduct of'
the top control hierarchy in the corporate society are shaped by
high ideals and rigid strictures, the beneficence of the system will
be assured. In turn, the inestimable impact of the corporation on
Society will be equally beneficent. The importance, then, of' a
thoughtful study of corporate control is incalculable.
And what better subject for such a study than the mutual
insurance company? The mutual company is archetypal. In it the

t In his scholarly analysis of problems inherent in the mutual insurance company
form, Father Bayne has produced an invaluable study of the strict-trust approach to the
sale of corporate control, corporate opportunity, and conflict of interest. In this fascinating
brief-written from the outset for publication-the author has added a significant commentary on Borden u. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1976), a case previously neglected
by the commentators but characterized by Father Bayne as "the most important single
opinion in the field of corporate philosophy in decades."
This brief, submitted on behalf of the plaintiff-appellees, represents the scholarly
fruit of years of litigation, culminating in an affirmance of a thorough and far-reaching
remedy, including a $2.5 million damages award, in Rowen u. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co. of
Iowa, 282 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1979).
To preserve the author's vivid style, the brief has been reproduced essentially verbatim, with only minor changes in format. Because the brief is considered a primary reference in its own right, the references to depositions, exhibits, etc. are printed exactly as
they appear in the brief, and without further citation.
-The Editors
* A.B., 1939, University of Detroit; M.A., 1946, Loyola University of Chicago; LL.B.,
1947, LL.M., 1948, Georgetown University; J.S.D., 1949, Yale University; S.T.L., 1953,
Loyola University of Chicago. Member, District of Columbia, Michigan, Missouri, and
Iowa Bars. Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law.
1. Berle, Control in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM.L. REV.1212, 1212 (1958).

228

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I979

power of control is virtually absolute. No stockholder investors
intrude upon the contrbleur's uninhibited rule. The only owners
are the policyholders. The annual meeting is a charade. Unassailable control passes from generation to generation, from insiders
to insiders. All this is referable to the control of the proxy, and
the wide dispersal of the owners. In the mutual company, this
power of control is as absolute and unchecked as in any type of
modern corporation.
Statutory protection of the policyholder owner is virtually
nonexistent. No proxy rules. No quorum requirements. No disclosure regulation. No codified fiduciary duty. The entire burden is
thrown on the court. The lone recourse: post-factum judicial recovery under the common law.

The Le Mars Mutual
Q. Do you recall, Mr. Vander Meer, any specific occasion during the ten to fifteen years when you were on the
Board of Le Mars when you took exception to any policy
or recommendation made by John Alesch?
A. No, I don't recall that I did.
-Peter Vander Meer, Le Mars Director,
Deposition a t 21.

A. John Alesch I knew since 1934. He and I were cardplaying buddies.
Q. So you had a good close personal relationship since
you moved into town?
A. About as close as you can get without sleeping together.
-John Vollmar, Le Mars Director,
Deposition a t 6.

And the Le Mars Mutual Insurance Company of Iowa is the
perfect vehicle for the study of a mutual company. The biggerthan-life realities of this little company in Iowa lend themselves
ideally to an application of the broad philosophy of corporate
control. The lesson of Le Mars reaches far beyond an Iowa county,
or even a state. Le Mars is a microcosm of the mutual-company
world. The pertinency of its lesson is nationwide.
This is a Brief, therefore, written on behalf of Society. The
solution of the manifold problems of Le Mars is the solution of
the identical problems of thousands of other mutuals, to say nothing of cooperatives, fraternal organizations, savings-and-loan associations. The lesson of Le Mars could be a prophylaxis for the
nation, a salutary warning for the future. Further, the curse of
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corporate control afflicts the mutual company to a degree surpassed by no other kind of corporation. The burden of this Brief
is great.

The Burden of the Brief
It appears to me that everything is shaping up just as
we anticipated and I am sure that this venture can and
will be advantageous and profitable to all parties concerned.
-Burton Dull, Esq., Le Mars Counsel,
to Raymond Brown, Esq., De Witt Counsel,
Executive Committee,
Exhibit 19A.

At the heart of every Le Mars dereliction was an abuse of
corporate control. The story began with the Illegitimate Sale of
Control. Next, Looting, toward recoupment of the premium-bribe
dollars. Thence Embezzlement, to produce the wherewithal for
the premium-bribe. Theft of a Corporate Opportunity was an
expectable concomitant. Disloyalty was inherent in the whole.
The lesson of these control abuses is complex, but eminently
worthwhile.
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Ray[mond Brown]: Burt[on Dull] is working on the
changes in the minutes and getting them lined up. I do
wonder if you people have come up with the substitute
for the automobiles. Too bad I don't have a subagent or
two in Hawaii and perhaps a few other nice places that
we could send you people to check out for us, but maybe
as time goes on we can have the Alesch Agency promoted in all the states where De Witt is at and then we
can all wheel and deal, can't we?
-John Alesch, Le Mars Contrbleur,
to Raymond Brown, Exhibit 82.

The story of this lawsuit is really a tale of two cities. In the
northwest Iowa town of Le Mars is headquartered the Le Mars
Mutual Insurance Company of Iowa. For many years antedating
this lawsuit, Le Mars was in the complete and unfettered control
of old John Alesch (now some four years deceased). John Alesch
held sway over Le Mars with the help of his family and a coterie
of obedient directors, all together, the Alesch Group.
John Alesch was undoubtedly the central character in the Le
Mars half of this story. But he was aided immeasurably by Burton Dull, Esq., longtime counsel to Le Mars. It was Burton Dull
who guided John Alesch step by step through most of the machinations. It was Burton Dull who later carried on for De Witt as
liaison man inside Le Mars. Burton Dull and John Alesch rank
as two of the principal malefactors in this litigation.

The Alesch Agency
It would seem to me that this pup corporation [the
Alesch Agency] could be used for perhaps some other
things in the business between the two companies [Le
Mars and De Witt].
-John Alesch to Raymond Brown,
Exhibit 63.

Up in this town of Le Mars, John Alesch, his three daughters,
and his wife had for many years owned, or seemingly so, a little
insurance agency (interestingly, housed in the very headquarters
of Le Mars). This Alesch Agency played only an unassuming part
in this story, but nonetheless served well the purposes of Alesch
and Dull. The role of the Five Alesches-father, daughters,
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wife-as sole owners, or seemingly so, of the Alesch Agency was
integral, albeit lesser, to the overall plot.

De Witt
Q. Are these [the Le Mars Executive Committee]
substantially the same individuals who are on your Executive Committee a t . . . De Witt?
A. That is right.
Q. How often did these meetings of the Executive
Committee take place?
A. Almost daily. At De Witt.
-William Couch, Executive Committee,
Deposition a t 20-21.
My Dad started De Witt . . . . My Father was President. My brother was President. I was President and
now my son is President.
-Carl Smith, Executive Committee,
Deposition a t 7, 18.

Across the state in another Iowa town was the Iowa Mutual
Insurance Company of De Witt. De Witt is the unquestioned chief
of all the malefactors. De Witt was bent on a headlong course of
expansion, merger, bribery, looting, and embezzlement. De Witt,
considerably larger than Le Mars, was the undoubted center of
all the chicanery. But De Witt, as a corporate entity, must necessarily be guided by agents, and De Witt, for its part, had been
for many years under the complete and untrammelled control of
a select circle of five men-Carl Smith, Raymond Brown, William Couch, Carman Smith (President of De Witt, and Le Mars,
a t the grand old age of 33), George Howes-the omnipotent Executive Committee, contraleur, and prime agent, and the unchallenged master of the subservient nine-man Board of De Witt.
Just as John Alesch had his Burton Dull, so too did the
Executive Committee have Raymond Brown, Esq., house counsel
and himself a prime member of the Executive Committee of De
Witt. It was Raymond Brown who implemented the plan and
carried out the negotiations with Burton Dull.
Thus Alesch and Dull a t the one end and the Executive
Committee and Brown a t the other were major malefactors in the
De Witt-Le Mars axis, with De Witt the chief of all. Many lesser
parties-the
Alesch Group, t h e S m i t h Group, t h e Five
Alesches-moved in and out and around during the eight
years-1970 through 1977-of this tale of two cities. Exhibit 522
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lists the Dramatis Personae. But Alesch and Dull and the Executive Committee were the principals, behind De Witt itself.

Q.
tors
A.
was

So actually, getting the designated Board of Direcwas part and parcel of this contract?
There isn't any question that the overall agreement
all a part of one overall transaction.
-Burton Dull, Deposition at 71.

I didn't know [Burton Dull] was mixed up in this deal
like he is.
-Clyde

Eastman, Le Mars Director,
Deposition at 59.

From a legal and conceptual standpoint, the date of April 21,
1970-the day the control of Le Mars passed from the Alesch
Group to De Witt-serves as an excellent point of demarcation
between the major classes of malefaction in this lawsuit: the Sale
of Control, the Looting of Le Mars, and Embezzlement. The principal elements of the Sale of Control and the Embezzlement occurred before April 21, 1970, and most of the Looting after. But
there was not a perfect dichotomy. Some Sale-of-Control details
and the Embezzlement did carry beyond April 21, 1970. But that
date, nonetheless, remains the ideal break-off point for this factual presentation.
The fourth malefaction was sui generis-the Twice-Stolen
Agency-and was the successive work of the Five Alesches and De
Witt. This double usurpation of a Le Mars "corporate opportunity" requires distinct treatment, both factual and legal. The
fifth-Disloyalty-was
all-pervasive, everywhere, and always.
Every one of the substantive defendants played an active role
of more or less importance in the Sale of Control, the Embezzlement, and the Looting. The Five Alesches and De Witt stole the
Alesch Agency from Le Mars. Every defendant was consciously
Disloyal, with varying degrees of culpability.
A.

The Sale of Control

Q. Well, as a normal thing, at your annual meeting,
what percentage of your policyholders actually attend?
A. Very few.
Q. And there is no requirement for a quorum?
A. No.
-Raymond Brown, Deposition at 82.
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I was kicked out of Le Mars by Alesch. They didn't want
me to know [about the Sale of Control]. They pushed
me out.
-Clyde Eastman, Le Mars Director,
Deposition a t 59, 61.

In the late 1960's old John Alesch was in his sixties, had
congestive heart failure and knew he could no longer handle Le
Mars. Further, no close relative was a t hand to perpetuate the
Alesch control. The prestige, the power, the perquisites, the salaries and bonuses, all would ndw be lost, unless a suitable successor was soon found. John Alesch knew full well the value of this
control.
John Alesch also knew that the very nature of a mutual company guaranteed him absolute power to hand over this valuable
control to whomever he chose. Le Mars had no shareholders. Each
little policyholder had only one single vote. The annual election
of directors was the merest formality. Unorganized, apathetic,
the policyholder owners never even came to a meeting, let alone
opposed the Alesch slate. The annual meeting was a family affair.
A few intimates gathered to rubber-stamp the Alesch nominees,
whoever they might be.
And the beauty was that old John Alesch, and the Alesch
Group, were not risking one personal cent. Le Mars was owned
completely by the policyholders. The Alesches were only custodians, never owners. Not one personal cent.

Employers Mutual
A. And it was understood that Le Mars Mutual would
be merged into the Employers.
Q. Did that discussion that day have anything to do
with Alesch, Incorporated, the insurance agency? That
it was to be purchased by Employers Mutual?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember the amount of dollars that would
be paid for the insurance agency?
A. It was $450,000.
-Burton Dull, Deposition a t 19-20.

Armed with this unassailable power to name a new Board,
John Alesch began his hunt for a "suitable" successor. "Suitable"
in the sense that it come forward with a suitable premium-bribe.
If the Alesches were to relinquish the power, the prestige, and the
perquisites, at least they would be handsomely rewarded for the
relinquishment.
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The first Alesch selection was Employers Mutual Insurance
Company of Des Moines. Employers also understood full well the
value of control of Le Mars. More to the point, Employers was
prepared to pay a substantial premium-bribe for that control.
Negotiation between briber and bribed went on apace, but in the
end John Alesch decided to hunt for a "more suitable" successor.
Henceforward: competitive Premium-Bribery.
(This term "premium-bribe" has gained currency in Sale-ofControl argot because a "premium" or gratuity is usually added
to the true value of the contrbleur's stock, thus effecting the sale
of corporate control for a price.)
At this point in late 1969 John Alesch and Burton Dull began
the successful negotiations with De Witt, through its agent, the
Executive Committee. When the dust settled, De Witt had
agreed to a total premium-bribe of $600,000.
The Guises of the Bribe
I found out later [Burton Dull] was in back of all these
contracts.
-Clyde Eastman, Le Mars Director,
Deposition a t 59.

Q. Did you prepare that [sales] contract, Mr. Dull,
eventually?
A. Eventually, yes.
-Burton Dull, Deposition a t 39.

This $600,000 premium-bribe passed in three separate segments:
$400,000
(1) The "Sale" of the Agency:
46,000
(2) The "Consultant's" Contract:
154,000
(3) The "Pension Plan":
The Total Premium-Bribe:
$600,000
Throughout the lengthy De Witt-Alesch maneuvers, the
wonder is not so much a t the dishonesty and duplicity, but a t the
calloused candor of the details of the dishonesty, reduced to permanent record for all to read. The most notable record of all was
a four-page letter-the Bribery Letter-from Burton Dull to Raymond Brown, November 19, 1969, spelling out precisely the exact
terms of the Sale of Control. This damning document outlined (1)
the Alesch "quid," (2) the De Witt "quo," and (3) tied the two
together with a proximately causal "pro." The "quid pro quo"
spelt Premium-Bribery .
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In this single letter was a summary of all three segments of
the total $600,000 premium-bribe.
[Tlhe following will outline John's understanding of what will
be expected from him and what in turn De Witt will do in
consideration therefor:
[(I) The "Sale)' of the Agency:] John will sell the Alesch
Agency to De Witt for $500,000.
[(2) The "Pension Plan":] It is understood also that the pension plan will be funded prior to the 1970 annual meeting: (1)a
pension for John Alesch of $600.00 per month for life and 10
years certain; (2) a pension for M. H. Tappan of $400.00 per
month for life and 10 years certain; and (3) a pension for all
Directors of $300.00 per year for life.
[(3) The "Consultant's" Contract:] Alesch will work for the
Alesch Agency for a period of three years for $1,000.00 per
month. Also . . . either Le Mars or De Witt will furnish . . . an
automobile and operating expenses therefor.
The above is all subject to the election of Directors approved by
De Witt.
-The Dull-Brown Bribery Letter, Exhibit 4.

Pursuant to the unfailing urge to reduce all to permanent record,
De Witt promptly answered the Bribery Letter: "Our Executive
Committee are in complete agreement with the proposal as outlined in your letter." (Exhibit 3.) The deal was sealed.
Although the premium-bribe was hidden under various
guises-sale price, fees, pensions-the overall purpose was the
same: to induce the Alesch Group to hand over Le Mars to De
Witt without the embarrassing knowledge or consent of the policyholder owners. An open and honest election would be dangerous. An open and honest election plus disclosure of the $600,000
would be disastrous.
I have discussed with John the mechanics of the annual
meeting and it is my suggestion that we hold the present annual
meeting as though no change were being made and then, following this, calling a meeting of the Board and accepting the resignations of those we desire to accept [and] appoint the succeeding Directors in accordance with our hopes.
This, in my opinion, will cause less confusion and allow us
to make the desired changes with the least amount of objections.
-Burton Dull to Raymond Brown, Exhibit 39.
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1. The "Sale" of the Agency: $400,000

A. There would have been no value in De Witt having
any interest in the Alesch Agency . . . unless they were
in control of the Le Mars Mutual.
-Lorne R. Worthington, Insurance
Commissioner, Deposition at 42.

All the De Witt-Alesch attempts to camouflage the
premium-bribe were childishly primitive. But the Agency-sale
gambit was the most artless.
The Five Alesches were the sole owners, or seemingly so, of
the Alesch Agency, on its face absolutely unrelated to Le Mars,
beyond the fortuity of its location in the Le Mars Home Office.
This little "pup" Alesch and Dull chose as the secret vehicle for
passing some $400,000 of premium-bribe. The Agency was worthless to anyone except John Alesch, or someone else able to use it
as a front for stealing Le Mars business. Why did Insurance Commissioner Worthington say the Alesch Agency was worthless?
Alesch Agency: A Pawn
This particular transaction cannot be viewed as a normal insurance agency acquisition.
-David Bakst, Insurance Expert,
Transcript a t 1464.

The Alesch Agency had been used for years by John Alesch
to funnel Home Office business to himself personally. Exhibit 707
tells the tale. The total commission income generated by the
Agency for 1969 was $36,800. Of that, some $17,800 represented
income on business placed by the Agency with Le Mars itself.
Another $8,200 came from policies Le Mars itself carried on Le
Mars' new building, automobiles, and employees. (Transcript at
623.) After all, John Alesch, Le Mars executive, would choose
John Alesch, insurance agent, to write any insurance Le Mars
itself needed.
No seer need predict what would happen to this $26,000 in
business (of the total $36,800) when a competitor took over the
Agency. Le Mars would throw the Agency out of its headquarters,
direct customers to another agent, place its own coverage elsewhere. Never would Le Mars let commission income flow to competitor De Witt. Without a covenant not to compete by Le
Mars-and there was no covenant-the Agency would be denuded overnight. With only $10,000 in independent commissions
left, what-then?

CORPOMTE CONTROL

Alesch Agency: A Kept Woman
The operation in Le Mars should have been a little less
than 50 percent [of commission income] in terms of' its
expense.
-David Bakst, Insurance Expert,
Transcript at 1526.

With income reduced overnight, with the Agency out on the
street, whence the normal Operating Expenses? No longer will Le
Mars supply free telephone, utilities, clerical help, office space,
whatever. But even that is not all. John Alesch will be gone. Or
if retained, retained at $12,000 per annum. Whence the $12,000?
Worthington, Bakst-any expert-could only conclude: the
Agency was worthless, under any normal conditions.
With a worthless Agency, the calculation of the premiumbribe is effortless. The Agency had $100,000 in cash on hand, its
total value. The Five Alesches got $500,000. The differential:
$4OO,OOO.

The Quid Pro Quo
Q. [Tlhe $500,000 wouldn't be paid unless there was
the replacement of the Board of Directors of Le Mars?
A. Well, the two transactions were tied together, all of
them. There is no question about that.
-Burton Dull, Deposition at 40.

Again guilelessly, the Agency-sale Agreement to Sell Stock,
drawn b y Burton Dull, was not a simple contract of sale, but
incorporated quite incredibly the baldest stipulation: "This
agreement shall not become effective unless and until all of the
present Directors of the Le Mars Mutual have submitted their
resignations and qualified successors, as designated by [De
Witt], have been qualified as Directors of the Le Mars Mutual."
(Agreement to Sell Stock, Alesches and De Witt, Exhibit A, 3,4.)
Here again, conveniently, remarkably, was the proximate causal
connection between the passage of the $400,000 premium-bribe
and the Sale of Control. The total absence of any other connection between the Agency sale and the Board election drew blatant
attention to the Premium-Bribery.
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THE FIVE

ALESCHES

I
The Denouement

Burton [Dull] said it was your intent to have the meeting of the Alesch Agency on April 21, and turn the stock
over to us at that time, so I will bring the certified check
with me. [I]n turning over control of Le Mars Mutual
on April 21, it would only naturally follow that the complete transaction including the Alesch Agency would
have to be made on the same date.
-Raymond Brown to John Alesch,
Exhibit 41.

Thus on April 21, 1970, the $400,000 in premium-bribe
passed, and De Witt took over the Le Mars Board, manned predictably by the omnipresent Executive Committee. Conveniently, John Alesch and Burton Dull also sat on the new Board.
Thus did the first of the three segments pass. Note: This $400,000
from De Witt went exclusively to the Five Alesches. The others
were to receive theirs in more direct ways.
Epilogue
In the early days after the De Witt takeover (before he was
treated so shabbily) old John Alesch was most solicitous in his
thoughtfulness of De Witt (and of himself, incidentally). He was
justly concerned lest the Iowa Insurance Department uncover the
premium-bribe. His fatherly suggestion: "You might want to give
some thought to building up the value of the Alesch Agency and
thus when you are audited by the Insurance Department in three
years you would have a strong argument with the Department as
to the value of Alesch Agency." (John Alesch to Raymond Brown,
Exhibit 63.) John Alesch must have been gratified. De Witt
heeded his word: "We will want to try to build up the value of
this Agency to increase the market value as we will have to show
it in our annual Statements." (Raymond Brown to John Alesch,
Exhibit 64.)

2271
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The "Consultant's" Contract: $46,000
Q. And it was the Executive Committee of Le Mars
then that was working through the Alesch agency to
manage Le Mars?
A. Well, the Executive Committee of De Witt, too.
Q. They were substantially the same people?
A. Yes.
-Raymond Brown, Deposition a t 120.

For the second segment, De Witt decided that this time John
Alesch would be the lone recipient. And the "pup corporation
could be used" again as the conduit.
Remember that now the Alesch Agency was wholly owned by
De Witt. The Alesch Agency was De Witt. This was post-April
21, 1970. With this setting, any unearned dollars passing to John
Alesch from the Alesch Agency would in effect be extra bribe
dollars from De Witt to John Alesch.
How, then, to use the "pup corporation" to pass the dollars?
The answer was ready. The Alesch Agency was now owned completely by De Witt. So if old John Alesch was a "consultant sine
cura, " any dollars paid would be De Witt dollars and hence pure
premium-bribe. The result was the "Consultant's" Contract.
WHEREAS the services and advice of John H. Alesch are
needed for the Alesch Agency and the Le Mars,Mutual:
John H. Alesch does hereby agree to act as a consultant and
adviser to employees designated by De Witt to succeed him. Mr.
Alesch's responsibilities will be only as consultant and adviser
to these persons.
The Alesch Agency agrees to pay John H. Alesch $1,000 per
month for the services, advice and consultation, to furnish an
automobile and to pay all the expenses for said automobile.
-John Alesch and Alesch Agency, Consultant's Contract,
Exhibit A.

In the years before his death, $36,000 for "advice" and a
minimum $10,000 in free automobile passed to John Alesch to
augment the basic premium-bribe of $400,000. The money was
pleasant, but John Alesch was accustomed to work for his pay,
and more to the point, to run the show. It hurt his pride deeply
to be shunted out of his job. Perhaps the indignity was not worth
the $46,000.
I myself have felt this pressure to no end, and will advise
that this was most of my trouble in my recent illness. [I]t does
cause many heartaches to Alice and myself. Am sure that you
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too would feel badly after so many years of hard work with De
Witt if you were left in the cold as we have been treated.
I am at a loss as to know just what is expected of me, since
I am not advised or asked of any changes.
-John Alesch to Raymond Brown, Exhibit 95.

The terms of the deal were clear: John Alesch was to do nothing
to earn his $46,000, except hand over Le Mars. Not even advise.
Or be consulted.
[Alpparently you feel you are being put out of your office
against your wish. We had no intent of forcing you out of your
office if you wanted to keep it. We understood you only wanted
a desk available when you occasionally would come to the office.
We want your services continued in an advisory capacity as
before if your health permits. We felt that John Breese should
assume full responsibility for the operation of the Company.
-De Witt to John Alesch, Exhibit 93.

And John Breese was a De Witt man, on a full salary of $15,000,
paid by Le Mars to De Witt. John Alesch had no duties, and he
hated the whole deal.
Again conveniently and remarkably, the same deftless approach (1)tied the "Consultant's" Contract to the "Sale" of the
Agency and (2) then connected both causally to the Sale of Control. The "Consultant's" Contract went on to emphasize that
John Alesch's duties-"only as a consultant" to De Witt people-were "part of the consideration of: (1) this Consultant's
Contract, and (2) the Sales Agreement between the owners of the
stock of the Alesch Agency and De Witt." (John Alesch and
Alesch Agency, Consultant's Contract, Exhibit A,) Thus did De
Witt add $46,000, to increase the Alesch bribe to $446,000, all
with the continuing blessing of all parties.
3. The "Pension Plan": $l54,OOO
I never knew retiring directors were to get a pension. I
don't know who voted to get a pension. I wouldn't have
voted to approve it. I have no recollection of a pension
discussed a t a board meeting.
-Clyde Eastman, Le Mars Director,
Deposition a t 40, 45.

For the third segment of the premium-bribe De Witt decided
on a naive subterfuge, and this time each and every member of
the Alesch Group was to be included, except the three Alesch
daughters who had already gotten theirs.
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Up until the pivotal April 21, 1970, the directors of Le Mars
had never enjoyed any pension of any kind. But late in 1969 the
Alesch search for guises for the premium-bribe produced a ready
device. Why not fund a bountiful "pension plan" for all? How
simple a way to pass premium-bribe dollars from De Witt to the
"resigning" Board to assure the "resignations" with a minimum
of fuss, and recalcitrancy.
In all, De Witt agreed to $154,131.53 in a one-shot, singlepremium payment to fund generous pensions all around: (1)Old
John Alesch was to get $600 a month for life or ten years certain;
the cost-$69,011; (2) the Le Mars president, Milton Tappan,
long retired in Lauderdale, $400 a month for life or ten years
certain; the cost-$51,004; (3) the ten "lesser parties" on the
Board, $300 annually; the cost-$34,116.53. The total outlay:
$154,131.53, again with the continuing blessing of all parties. The
testimony of J.D. Hattam, Insurance Auditor, Arthur Young &
Company, details the names and numbers. (Transcript at 25963.) Since none of this $154,000 was a valid debt, since no pensions had hitherto ever been funded, the full amount was pure
Premium-Bribery.
Thus De Witt bought assurance that the lesser members of
the Alesch Group would not upset the applecart a t the last minute.
Under whatever guise, the total $600,000 was a crass
premium-bribe passing from De Witt to the Alesch Group for the
illicit Sale of Control of Le Mars to De Witt, and always abetted
by the Smith Group.

-Burton Dull---Q . Over these years since 1958 when Mr. Dull has been
on a retainer, did he also charge for work not on
retainer?
A. The agreement was that the only time there'd be an
additional charge is if the Dull Law Firm represented us
in a suit.
-Melvin Gearke, Le Mars Officer,
Director, Transcript at 771.

Burton Dull's singular role throughout the Premium-Bribery
negotiations-and afterwards-demands special attention. Burton Dull spanned the days of John Alesch, with the PremiumBribery, the Looting, and the Embezzlement, on through the
Twice-Stolen Agency and down to the very present. During all
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this time, Burton Dull was on a set retainer as Le Mars counsel.
After the De Witt takeover he was also a director. As counsel and
director, Dull was the Le Mars liaison with De Witt in all the
malefactions, and he was paid well for his work. "I found out later
[Burton Dull] was in back of all these contracts." (Clyde Eastman, Le Mars Director, Deposition at 59.)
Burton Dull and John Alesch began the negotiations for the
Sale-of-Control premium-bribe as early as mid-1969. The correspondence and meetings with the Employers Mutual were abortive. But the consummation meeting among Dull, Alesch, and
Raymond Brown, De Witt counsel, firmed up the total $600,000
premium-bribe per the Dull-Brown Bribery Letter.
What remuneration did Burton Dull receive for his years of
"services," first to Alesch alone, then to Alesch and De Witt
together, and finally to De Witt alone? The "remuneration7?came
from Le Mars, always from Le Mars, since Le Mars paid Burton
Dull from beginning to end.
Remium-Bribery Remuneration
A. This $10,000 was entirely for payment [by Le
Mars] of past services.
Q. So by past services you mean the consultation with
the Insurance Department and the preparation of the
[Agency-sale] contract and other [premium-bribe]
negotiations that took place?
A. Yes. The amount, as I recall, had been suggested
originally by Mr. Alesch and then we did discuss it with
Mr. Dull as to whether this amount was agreeable with
him.
-Raymond Brown, Transcript a t 397-98.

Burton Dull's regular retainer took care of most of his
Premium-Bribery pegotiations and the work on the Twice-Stolen
Agency, but John Alesch had promised a bonus for drawing up
the Premium-Bribery Agency-sale contract and the actual closing
of the deal. This was the $10,000 approved by Raymond Brown
and noted in the Special Report of Arthur Young & Company
(Exhibit 508, 111).
But Burton Dull was to receive much more than a mere
$10,000 for the betrayal of Le Mars.
Directorship and Retainer
Q. Did you know that Mr. Dull was going to be named
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a director of Le Mars a t the time this transfer took
place?
A. No, of course not. I didn't know anything about this
Dull that I heard so much about. Except I found out
later that he was the one that was in back of all these
contracts and stuff. I hadn't even heard of him.
Q. Did you know that Mr. Dull was going to get his
retainer increased from $600 a month to $1,000 a month
as soon as the transfer took place?
A. I should say not. I should say not. I didn't know he
was mixed up in this deal like he was, but it seems like
he was.
-Clyde Eastman, Le Mars Director,
Deposition a t 58-59.

The intriguing Brown Doodle Notes (Exhibit 236(7)) confirmed in detail that Mr. Dull had in fact bargained with De Witt
over his reward for his role in the Sale of Control, and for his
liaison work inside Le Mars after the takeover. Brown's Doodle
Notes indicated that Dull wanted $1,500 a month. The $1,000-amonth retainer-total $87,000 to date-was the negotiated result.
This $87,000 covered all Dull's "services" to De Witt during and
after the Sale of Control. Which Le Mars dutifully paid. The new
$1,000-per-month retainer began on the key date of April 21,
1970. The Special Report of Arthur Young & Company carries the
statistics. (Exhibit 508, 111.) What Burton Dull received in the
years before the takeover remains to be calculated.

B.

The Looting

We don't intend to milk [Le Mars] for a t least five
years.
-Carl Smith, Executive Committee, to
Russell W. Sandy, Le Mars Supervisor,
Deposition a t 48.

Burton Dull was correct in his remark a t the outset to Raymond Brown that "this venture can and will be advantageous and
profitable to all parties concerned." De Witt did not wait five
years to prove him right.
On the crucial date, April 21, 1970, De Witt took control of
Le Mars. From this point forward, with calculation and design,
De Witt milked Le Mars systematically over the succeeding seven
years. As with the Premium-Bribery, the direct Looting took on
various guises: The Management Contract-$190,000; Fabricated
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~x~enses-$103,000; Coerced Expenses-$449,000. (Exhibit
508.)
A warning is in order. Although the Looting was effected in
two stages, first by "contract," second without contract, the pattern was continuous from April 21, 1970, to mid-1977, and was
accomplished by the same stratagem: forcing Le Mars to purchase multifarious "services" from De Witt.
The Recoupment Letter
I think a Director can adequately serve two different
masters.
-William Couch, Executive Committee,
Deposition at 67.
I see no problem in representing both sides.
-George Howes, Executive Committee,
Deposition at 52.
I did not see anything inherently contradictory in my
position of President of both [De Witt and Le Mars].
-Carman Smith, Executive Committee,
Deposition at 50.

Perhaps the second most brazen De Witt-Alesch document
was the celebrated Dull-Brown Recoupment Letter. First, in the
Bribery Letter, Dull and Brown had spelled out for all to read the
exact terms of the De Witt Premium-Bribery. Now, in a second
gift to posterity, the coldly calculated intent of the parties was
again reduced to permanent record for all to read. The Recoupment Letter obligingly combined (1) an avowed intent to loot
with (2) an open admission of long-term planning and anxious
anticipation of the spoils:
I have not and will not attempt to prepare the agreement
between the Alesch Agency and Le Mars until after we have had
an opportunity of discussing this matter further. The provisions
of this contract, of course, will be the means of [De Witt's]
method of recouping its payment to the owners of the stock of
the Alesch Agency.
. . . It appears to me that everything is shaping up just as
we anticipated and I am sure that this venture can and will be
advantageous and profitable to all parties concerned.
-The Dull-Brown Recoupment Letter, Exhibit 19A.

Special attention should be paid to this Recoupment Letter of
Burton Dull to Raymond Brown. These two had put the deal
together for De Witt. A truism: A premium-bribe is never paid
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without recoupment in mind. De Witt did not pass $600,000 in
premium-bribe money without larceny a t heart. This Recoupment Letter identifies the brand of larceny: Management
"Services. "
1.

The Management Contract: $l9O,OOO
I,

To my knowledge, nobody represented Le Mars in purchasing the Managerrlent Services from De Witt
through the Alesch Agency.
-Carl Smith, Executive Committee,
Deposition a t 38.
When the Management Contract was negotiated, there
wasn't anyone representing Le Mars.
-Carman Smith, Executive Committee,
Deposition a t 52.

On that same April 21,1970, the little Alesch Agency became
the wholly owned subsidiary of De Witt. Any monies flowing into
the coffers of "this pup corporation" now flowed necessarily into
the coffers of De Witt. This little pup therefore could now serve
a third purpose. First, it had been the conduit for $400,000 of the
premium-bribe passing from De Witt to the Alesches. Next, it
carried De Witt dollars in premium-bribe from De Witt to John
Alesch for "Consultation" fees. Now, it was to be the conduit into
De Witt for a long series of false management fees flowing from
Le Mars. The flow was reversed. The total: $190,000, under the
"contract," April, 1970, to the end of 1973.

2

Alesch
$190,000
Agency

Pooh Bah
Q. And it was the Executive Committee of Le Mars
then that was working through the Alesch Agency to
manage Le Mars?
A. Well, the Executive Committee of De Witt too.
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Q . They were substantially the same people?
A. Yes.
-Raymond Brown, Executive Committee,
Deposition at 120.

Note well: after April 21, 1970, the Executive Committee
controlled all three boards, De Witt, Le Mars, the Alesch Agency.
De Witt

Le Mars

Alesch Agency

Carl Smith
Raymond Brown
William Couch
Carman Smith
George Howes

Carl Smith
Raymond Brown
William Couch
Carman Smith
George Howes

Carl Smith
Raymond Brown
William Couch
Carman Smith
George Howes

John Wilkinson
J. Ray Judge
D. M. Molyneaux
W. L. Rutenbeck

John Wilkinson
John Howes
John Alesch
Burton Dull
Melvin Gearke

John Alesch
John Breese

The upshot: The Executive Committee (as De Witt) suggested to
the Executive Committee (as Alesch Agency) that the Executive
Committee (as Alesch Agency) suggest to the Executive Committee (as Le Mars) t h a t perhaps Le Mars might retain Alesch
Agency to manage Le Mars. No matter that Le Mars was already
being ably managed by paid employees of Le Mars. No matter
further that "substantially the same people" were already being
amply compensated by Le Mars. If Pooh Bah could do it, why not
the Executive Committee? The result? A Management Contract
between Le Mars and the Alesch Agency:
WHEREAS Le Mars Mutual is in need of trained personnel
to manage their complete operation: The Alesch Agency agrees
to furnish such personnel and Le Mars Mutual agrees to pay the
Alesch Agency $2,500.00 per month for these services.
It is agreed that the Alesch Agency will furnish the services
of John Alesch to carry out this management contract.
-Management Contract, Exhibit 20.

This Management Contract was signed for Le Mars by Raymond Brown of the Executive Committee, and for the Alesch
Agency by William Couch of the Executive Committee who could
"adequately serve two different masters."
Throughout the entire term of this Management Contract,
the Alesch Agency was a total sham. The Alesch Agency had no
life of its own, but was staffed completely by Le Mars employees
already fully paid by Le Mars. Here was double compensation.
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Payment once by Le Mars to the individual employees. Payment
twice by Le Mars to De Witt through the conduit of the Alesch
Agency. John Alesch was right: "[Tlhis pup corporation could
be used for some other things in the business between the two
companies [Le Mars and De Witt]."
Through deposition after deposition of De Witt insider after
De Witt insider, it became embarrassingly, and culpably, clear
that Le Mars was the same after the takeover as before. The same
people continued to man Le Mars. Le Mars was the same old Le
Mars. But now suddenly on April 21, 1970, Le M a n needed all
kinds of help-some $190,000 in help under a Management Contract. (And $552,000 worth later without it.)
There was no change in personnel of Le Mars after the 21st of
April, 1970.
-William Couch, Executive Committee, Deposition at 47.

I don't recall any change in personnel of Le Mars on the 20th
day of April, 1970, as compared to the personnel that were employed on April 21, 1970, or April 22, 1970.
-Carman Smith, Executive Committee, Deposition at 24, 29.
Q . [I]f on April 22, 1970, Le Mars has retained John Alesch
as chief executive officer and chairman of the board, why would
they pay the Alesch Agency for his services?
A. I don't know that I can adequately answer that question.
-Carman Smith, Executive Committee, Deposition a t 29.

Q. And in your opinion, did John Breese [on full-time, $15,000
Le Mars salary] assume shortly after April, 1970, the. overall
management of Le Mars?
A. He did, with the help of the Executive Committee.
-Carl Smith, Executive Committee, Deposition a t 32.

The Clandestine Contract
Q. I show you the Management Contract between Le
Mars Mutual and the Alesch Agency.
A. I have never seen that before. I was not aware the
Le Mars Mutual was paying [De Witt] considerable
sums of money on a yearly basis when I resigned as a
Director [on July 1, 19761. I don't think I missed any
Board meetings [in 14 years].
-J. Ray Judge, De Witt Director,
Deposition at 13-14.

The Executive Committee did not want its looting known,
even to some of its own Board. The Executive Committee felt
guilty enough without facing the "outside" De Witt directors. J.
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Ray Judge was associated with De Witt for fifty years, knew Carl
Smith, his brother, his grandfather, was a director for 14 years,
missed no Board meetings to July 1,1976. Yet the entire deal was
concealed from him.
Thus did De Witt "recoup" from the Le Mars treasury
$190,000 of the original premium-bribe paid "to the owners of the
stock of Alesch, Inc."
2. Fabricated Expenses: $1 03,000

Q. I think you've already testified you were an employee of Le Mars all those years, were you not?
A. Right.
Q. When the Le Mars Board of Directors decided to
achieve a more favorable mix of business, would you tell
the Court what personnel achieved the results, to your
knowledge?
A. It would be the [Le Mars] in-house underwriters
and fieldmen.
-Donald Coats, Transcript at 1905.
Q . [Albout the only time you see the [De Witt]
Board Members is at the annual meeting?
A. Yes.
-Donald Coats, Transcript at 990.

But in mid-1973 the Insurance Department unobligingly
began to meddle in the matter. The result: The Department felt
constrained to suggest (as Richard Baldwin of the Department
put it (Deposition at 43)) "that Le Mars and Alesch abrogate
this agreement."
(Dolorous Interjection: The end of the Management Contract
saw the end of the personal fees collected by the Executive Committee. The cessation of false "services" meant the cessation of
false fees. (Exhibit 426, Alesch, Inc. B.S., 12-31-74.))
With the mandated end of the Management Contract, what
to do? The answer: a second gambit to "recoup" their "payment
to the owners of the stock of Alesch, Inc." With this new ploy, the
Executive Committee (as De Witt) whispered to the Executive
Committee (as Le Mars) that Le Mars might now be interested
in employing De Witt directly (and thus succeed the Alesch
Agency) for those manifold "services" that Le Mars had hitherto
successfully performed itself.
Again, expectably, the Executive Committee (as Le Mars)
concurred completely with the Executive Committee (as De

2271

CORPORATE CONTROL

249

Witt) and contract or no, De Witt milked Le Mars of an additional $103,000.
Nothing thus far was quite so bald as this $103,000. Recall:
The Executive Committee itself never even graced the scene a t
Le Mars. All the management of Le Mars was done by Le Mars
at Le Mars. Yet the Executive Committee of De Witt in De Witt
billed Le Mars $103,000 for "administration fees" by the Executive Committee of De Witt itself. De Witt admitted this openly
in Interrogatory No. 11. And this $103,000 only covered three
years, 1974, 1975, 1976. How can a competitor charge a competitor for nonexistent "services"?
Thus during this entire period the very persons performing
the De Witt "services" for Le Mars, and billed by De Witt against
Le Mars, were fully paid employees of Le Mars. By this second
gambit did De Witt "recoup" $103,000 of their "payment to the
owners of the stock of Alesch, Inc."
3. Coerced Expenses: $449,000
Q. Who negotiated the contract between Le Mars and
[De Witt] for the use of the computer?
A. There wasn't any contract provided.
-Raymond Brown, Executive Committee,
Deposition a t 116.
I see no problem in representing both sides as to how
much is to be paid.
-George Howes, Executive Committee,
Deposition a t 52.

We never asked anyone at Le Mars whether they felt our
charges were fair and reasonable.
-John Howes, De Witt Director,
Deposition a t 40.

But De Witt was not satisfied. De Witt's own Operating Expenses a t home needed pruning. How better than forcing Le Mars
to share the load? All across the board-stationery, computer,
telephone-Le Mars could help bear the burden. And the thought
was father to the deed: Some $449,000 in "services"-coerced
6
services"-were imposed on Le Mars by De Witt, charged
against Le Mars by De Witt, in the same three years, 1974, 1975,
1976, after the Insurance Department called a halt to the Management Contract. The Special Report of Arthur Young & Company (Exhibit 508,II) gives the breakdown through 1975. Le Mars
Interrogatory No. 7 covers 1976.
6
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And yet, all this time, as Melvin Gearke, longtime Le Mars
general manager so bluntly put it:
A. The only thing [De Witt] does for us is furnish computers
to kick out renewals that we used to do by manual typewriter.
They have nothing to do with underwriting a t all.
Q. The complete and total underwriting is done in Le Mars?
A. Done in Le Mars, yes.
-Melvin Gearke, Le Mars Officer, Director,
Deposition at 58.

In all, over seven years De Witt successfully extracted from
Le Mars a total of $742,000, without interest.

C. Embezzlement
[Tlhe following will outline John's understanding of
what will be expected from him and what in turn De
Witt will do in consideration [for control].
-The Dull-Brown Bribery Letter,
Exhibit 4.

At the end of the protracted bribe negotiations between De
Witt and the Alesch Group, De Witt finally committed itself to
pass $600,000 to buy the Board of Le Mars. The exact terms of
the bribery were detailed in the infamous November 19, 1969,
Bribery Letter: Alesch would deliver the Board if, but only if, De
Witt remitted $600,000.
Once thus committed, the "bribed" Alesch had no trouble
delivering the Board. All dutifully resigned. De Witt minions
moved in. This was "what was expected from" Alesch.
But "briber" De Witt had pledged $600,000. This was "what
in turn" De Witt would do to buy the Board. And $600,000 is a
lot of money. Whence De Witt's "consideration" for the Sale of
Control?
Now, in your ordinary garden-variety bribery, the briber
usually reaches into his own pocket, takes out his own dollars,
pays off the bribed, and takes over. Thus did De Witt, but only
up to a point. When De Witt paid the Alesches the $400,000
segment under the Agency-sale guise, and again with $21,400 of
the $46,000 "Consultant" segment, the bribe dollars did come
from the De Witt pocket. Thus far, garden-variety bribery.
But at that point De Witt either ran out of its own dollars,
or became inspired, or whatever. In any event, the garden-variety
bribery ended. Henceforth, De Witt would steal the bribe dollars
directly from the Le Mars till, and then pass them on to the
Alesches.
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Pension Payments. Thus inspired, De Witt first embezzled
from Le Mars $154,000 in cash which it paid over for the sole
benefit of the Alesch Group under the third, "Pension-Plan" segment of the bribe. This cash was readily traced by J.D. Hattam,
Insurance Auditor, Arthur Young & Company, (Transcript a t
260-61) to The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company of Toronto, Ontario, Canada: amount $154,131.53, check #80337, dated
April 20, 1970 (Exhibit 604). Thus, instead of paying this $154,000
segment of the premium-bribe itself, De Witt stole the dollars
from Le Mars and avoided the circuity of later recoupment.
"Consultant's" Contract. In this segment of the premiumbribe agreement, De Witt had agreed to pass John Alesch
$36,000. After De Witt had paid only $21,400 through its Alesch
Agency, it decided to steal the rest from Le Mars. For the last
years before his death, John Alesch got $14,600 of his premiumbribe dollars from the Le Mars till. The Special Report of Arthur
Young & Company carries the figures. (Exhibit 508, IV).
The Automobile. De Witt had included in the premiumbribe a free car, and upkeep. Here, too, De Witt decided to steal
the $10,000, or whatever, from Le Mars and thus satisfy its
premium-bribe obligations. By a convenient oversight De Witt
simply let the cost of the car and its daily upkeep come from the
Le Mars treasury. (Exhibit, Le Mars Interrogatories.) To this day
De Witt has never restored this outlay of $10,000 or more, thus
embezzled from Le Mars.
In all, therefore, De Witt embezzled $178,600 from Le Mars,
and used the dollars to bribe the Alesch Group. "Embezzled,"
because De Witt had full control of Le Mars and, more to the
point, fully controlled and engineered the two transactions. Most
importantly, both De Witt and the Alesch Group had long since
negotiated to this $178,600 in the "De Witt consideration" for
buying the Le Mars Board. The Alesch Group delivered the
Board, De Witt delivered the bribe dollars, of which $178,600 was
embezzled from Le Mars.

D. The Twice-Stolen Agency
I saw no conflict between John Alesch's personal interests and the corporate interests of Le Mars in having the
Alesch Agency in the offices of Le Mars.
-Carman Smith, Executive Committee,
Deposition at 21.
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[De Witt] bought the Alesch Agency to increase our
business in Northwest Iowa.
-Raymond Brown, Executive Committee,
Deposition a t 26.

That little "pup," the Alesch Agency, was the most maltreated being in this whole sordid tale, and its maltreatment was
not only through Premium-Bribery and Looting. The history
began with the Five Alesches and continued after April 21, 1970,
with De Witt.
1.

The Five Alesches
Q. Why was Alesch Agency given 700 square feet in the
new building, utility-free space?
A. The Agency had always been with the Company. It
always, even though it was separate, it had always been
in the same building.
-Melvin Gearke, Le Mars Officer,
Director, Deposition a t 84.

The early history of the Alesch Agency tells the story well.
From the day (and probably before) that John Alesch bought the
Alesch Agency from the Le Mars founder sometime before 1950,
every bit of the Agency, both Assets and Income, belonged wholly
to Le Mars. From the outset the Alesch Agency never had a life
of its own.. Le Mars supplied its Financing, Management, Overhead, Image and Goodwill. Le Mars in truth owned the Alesch
Agency, until the Five Alesches stole it, and all its income.

Financing
We each paid $50 a share for our stock in Alesch Agency.
-Alice Alesch, Deposition a t 12.

In the yean after its inception, and after John Alesch received it from the Le Mars founder, the Agency had been unincorporated. But in 1962 it became Alesch, Inc., and the Five
Alesches purchased it for a grand total of $15,000. (The very
Agency for which they received $516,000 some eight remarkable
years later.) This $15,000 valuation came more than a decade
after John Alesch took over. And why was its capitalization so
low? Because every cent of its Financing came from Le Mars.
When a corporation does not need to pay for salaries, furniture,
wages, utilities, overhead, or anything, self-financing is an effortless chore. Since John Alesch controlled Le Mars (as the founder
had before him), Le Mars most graciously supplied John Alesch
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(and the founder before him) with all the necessaries of corporate
life, free for the taking. From its first breath sometime before
1950, the Alesch Agency was the legitimate offspring of Le Mars.
Every bit of its being belonged to Le Mars.

Management
And Mr. Alesch ran his Agency and also managed the
company.
-Melvin Gearke, Le Mars Officer,
Director, Deposition at 84.

From the very first day that John Alesch took over the
Agency he was a full-time employee of Le Mars, receiving a fulltime salary. In 1970-the year the Five Alesches "sold" the
Agency-John Alesch received $17,400 as the chief executive officer of Le Mars. His sole obligation was to manage Le Mars. Yet
at the same time, on Le Mars time, at Le Mars expense, as the
top officer of Le Mars, John Alesch was managing and building
an insurance agency. The Agency's informative Federal Tax Return revealed that he was the while working 100 percent of his
time for Alesch Agency-no mean feat-at a salary of $9,000 in
1967, 1968 and $12,000 in 1969. (Exhibit 509-11.)
Thus, over the formative years of its life, this offspring of Le
Mars was being nurtured and protected, guided and guarded, by
Le Mars itself, in the person of its chief executive officer, on
company time, on company salary, at company expense.

Overhead
Q. To your personal knowledge, who handled the State
reports on accidents for the Alesch Agency?
A. The Claims Department of Le Mars, Le Mars Mutual.
-Donald Coats, Transcript at 981.
[Tlhere is reserved to John Alesch the right to use 700
square feet in the [Le Mars] building for the real estate
and insurance business of John Alesch.
-Deed of Land to Le Mars by John Alesch.

Nothing went into the formation and growth of the Alesch
Agency that did not come from Le Mars. For all the years the Five
Alesches "owned" the Agency, it lived as the ward of Le Mars.
With the lone exception of a monthly rental-at one period it was
only $100a month-every bit of overhead, the heat, the light, the
telephone, the desks, the typewriters, whatever, were contribu-
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tions of Le Mars to the support of its offspring. These monthly,
yearly, contributions enhanced the value of the Agency, and
added appreciably to the monthly, yearly income. Le Mars owned
the Alesch Agency. Add to this the invaluable clerical help, both
direct and the incalculable indirect, and the result is the same.
None of the Alesch Agency belonged to the Five Alesches.

Image and Goodwill
I knew the Alesch Agency would sell Le Mars policies. I
knew John would naturally get commissions on those
policies.
-Clyde Eastman, Le Mars Director,
Deposition a t 50.
John Alesch was probably one of our larger agents.
-Melvin Gearke, Le Mars Officer,
Director, Deposition a t 86.

Clairvoyance is not needed to discern the reason for housing
the Alesch Agency in the Le Mars headquarters. Le Mars is the
pride of the region. And the Home Office itself does not sell policies. The agents do. But the many regional customers of Le Mars
did not know this. Where to buy a policy then? Who better than
a Le Mars-approved agent, approved by none other than the top
Le Mars executive? One step across the hall-a change of hat.
John Alesch sold another policy.
Nor was that all. The prestige of the Le Mars headquarters,
the aura of the Le Mars highest officer, would aid sales inestimably. Would not, moreover, other agents butter their bread by
referrals when the problems of coverage were too recondite? Or
outside the letter of the permissible underwriting coverage?
Not only was the Agency the legitimate progeny of Le Mars,
but the Agency used this birthright to the utmost. And this too
was the just property of Le Mars itself.
Thus, every bit of its being, the entire Alesch Agency, from
its initial Financing long before John Alesch, to the notable dollars spent in Management and office Overhead, to its Goodwill
itself, all belonged to Le Mars. Nothing belonged to the Five
Alesches. In one sad word, the Alesch Agency, its total assets and
its income, had been surreptitiously and slowly stolen from Le
Mars.
Over the twenty-plus years, John Alesch took home uncounted undeserved dollars in full-time salary, while working
full-time for Le Mars. Over the same twenty-plus years, the Five
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Alesches skimmed off annual dividends in an untold amount.
However so much its true asset value, that value certainly
belongs to Le Mars. An accounting of the undeserved salary, and
the equally undeserved dividends, must be added to this value,
because Le Mars has a right to all returns from the Agency as
well.
2.

The Second Stealing
[De Witt] bought the Alesch Agency to increase our
business in Northwest Iowa.
-Raymond Brown, Executive Committee,
Deposition at 26.

De Witt has abused the Alesch Agency in many ways over
the years. The maltreatment of the "pup" continued from April,
1970, to the present, again in a second "usurpation of a corporate
opportunity." De Witt in its turn also proceeded to steal the
Alesch Agency.
Although never theirs to sell, the Alesches nonetheless had
"sold" the Agency to De Witt. Assume, arguendo, that De Witt
now had a legitimate investment (an assumption grounded on a
second assumption: that the Alesches disgorge the De Witt investment to Le Mars), what now? How is De Witt to recoup its
investment?
The baneful effects of the De Witt takeover of the Alesch
Agency were threefold, all illicit: (1)the marked Diversion of Le
Mars business to De Witt, (2) the illegal Conversion of Alesch
Agency annual Income-rightly Le Mars'-to De Witt, and (3)
the unjust Appropriation of the increment in Alesch Agency Asset
value-rightly Le Mars'-to De Witt. These three illicities coalesced into the Second Stealing.

In the Enemy Camp
From 1970 forward, the Alesch Agency sold policies of
Le Mars and also sold policies for De Witt. I do not see
any conflict.
-Carman Smith, Executive Committee,
Deposition at 68.
The weakest part of our business was in Northwest
Iowa.
-George Howes, Executive Committee,
Deposition at 18.
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We wanted the business from the Alesch Agency itself,
which a good deal of it had been going into other insurance companies. So, we was interested in getting that
business in De Witt.
-Raymond Brown, Executive Committee,
Deposition a t 26.

The Executive Committee could "not see any conflict" in
planting a De Witt-owned, De Witt-controlled outpost in the tenter of enemy headquarters. Before April 1970, the considerable
regional business a t the Le Mars Home Office was routed across
the hall to old John Alesch's personal pocket. Now the diversion
continued, but the pocket now was De Witt's. But this was a
diversion with a difference. True, John Alesch personally pocketed commissions that belonged to Le Mars, but at least John
Alesch placed his policies with Le Mars. Le Mars lost the Alesch
commissions, but kept the underwriting. Not so now with De
Witt. "They said it would give De Witt more outlet for our insurance. The purchase of the Alesch Agency would allow us to expand in Northwest Iowa." (J. Ray Judge, De Witt Director, Deposition a t 9.) Mr. Judge was right. Henceforward, the customer
still stepped across the same hall. And Le Mars still lost the
commissions. But now Le Mars lost the underwriting business as
well, "the business from the Alesch Agency itself, which had been
going into other insurance companies. So, we was interested in
getting that business in De Witt." And that they did.
So successful was De Witt "in getting that business in De
Witt," that the marked results appeared shortly. In the year 1970
the Alesch Agency had placed exactly zero business with De Witt.
Not one policy. But by 1974 the entire picture had changed. The
Agency billed over $60,000 in premiums alone for policies placed
with De Witt. In this short time, De Witt ranked second only to
Le Mars in business written by the Agency. De Witt received
more than double any other underwriter. Meanwhile, the placements by the Agency with Le Mars remained stagnant. (Exhibit
425(3).) De Witt indeed did succeed "in getting that business in
De Witt."
Somewhere, somehow, the exact figures on the extent of the
De Witt depredation will emerge. All that is patent now: De Witt
stole untold Le Mars business after the De Witt takeover. (Moreover, be assured that the De Witt incursions on Le Mars business
were not reserved exclusively to the Alesch Agency.)
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The Income Conversion
I remember that the Alesch Agency was producing an
annual net profit of somewhere around $35,000.
-Raymond Brown, Executive Committee,
Deposition a t 29.
John Alesch was probably one of our larger agents.
-Melvin Gearke, Le Mars Officer,
Director, Deposition a t 86.

The theft by De Witt of Alesch Agency income from Le Mars
followed the same modus furandi of John Alesch. The pattern was
virtually identical. The Overhead, Management, Goodwill, all
were the "gift" of Le Mars to De Witt. Le Mars produced the
Agency income, all to the profit of De Witt.
Overhead. In the Agency's Federal Tax Return for 1971, the
first year after the takeover, De Witt again obligingly laid it all
out on the record. The Alesch Agency showed no expenses whatsoever for rent, office space, utilities, telephone, or maintenance.
No overhead charges at all. Thanks to Le Mars. Just as they had
been for John Alesch, these contributions were an excellent augmentation to the income of the Agency, and De Witt. (Exhibits
512, 513, 424(10).)
But then came the year 1975, after De Witt in a surge of
prudence (induced no doubt by the instant litigation) decided to
lodge the Alesch Agency outside the Le Mars Home Office. The
comparative Overhead is revealing.
Telephone:
Utilities:
Repairs:
Office Supplies:
-Exhibit 427, Alesch, Inc.
B.S., 12-31-75

The De Witt Income Statement had been enhanced appreciably
over those years.
The fascinating interlude over the then rent-free status of the
Agency in Le Mars headquarters is instinct with insights into the
mentality of the Executive Committee and the extent to which
Conflict of Interest permeated its life. At one point the De Witt
Board found out that the Agency was living rent-free in the Le
Mars Home Office: "I first became aware that the Alesch Agency
was not paying any rent for office space in Le Mars, that information came out after the lawsuit came into being [May, 1973j."
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(John Wilkinson, Outside De Witt Director, Deposition at 44.)
But even then the Executive Committee simply could not bring
itself to make Le Mars whole with reasonable rent. In an uncontrollable spasm of magnanimity the rent was set at $150 per
month. And who set the rent? The answer came from Carman
Smith of the Executive Committee who did "not see any conflict"
in the situation:
Q. Were you aware that for a period of time after April, 1970
that the Alesch Agency was not paying rent in the home offices
of Le Mars?
A. I'm not sure I was aware of it then. I am now [1976].
Q. And who decided the amount of rent should be paid by the
Alesch Agency to Le Mars?
A. I think the Executive Committee of De Witt probably was
the determining factor on that, who decided.
-Carman Smith, Executive Committee, Deposition a t 40.

After t h a t the Agency Tax Return showed the $150 per
month-but nil else in Overhead.
The prudent move out of Le Mars headquarters saw the Rent
jump to $4,000 per year. (Exhibit 427.) Res ipsa loquitur.
Management. As in the days of John Alesch, so too in the
days of De Witt, the management of the Alesch Agency was supplied exclusively by Le Mars. In the three years before his death
but after the De Witt takeover, John Alesch, on a Le Mars salary,
managed the Agency. And if John Alesch happened to be absent,
who took over at the Alesch Agency? Another full-time Le Mars
executive, John Breese, on a full-time $15,000 Le Mars salary.
Q. Who operated Alesch Agency when your husband was in
the hospital?
A. John Breese.
-Alice Alesch, Deposition at 21.
Breese was working for the Le Mars. I know he helped Alesch
Agency a lot.
-Carl Smith, Executive Committee, Deposition at 25.
Q. Did the Alesch Agency pay Mr. Breese anything for the
services he rendered?
A. No.
-Carman Smith, Executive Committee, Deposition a t 39.

Goodwill. The Alesch Agency continued to bask in the sun
of the Le Mars Home Office. Again the regional public had no
idea of the true state of affairs. If an agency is housed in Le Mars
headquarters, it must be owned by Le Mars. If one wants to
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support home industry, how better than a t Le Mars? Could anyone even conceive that Le Mars' arch competitor, De Witt, could
own an agency in the Le Mars headquarters? Everything already
said of the Alesches' theft of the Agency income is also pat for De
Witt.

The Agency Increment
I was interested in getting the Agency because I thought
it was a great opportunity for us to secure business. We
had very little business in Northwest Iowa.
-Carl Smith, Executive Committee,
Deposition a t 9.

As the days passed, the "usurpation of corporate business
opportunity" continued apace, and the combined fruits of all De
Witt's marauding became manifest. Not only did De Witt cash
in on "a great opportunity for us to secure business" (ironic that
the word-and concept-should be used so opportunely), but the
little "pup" grew, too. The Le Mars input in dollars, in dollars of
Overhead, Management, and Goodwill, in added dollars of business from Le Mars' "largest agent," increasingly paid off. In the
five years after the takeover De Witt reported in its official Annual Statement to the Insurance Department that the little pup
had grown to a net asset value of $414,000 by 1975. By mid-1977,
query.
Yet all of this appreciable increment, all of it except $150 per
month, is referable to the input of Le Mars.
In the end, then, De Witt owes Le Mars calculable sums for
Diversion of Le Mars business to De Witt, Conversion of Alesch
Agency income to De Witt, in commissions, salaries, dividends,
and Appropriation of the increment in Alesch Agency asset value,
still "owned" by De Witt.
Only a thorough Accounting can uncover all these substantial sums.
For the most part, then, thus ends the tale of two cities. The
intrigue, deception, chicane, are truly worthy of a Dickensian
plot. It indeed was the worst of times for poor hapless Le Mars.
It was the best of times for De Witt, the Alesch Group, and the
Smith Group.
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The principle that a contract to resign a public office or
to exert influence to secure the appointment of another
is void against public policy has been too long established to require the citation of authority for its support

....

2

Q.
tors
A.
was

So actually, getting the designated Board of Direcwas part and parcel of this contract?
There isn't any question that the overall agreement
all A part of one overall transaction.
-Burton Dull, Deposition at 71.

Mr. Berle was indeed right when he said t h a t the
"phenomenon of 'control' is perhaps the most important single
fact in the American corporate ~ y s t e m . "Equally
~
important,
moreover, is the law, and the philosophy underlying the law,
governing that "control. "
Understandably, the overall law of corporate control encompasses a broad field. Every action of the contrbleur-that topmost
person in the corporate hierarchy-is regulated by the law of
corporate control. Necessarily these actions span the entire spectrum of corporate activity.
And within this spectrum of the contrbleur's manifold activities-and his corresponding obligations-the sale of his office for
a price poses the most arresting challenge to control law. Sale-ofControl Premium-Bribery calls into play all the major principles
of the philosophy of corporate control. Further, the overall philosophy finds its most impressive expression at that charged instant
when corporate control is sold for a price. Around the Sale of
Control, therefore, coalesce all the major concerns of this Brief.
The Le Mars Sale of Control will be approached from two
aspects: Premium-Bribery and Commercial Bribery.

A. Premium-Bribery
A trustee may not make use of his relations as such for
personal emolument. An agreement for a valuable consideration to abandon the trust or to transfer it to another is void.4
2. Aughey v. Windrem, 137 Iowa 315, 320, 114 N.W. 1047, 1049 (1908).
3. Berle, supra note 1, at 1212.
4. Aughey v. Windrem, 137 Iowa 315, 320, 114 N.W. 1047, 1049 (1908).
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Q. [Tlhe $500,000 wouldn't be paid unless there was
the replacement of the Board of Directors of Le Mars?
A. Well, the two transactions were tied together, all of
them. There is no question about that.
-Burton Dull, Deposition a t 40.

The thesis set for present proof is succinct: (1) The $600,000
premium-bribe passing from De Witt to the Alesch Group (2) to
buy control of Le Mars (3) is intrinsically illegitimate, (4) must
be disgorged by the Alesch Group and (5) paid over to the injured
entity, Le Mars. Proof will be laid out in three parts: The Law of
Strict Trust, The Intrinsic Illegitimacy of the Premium-Bribe,
and Disgorgement.
I.

The Law of Strict Trust
The authorities are agreed that the officers and directors
of a company are trustees . . . in the transaction of the
business and care of property of the corporation . . . ."
These mutual insurance companies arose on the back of
their founders.
-Milton Tappan, Le Mars Director,
Deposition a t 29.

From the day of its foundation in 1901, the GermanAmerican Insurance Company was under the absolute and untrammeled domination of its founder. A half-century later, this
same company, now Le Mars, passed into the absolute and untrammeled control of the founder's successor, John Alesch. No
proxy solicitation. No disclosure. Not even a quorum. The annual
meeting was a travesty.
John Alesch was the unquestioned contr6leur of Le Mars.
The policyholder owners never voted. And those who did vote
were office employees, malleable friends, or Alesch relatives. So
too with the Directors: they were officers, officers' wives, or cronies of John Alesch. Certainly no director questioned the Alesch
word.
Q. Do you recall, Mr. Vander Meer, any specific occasion during the ten to fifteen years when you were on the Board of Le
Mars when you took exception to any policy or recommendation
made by John Alesch?
A. No, I don't recall that I did.
-Peter Vander Meer, Le Mars Director, Deposition a t 21.
5. Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co.? 176 Iowa 362, 369, 157 N.W. 929, 931 (1916).
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Do not be misled, however. This unassailable control of John
Alesch was not a phenomenon peculiar to Le Mars. Rather, the
very genius of the mutual company encourages, even mandates,
this abuse of control by an omnipotent contrbleur. This is the
curse of the mutual system. It is inherently defective.
Confidence-Reliance-Dependence
The very selection for service is an expression of confidence, and the employment, the bestowal of power. The
shareholder selects the director to serve him in caring for
the corporate property. . . . Is he not thereby expressing his confidence? . . . He trusts all with the managing
officers, and naturally relies on them in all matters
touching his interest in its business and property."
Q . As President, do you recall any times when you
objected and told John Alesch?
A. No. He was a competent and able executive.
-Milton Tappan, Le Mars President,
Director, Deposition at 22-23.

The Supreme Court of Iowa-and the same must be said of
most jurisdictions-truly understands this most fundamental of
all corporate-control principles. The concise enunciation by the
Dawson court showed a remarkable g a s p of the ultimate basis of
corporate Strict Trust. As the Iowa court intimated, in constructing the bottommost foundation for the law of corporate control,
one can go no deeper, become no more basic, than this: the helpless entity is nakedly dependent-its assets, its structure, its personnel, its policy-on the raw power of the contrdleur. In the
contr6leur the owners have placed unquestioning confidence. On
the contrdleur, complete reliance, willy-nilly.
And so it was with Le Mars. Assets, policy, personnel, everything, were totally dependent on the will of John Alesch. On him
alone the policyholder owner "naturally relied." Their "very
selection" of John Alesch was "an expression of confidence."
Finally and most important, both confidence and reliance
are reducible to dependence. It is interesting that Webster gives
two direct synonyms for dependence: "reliance" and "trust."
The note of dependence is the element most expressive of the
true status of one who reposes confidence in another. A dependent person is subject to, in the power of, another. This depend-

-

6. Id. at 376, 157 N.W. at 933.
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ence is coterminous with the orbit of reliance or confidence. The
dependence in the one finds the correlative independence in the
other. . . .
No more ultimate constituent of the trust lies beyond or
beneath this dependen~e.~

The extent to which the Supreme Court of Iowa intuited this
ultimate concept is arresting:
The fiduciary relation may exist wherever special confidence is reposed, whether the relationship be that of blood, business, friendship or association, by one person in another when
they are in a position to have and exercise or do have and exercise influence over each other. Curtis u. Arrnagast, 158 Iowa
507.8

In the case of Le Mars, this confidence, reliance, dependence, was
total. In a word, Le Mars was in the complete custody of John
Alesch.

The Custodial Concept of Corporate Control
[The contrbleur] has custody only, not ownership.
The corporation is merely entrusted to an office, not
given to an individual. The custodian must guard, guide
and nurture the corporation as if it were his own, with
full knowledge that it belongs to another."
The directors have the custody and control of the assets
of the corporation for the benefit of those to whom they
belong . . . .10

The nexus is immediate between the confidence, reliance,
dependence, and the next logical development of the law of Strict
Trust. The human mind moves inexorably from the total dependence of the corporation to the Custodial Concept of Corporate
Control. Herein lies the first major trust concept.
In the theoretical-but very real-beginning of every corporation the shareholder owners in a deliberate appropriation entrust the corporate assets to the untrammeled dominion of that
necessary top-level authority, the contrbleur. In acquiescing to
this appropriation the contrbleur thereby assumes custody of
the entity, with all its duties and rights. Technically, therefore,
7. Bayne, Corporate Control as a Strict Trustee, 53 GEO.L.J. 543, 557 (1965).
8. Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 376-77, 157 N.W. 929, 933 (1916).
9. Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate Control, 112 U . PA. L. REV.22, 32 (1963).
10. Hoyt v. Hampe, 206 Iowa 206, 208, 214 N.W. 718, 720 (1927).
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corporate control is a relation of total custody subsisting between the subjective term, the office of control, and the objective term, the corpofate entity itself.I1

With continuing remarkable insight, the Supreme Court of Iowa
expressed this custodial concept in similar words:
The ordinary stockholder gives little or no attention to the details or control of corporate affairs. He trusts all with the managing officers, and naturally relies on them in all matters touching
his interest in its business and property. . . . [Plower akin to
that of an attorney, priest, agent or copartner is conferred on the
directors and officers by those selecting them to manage corporate affairs.I2

And again, with even greater directness:
The directors are primarily trustees for the corporation and
its stockholders, and it is their duty to manage the affairs of the
corporation and administer its assets in accordance with the law
and legal rights of all persons interested. . . . The directors
have the custody and control of the assets of the corporation for
the benefit of those to whom they belong . . . .13

From this foundation concept of custody the Iowa court moved
effortlessly to the inescapable conclusion:
The fiduciary obligation is to the stockholders in a body.
.

.

.

...

a

. . . Whether the corporation be treated as an enlarged and
amplified form of partnership, and the director as managing
partner, or whether he is called an agent or trustee, elected by
the stockholders to represent them in the management of the
concern, he occupies a fiduciary position.I4
Thus far-and they persist to the end-John Alesch, contrdeur,
and Le Mars, helpless beneficiary, verify every element of the
Custodial Concept of Corporate Control outlined by the Iowa
court.

Strict Trust
Since the scope of [the contr6leur'sl responsibility
is coterminous with the extent of the custody, it follows
11.
12.
13.
14.
(1916).

Bayne, The Noninvestment Value of Control Stock, 45 IND.L.J. 317, 333 (1970).
Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 376, 157 N.W. 929, 933 (1916).
Hoyt v. Hampe, 206 Iowa 206, 208, 214 N.W. 718, 720 (1927).
Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 376, 381, 157 N.W. 929, 933,935
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that the responsibility of [the contr6leurl is total because the entire corporate entity has been entrusted to
[the contr6leur.l l5
Equity holds them strictly accountable as trustees.'"

Nor did the Iowa court stop short with a watered-down definition of the "fiduciary duty" incumbent on the contrbleur. To
the Iowa court the logical consequences of custody were the rigid
stringencies of the Strict Trust. (And these stringencies include
notably the Benefit-to-Beneficiary and No-Inquiry Rules.)
"The fact that he is a trustee for all is not to be perverted
into holding that he is under no obligation to each. . . . That
he is primarily trustee for the corporation is not intended to
make the artificial entity a fetich to be worshipped in the sacrifice of those who in the last analysis are the real parties a t
interest. "I7

For a correct understanding of the Iowa embrace of Strict
Trust, note that the court draws the understandable dichotomy
between the contrbleur's Strict-Trust obligation to the corporation itself, and his quasi-trust duty to the shareholder in the
course of individual contrbleur-shareholder transactions. Thus,
although the contrbleur is a strict trustee to the entity, to the
private shareholder he is " '[nlot a strict trustee, since [the
contrbleur] does not hold title to the shares, not even a strict
trustee who is practically prohibited from dealing with his cestui
que trust, but a quasi trustee as to the shareholder's interest in
the shares.' "I8 Thus, when the Iowa court injects the qualifications "quasi trustee" into its definition, it intends only to qualig
the Strict-Trust duty of the contrbleur to the individual
shareholder, but not to the entity itself and its assets.
The Iowa court was hesitant to apply "strict trustee" to the
limited dealings with the shareholder because of the absence of
t h a t supposed Strict-Trust requisite: possession of title.
"Undoubtedly, he is not a trustee of the stockholder in the strict
sense, for he does not have title to the latter's stock. His relation
is that often denominated quasi tr~stee."~@Thus,only in direct
15. Bayne, supra note 9, at 33.
16. Holden v. Construction Mach. Co., 202 N.W.2d 348, 358 (Iowa 1972).
17. Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 379-80, 157 N.W. 929, 935 (1916)
(quoting Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 367, 45 S.E. 232, 233 (1903)).
18. Id. at 380, 157 N.W. at 935 (quoting Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 367, 45 S.E.
232, 233-34 (1903)).
19. Id. at 378, 157 N.W. at 934.
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dealings with the entity and its assets does Iowa hold the contrbleur to the full strictures of Strict Trust.
In later years this valid distinction occasionally becomes
blurred. Sometimes the Iowa court uses "quasi trustee" when it
means "strict trustee," and vice versa. Throughout this Brief,
however, the sole concern is the contrbleur's custody of the corporation, His dealings with individual shareholders never surface.
Hence the "possession of title" to the shareholder's shares is of
no matter. As to the contrbleur's title to corporate assets:
"[Flrom the custodial aspect, the formal passage of title means
nil. The property tenure of the corporate [contrbleur] is fully
tantamount to actual possession of title and could scarcely be
more complete."20Clearly, the unfettered domination of the contr6leur would not be any less fettered by formal possession of the
title to the assets. From a practical standpoint, the contrbleur has
tantamount to title to the entity.
Iowa, therefore, embraces fully the Strict-Trust tradition,
from beginning to present. In the 1972 decision in Holden, quoting the 1953 decision in Bechtel, the court employs the traditional
Strict-Trust rule: "[D]irectors of a corporation are the agents of
and act for it, and indirectly for its stockholders, and they are
trustees or quasi trustees, at least, of the property of the corporation for the company and its stockholder^."^^ And this rule was
later endorsed by the 1974 decision in Holi-Rest, Inc. v. Treloar. 22
The Iowa court, therefore, holds the contrbleur as a strict trustee
of the corporation, and a "quasi trustee, at least," of its stockholders.
,

The Benefit-to-Beneficiary Rule
"[Directors] impliedly undertake . . . to exercise the
powers conferred solely in the interest of the corporation
or the stockholders as a body or corporate entity, and
not for their own personal interest^."^"

The Iowa court in Schildberg nudged its Strict-Trust reasoning to the next logical level, to the most important Strict-Trust
20. Bayne, supra note 7, at 561.
21. Holden v. Construction Mach. Co., 202 N.W.2d 348,357 (Iowa 1972) (quotingDes
Moines Bank & Trust Co. v. George M. Bechtel & Co., 243 Iowa 1007, 1081, 51 N.W.2d
174, 216 (1952)).
22. 217 N.W.2d 517, 525 (Iowa 1974).
23. Schildberg Rock Prods. Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 767, 140 N.W.2d 132, 136
(1966) (quoting 19 AM. JUR. 2~ Corporatiom 9 1272 (1965)).
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corollary. Necessarily, Schildberg began by laying the StrictTrust base: "Our own and other decisions make it clear, and it is
conceded, that officers and directors . . . are trustees or quasitrustees of the corporate assets and occupy a fiduciary relation to
the corporation and its stockholders . . . ."24 From this point,
one inevitable step leads to the Strict-Trust Benefit-toBeneficiary Rule :
Because this dependence [of the beneficiary on the contr6leur] is total . . . the resultant responsibility is total. . . .
This total responsibility for the stewardship of another's
assets is merely a collective noun describing a complexus of
duties in regard to these assets. This complexus is the essence
of the benefit-to-beneficiary rule. This in turn is only another
way of saying that the custodian has a duty to care for the assets
entrusted to him as if they were his own.
This reasoning coalesces into one simple unqualified rule
enunciated in the Restatement: "The trustee is under a duty to
the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of
the beneficiary."25

Thus, to the Custodial Concept of Corporate Control must be
added the second major Strict-Trust concept: All benefit must
inure to the beneficiary.
And the Schildberg court did just that. Directors, as trustees,
must act for the benefit of the corporation, and not
for their own personal interest. It is the policy of the law to put
fiduciaries beyond the reach of temptation by making it unprofitable to yield to it. Accordingly an act by the fiduciary in which
personal interest and duty conflict is voidable a t the option of
the beneficiary, regardless of good faith.26

To that, the court added a formal statement of the Rule:
" '[Directors] impliedly undertake . . . to exercise the powers
conferred solely in the interest of the corporation or the stockholders as a body or corporate entity, and not for their own personal
interests.' "27 At another point the Schildberg court was even
more blunt in its statement of the Rule: In the face of a conflict
between contr6leur and corporation, if " 'the interests of the cor24.
25.
(1959).
26.
(1966).
27.

Id. at 766, 140 N.W.2d 136.
(SECOND)
OF TRUSTS8 170(1)
Bayne, supra note 7, at 565-66 (quotingRESTATEMENT
Schildberg Rock Prods. Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 766, 140 N.W.2d 132, 136

Id. at 767,140 N.W.2d at 136 (quoting 19 AM.JUR. 2~ Corporations 8 1272 (1965)).
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poration are betrayed, the corporation may elect to claim all of
the benefits of the transaction for itself, and the law will impress
a trust in favor of the corporation upon the property, interests and
profits so acquired.' ""
Which is to say that one who willingly assumes, as John
Alesch did, the stewardship of millions of dollars of "other people's money" has thereby agreed "to administer the trust solely
in the interest of the benefi~iary."~~
As in fact John Alesch did
agree formally, annually, with solemn signature, in the Le Mars
"Annual Policy Statement on Conflicts of Interest":
Insurance is a business dependent upon public confidence;
therefore the ethical and legal obligations of insurance company
officers, directors and responsible employees to act solely for the
benefit of the company cannot be overemphasized.
It is the policy of this company that no officer, director or
responsible employee should use his position in such a manner
that a conflict between the company's interests and his personal
interest arises.
-Le Mars Policy Statement, April 21, 1970.

This Policy Statement, prepared by Burton Dull, was signed formally by John Alesch and the Board on April 21,1970, the fateful
day of the Sale of Control. It was, and had been, an annual rite.
Clearly, John Alesch and his coterie of subservient directors knew
full well what the Iowa court meant. Nor does one need to be a
moral theologian to enunciate the Benefit-to-Beneficiary Rule.
Human nature defines clearly the duties of the steward.
The implications of Strict Trust and the Benefit-toBeneficiary Rule are pervasive. At every turn their cogency will
carry the day. But a t this moment a special emphasis is in order.
The doctrine . . . is but one phase of the cardinal
rule of undivided loyalty on the part of fiduciaries. Our
own consideration . . .is mainly in Ontjes v. MacNider,
. . . 232 Iowa 562, . . . which quotes at length with
approval from Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, . . .
a leading case in this area of the law.31
28. Id. at 768, 140 N.W.2d at 137 (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 273,5
A.2d 503, 511 (Sup. Ct. 1939)).
29. Bayne, supra note 7, at 565-66.
30. 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
31. Schildberg Rock Prods. Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 768, 140 N.W.2d 132, 137
(1966) (citations omitted).
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Guth v. Loft is indeed "a leading case in this area of the law,"
an area concerned exclusively with "the cardinal rule of undivided loyalty on the part of fiduciaries." More pertinently, Guth
has been (until the 1976 decision in Borden v. S i n ~ k e yby~ ~
the
Third Circuit) the prototypal Strict-Trust case in the United
States. Guth has been cited and quoted year after year across the
nation, as well as in Iowa.
More to the point, Iowa has paraphrased and adopted the
basic tenet of Guth, the Benefit-to-Beneficiary Rule: In a
conflict-of-interest situation, all profits are disgorged to the corporation, all losses are borne by the trustee. The transaction is
void.
"If an officer or director of a corporation, in violation of his
duty as such, acquires gain or advantage for himself, the law
charges the interest so acquired with a trust for the benefit of
the corporation, at its election, while it denies to the betrayer
all benefit and profit. The rule, inveterate and uncompromising
in its rigidity, does not rest upon the narrow ground of injury or
damage to the corporation resulting from a betrayal of confidence, but upon a broader foundation of a wise public policy that,
for the purpose of removing all temptation, extinguishes all possibility of profit flowing from a breach of the confidence imposed
by the fiduciary relation. Given the relation between the parties,
a certain result follows; and a constructive trust is the remedial
device through which precedence of self is compelled to give way
to the stern demands of loyalty. . . . Meinhard v. Salmon, 249
N.Y. 458 . . ."33

.

Note well: When Guth cites Meinhard v. Salmon, all the strictures of Partnership and Agency are in turn embodied into Guth,
and thence into Dawson, Hoyt, Ontjes, Schildberg, Holden, HoliRest, and the long Iowa line. When then-Chief Judge Cardozo
wrote Meinhard v. Salmon, he composed the finest statement of
the loyalty of a fiduciary. Partnership, Restitution, and Agency
law all impose Strict-Trust standards.

The Third Circuit's Borden
[Applying the doctrine first announced in Guth u.
. . imposed a constructive trust

Loft] the Court below .

32. 530 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1976).
33. Ontjes v. MacNider, 232 Iowa 562, 578, 5 N.W.2d 860, 869 (1942) (citations
omitted) (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270-71, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Sup. Ct.
1939)).
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in favor of the plaintiff on Sinskey's stock . . . . In addition, plaintiff was awarded . . . the profit . . . as well
as all salaries, director's fees and dividends received by
him . . . .34

Borden is the crown to this entire Brief, and to the entire
Iowa, and national, line begun by Guth. Borden is the capstone.
Borden affirmed unanimously a federal district court. Borden
denied a rehearing, en banc. The entire circuit, nine judges, approved.
And Borden applied Strict Trust with religious exactitude,
totally true to the Benefit-to-Beneficiary Rule. The corporate
trustee, in Conflict of Interest, disgorged every penny. Not only
the stock but the profit, fees, and dividends. Even the salaries
earned while working for the beneficiary.
However, even if we were now to order an accounting, we would
not permit Sinsky to retain the reasonable value of his services.
Although defendants may be able to distinguish the facts of
Guth . . . they cannot distinguish away the rationale of that
decision. . . . The [Guth] court refused to allow him to retain
any of the profits or benefits derived from his misconduct in
order to deter any disloyalty on the part of a corporate fidu~iary.~~

Here is the Strict Trust of Guth in both theory and application.
And so does Iowa follow: "We have quoted quite extensively
from this [Guth] case, inasmuch as it is our conclusion that this
late and well-reasoned expression of the Delaware court summarizes the general holdings of the various jurisdictions and the
several texts and authorities which we have c ~ n s u l t e d . " ~ ~
Guth, Dawson, Hoyt, Ontjes, Schildberg, Holden, Holi-Rest,
Meinhard, Borden, all join forces in laying the most stable StrictTrust foundation possible for Iowa, and everywhere.
(Further, the immediate corollary to the Benefit-toBeneficiary Rule is the No-Inquiry Rule: When the interests of
contr6leur and corporation conflict, no inquiry is made into the
fairness of the transaction. The deed is voidable at the option of the beneficiary. The No-Inquiry Rule is another necessary derivative of Strict Trust. Again expectably the Supreme Court of Iowa
has adopted the No-Inquiry Rule. But its applicability in this
Brief is discussed later.)
34. Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478, 486-87 (3d Cir. 1976).
35. Id. at 497-98.
36. Ontjes v. MacNider, 232 Iowa 562, 579, 5 N.W.2d 860, 869 (1942).
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But do not be confounded by terminology, or technicality.
No mystery enshrouds Strict Trust. The concept is elemental. If
someone entrusts his assets to another, the trustee must administer those assets as if his own, but for the exclusive benefit of the
owner. It is as simple as that.
(A transitional interjection must be made: The reasoning
thus far has produced the Custodial Concept of Corporate Control
and its immediate corollary, the Strict-Trust Benefit-toBeneficiary Rule. At the present juncture, Strict Trust forms the
foundation for the Intrinsic Illegitimacy of the Premium-Bribe.
Next, Looting. Later, for the Disloyalty of the contrbleurs. Then
for the law of "Corporate Opportunity." And so throughout the
Brief .)
2.

The Intrinsic Illegitimacy of the Premium-Bribe
[Tlhe transaction would have been none the less reprehensible from a legal point of view, for, as aptly said by
the trial court, "the office of guardian is not a matter of
commerce," and "an agreement to resign was against
public policy. "37
This Agreement shall not become effective unless and
until all of the present Directors of the Le Mars Mutual
have submitted their resignations and qualified successors, as designated by [De Witt], have been qualified
as Directors of the Le Mars Mutual.
-Agreement to Sell Stock, Alesches and
De Witt, Exhibit A, 3, 4.

John Alesch and his minions breached the categorical
Benefit-to-Beneficiary Rule in many respects, as will be analyzed
apropos. But the control breach-the acceptance of a premiumbribe from De Witt for control of Le Mars-was the breach that
triggered most of the others. This Sale of Control has two major
facets: (a,) the Premium-Bribe Itself, and (b.) the Triple
Turpitude. The former is simple. The latter, complex. But both
produce far-reaching results.
a.

The Premium-Bribe itself.
The questions is . . . whether [the contr6leurl is bound
to account for the money received from Levy for the
transfer to him and his associates of the management
-

37. Aughey v. Windrem, 137 Iowa 315, 320, 114 N.W. 1047, 1049 (1908).
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and control of the Life Union [Mutual], together with
its property and effects. The learned appellate division
has treated this transaction as a bribe paid to the directors . . . . The election of directors, and the transfer of
the management and property of the corporation, were
official acts, and whatever money he received from such
official acts were moneys derived by virtue of his office,
for which we think he should account.38
The above is all subject to the election of Directors approved by De Witt.
-The Dull-Brown Bribery Letter,
Exhibit 4.

New York's highest court was the first to characterize the
price paid for corporate office as a plain old bribe, and bribe it
is. The modern term "premium-bribe" has arisen as more apt
because the corporate bribe is most often "hidden" in a
66
premium," an extra little bonus added somewhere, e.g., in a sale
of a stock block (most complex Sale-of-Control cases feature a
"premium" over market for the contr6leur's personal shares), or
perhaps in the collateral sale of an insurance agency, or wherever.
But "bonus," or "premium, " or "premium- bribe, " no matter.
The result is the same: Bribery.
De Witt and the Alesch Group left no necessary facts unstated in their methodical chronical of all the requisite elements
of Premium-Bribery. Premium-Bribery is contractual, and the
terms of the De Witt-Alesch agreement were summarized with
precision in one eye-opening document: the Dull-Brown Bribery
Letter.
Absent, moreover, are the subtleties so irritatingly present in
the usual Sale of Control of the complex stock company. With Le
Mars not only were all the facts set down unabashedly in print,
but no complicated stock ownership beclouded the issue. The
Alesches owned no Le Mars stock to sell. In fact the Alesches
owned nothing of Le Mars at all. So verification of PremiumBribery is effortless.
From that one principal document, the brazen Bribery Letter, plus the several supporting records and myriad confirming
facts, emerges the technical definition of Premium-Bribery:
Broken down into its five principal parts, the sale-of-control
premium-bribe can thus be technically defined as (1)some form
38. McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 80, 55 N.E. 388, 389 (1899).

CORPORATE CONTROL
of consideration, monetary or otherwise, (2) flowing to the incumbent contrdeur, (3) from or on behalf of the prospective
contrhleur, (4) to induce the appointment to the office of control, (5) paid knowingly, scienter. 3n
Each of these parts is realized in the Alesch Sale of Control t o De
Witt.

-Monetary

Consideration-

Broken down . . . (1)some form of consideration,
monetary or otherwise . . . .40
[Tlhe following will outline . . . what in turn De Witt
will do in consideration therefor.
-The Dull-Brown Bribery Letter,
Exhibit 4.
The first of many problems facing the fact-finder in
the analysis of the premium-bribe is the ascertainment
of some consideration. . . .
The chore for the fact finder is simple when the
consideration is cash and the parties make no attempt
to hide it.41
Undoubtedly, a n d justifiably, inspired by a deep distrust of
each other, both the Alesch Group and De Witt insisted on lawyerlike exactness in t h e terms of the premium-bribe. Fortunately
for present proof, the three segments of De Witt's "consideration
therefor" were preserved with unlawyerlike permanence in letter,
contract, and memorandum.

The "Sale" of the Agency
Without the onerous, and sometimes impossible, chore
of segregating the true investment value of accompanying shares, the [De Witt] premium stands stark, in the
words of the Appellate Division, "as a bribe."42

Q . [Tlhe $500,000 wouldn't be paid unless there was
the replacement of the Board of Directors of Le Mars?
A. Well, the two transactions were tied together, all of
them. There is no question about that.
-Burton Dull, Deposition a t 40.
39.
(1969).
40.
41.
42.

Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition, 53 MINN.L. REV.485,497

Id.
Id. at 498.
Id. at 492-93.

274

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I979

The sham sale of the Alesch Agency was the conduit for
$400,000 of the total premium-bribe. This final figure represents
the premium paid by De Witt over the actual value of the Agency:
Contract Price Paid:
Liquid Assets:
Premium-Bribe:

$500,000
100,000
$400,000

The contract price paid by De Witt to the Alesches was first
reached in protracted negotiations beginning some time before
November 12, 1969, (about the time the Employers Mutual
premium-bribe of $450,000 was rejected) and culminating in the
formal Agreement to Sell Stock of February 26,1970, prepared by
Burton Dull and signed by the Five Alesches, and Carman Smith
and Raymond Brown of the Executive Committee of De Witt.
The going-concern value of the Agency, as estimated by expert and layman alike, was zero, beyond of course the $100,000
in cash on hand. Faced with a certain cessation of Le Mars support (upon sale to competitor De Witt), loss of Le Mars policies,
the inception of real-life overhead and management salaries, the
Agency would be worthless. The liquid $100,000 in the Agency
till, therefore, was the Agency's total value. This amount, of
course, was recognized by the various agreements and letters as
deductible from the base price.

The "Consultant's Contract
"

As with the other facets of premium-bribe consideration, the only limit to the variety of corporate disbursement is human resourcefulness.43
Perhaps the most common method of corporate
payment is the unearned-salary or consultation-fee device.44
We understood you only wanted a desk available when
you occasionally would come to the office.
-De Witt to John Alesch, Exhibit 93.

The identification of the $46,000 in unearned fees as
premium-bribe dollars is airtight:
(1) The Bribery Letter specified "what in turn De Witt will
do in consideration therefor." De Witt promised: "Alesch will
43. Id. at 502.
44. Id.
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work for Alesch Agency for a period of three years for $1,000 per
month," and Alesch will receive "the same type of automobile,
and the operating expe~isestherefor." Thus, some $36,000 over
three years (April 1970 to Alesch's death in May 1973) passed to
Alesch, pursuant to De Witt's word. Another $10,000, minimum,
passed in the free automobile. As a further fillip, the Consultant's
Contract between De Witt and Alesch embodies the terms of the
Bribery Letter in a formal contract.
(2) Lest there be any doubt that the dollars in unearned
fees and free car were part of the premium-bribe, the Contract
obligingly tied together "(1) this Consultant's Contract and (2)
the Sales Agreement between the owners of the stock of the
Alesch Agency and De Witt." This "Sales Agreement" of course
bought the Board.
That John Alesch actually received $46,000, minimum, is
indisputable. That the $46,000 was actually unearned is equally
indisputable. The "consultation" was a mockery to begin with.
But as the event had it, John Alesch was not even allowed to
counsel, had he wished to do so (which occasionally he apparently
did): "I am a t a loss as to know just what is expected of me, since
I am not advised or asked of any changes. [I am] left in the
cold." Thus John Alesch to De Witt. (Exhibit 95.) To which, De
Witt: "We understood you only wanted a desk available when you
occasionally would come to the office."

The "Pension Plan"
A sum in the amount of $154,131.53 for Single-Premium
Annuities payable to The Manufacturers Life Insurance
Company of Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
-Check Number 80337, April 20, 1970,
Exhibit 604.
The kinds of consideration are limited only by the ingenuity of human desire. Consider, for example, a cumulative pattern of Christmas gifts, a long-term low-interest
loan, or perennial purchases below market.45

Or even better, a resignation-day farewell in the form of fully
funded pensions for life, all around. The "human desire" was
great indeed, but the "ingenuity" was not too ingenious, since the
Alesch Group and De Witt again strewed the evidence of the
single-premium payment all across their books of account, check45. Id. at 499.
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books, meeting minutes, Bribery Letter, and on and on. Nothing
is more readily ascertainable than the $154,131.53 in the lumpsum outlay for the new "Pension Plan" for the Alesch Group,
instituted by De Witt on April 21, 1970.
In all, the three segments of the Bribery Letter totalled up
to $600,000 in monetary consideration:
(1) The "sale" of the Agency:
(2) The "Consultant's" Contract:
(3) The "Pension Plan":

The Total Premium-Bribe:

No technical niceties complicated or obscured the premiumbribe. It was spelled out in document after document.

-To

the Incumbent Contr8leur-

Broken down . . . (2) flowing to the incumbent controleur [the Alesch Group] . . . .46
,

On April 20, 1970, Single-Premium Annuities were purchased for all of the "old" Directors of Le Mars.
-J.D. Hattam, Insurance Auditor,
Arthur Young & Co., Transcript
at 260-61; Exhibit 604.
On occasion, the premium-bribe consideration is
not only visibly present but its path to a point of rest in
the controleur is also unmistakable. More often, however, the path is more like a maze.47

But always obliging, the Alesch Group and De witUteschewed
the "maze," and tracked a highly traceable spoor along a straight
"path to a point of rest in the contr6leur." But once arrived at
the contr6leur, the task becomes moderately complicated.
The dollar amount of total premium-bribe has been clearly
established at $600,000. Once in the hands of the Alesch Group
this was divided up exactly according to the share of each in the
control of Le Mars. J.D. Hattam, Insurance Auditor, Arthur
Young & Company (Transcript at 260-61) itemized every dollar
received by each family member.
The broad analysis of the distribution of the $600,000 splits
the Alesch Group into three categories, arranged hierarchically
according to their roles in the power structure:
-

46. Id. at 497.
47. Id. at 499.
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(1) John Alesch was incontrovertibly the contr6leur of Le
Mars. Any threat to his position was indiscernible. Hence he
received the "lion's share": $218,000, of which $100,000 was
"hidden" in the Agency "sale," $46,000 was for silent "counsel,"
and $72,600 was in a lump-sum "pension."
Even the share of the four Alesch women was proportioned
to their control positions. Of the full $400,000 from the Agency
"sale," wife Alice, who was a director momentarily, received
$100,000. Add to this a "pension" of $4,000 for her momentary
service, "even though she has only been on the Board for two
years, in view of her long and loyal service . . . and as wife of
John Alesch" (as the Minutes of the fateful April 21, 1970, so
considerately admitted). The three daughters received in all only
$200,000 for acceding to the Premium-Bribery. Some $66,667 per
filial signature.
The Five Alesches, father, daughters, wife, received a grand
total of $522,600 of the total premium-bribe.
(2) President Tappan and wife Wilhelmine, daughter of the
Le Mars founder, alone composed the second category. Since 1967
Milton Tappan had been retired in Lauderdale (when he quit his
$38,000 a year longtime job as chief of Johnson Biscuit in Sioux
City), but he and Wilhelmine had been powerful forces to reckon
with (as his Deposition flavorfully attests: "[Alnd if you want
to know why I went to Florida, because you're sticking your nose
into so damned many impertinent things, I had an occluded artery in my leg." (Deposition at 12, 13.)) So powerful in fact were
the Tappans that they alone commanded a total of $58,000 in
"Pension Plan" resignation-day, farewell dollars. And the Tappans were the most sophisticated-and hence most culpable-of
the Alesch Group. Undoubtedly their sophistication enhanced
their command of a premium-bribe. Further they had been more
intimately privy to all five major malefactions.
(3) The "lesser parties" of the Alesch Group received their
share of the $600,000 premium-bribe in the lump-sum singlepremium annuities granted the same day, April 21, 1970. The
total: $19,400. As Burton Dull said to Raymond Brown in another
context, this permitted "us to make the desired changes with the
least amount of objections." (Exhibit 39.)
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the Prospective Contrhleur-

Broken down . . . (3) from or on behalf of the prospective contr6leur [De Witt]. . . .48
[Tlhe following will outline . . . what De Witt in turn
will do in consideration therefor.
-The Dull-Brown Bribery Letter, Exhibit 4.
As with the identification of the consideration and
its proven reference to the incumbent [Alesch Group],
the verification of the third element is at worst not a
greatly demanding assignment for the fact-finder.J9

In his four-page Bribery Letter to De Witt, Burton Dull,
"with the concurrence of John Alesch," detailed the exact terms
of the premium-bribe. These terms have totalled $600,000 and
represented "what in turn De Witt will do." Thus far the spoor
is unmistakable.
But a t this turn in the tracking, the pattern of guilelessness
disappears. And a recent admonition is pertinent in tracing the
$600,000 directly to (or better, "from") De Witt:
Whether there is a patent payinent directly from the appointee himself [De Witt], or indirectly from some third party,
or a complicated series of moves from the controlled corporation
[Le Mars], one overriding principle prevails-the consideration must be the responsibility of the appointee [De Witt].
Regardless of appearances, all three sources must be reducibly
the same.50

-

For the first time in this unfolding tale, the actors have,
probably unwittingly, camouflaged their actions. Not fully, but
somewhat. The premium-bribe totalled $600,000. As to $421,400
of this $600,000, De Witt openly and deftlessly reached into its
own pocket and paid the Alesch Group, first, $400,000 via the
sham "sale" of the Alesch Agency and, second, $21,400 of the
promised $36,000 in "Consultation" fees. Thus far there was "a
patent payment directly from the appointee," De Witt.
But with the remaining $178,600 of the $600,000 premiumbribe, the matter was entirely different. Perhaps it would be flattery to credit De Witt with "a complicated series of moves,'' but
the fact remains that this $178,600 was not "a patent payment
directly from" De Witt. Rather, the $178,600 came "from the
48. Id. at 497.
49. Id. at 500.
50. Id. at 501.
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controlled corporation" itself, Le Man. But this gambit was not
exactly a De Witt invention. The ploy was slightly devious, but
far from original:
Although definitely begging a later question [which is so
true here and now], nearly every successful premium-bribe is
sooner or later recouped from the corporation [Le Mars].
Often, however, the new appointee [De Witt] avoids the circuity of a personal payment and later recoupment by an immediate raid on the [Le Mars] corporate till.5'

Which, of course, is exactly what appointee De Witt did. Putting
the matter grossly, and tracing the circuity move by move, one
can see that De Witt simply stole the $178,600 directly from Le
Mars and paid it over to the Alesch Group, pursuant to agreement. Fortunately, as has been true thus far, De Witt and the
Alesches left none of this complicated circuity to conjecture.
Every step was tracked:
(1) Complicated negotiations over several months finally
crystallized the total premium-bribe at $600,000, and reduced the
terms to writing in the Bribery Letter. The repetition of the terms
in several other documents left no doubt that the remaining
$178,600 unpaid balance of the total $600,000 was integral to the
premium-bribe. This $178,600 balance was broken down into
$14,600 of Consultant fees, the $10,000 in free automobile and the
$154,000 embedded in the "Pension Plan." The amount was highlighted as "what in turn De Witt will do in consideration." This
was Burton Dull, "with the concurrence of John Alesch."
(2) To this specific inclusion of the $178,600 in the terms of
the premium-bribe, De Witt replied: "Our Executive Committee
are in complete agreement with the proposal outlined in your"
Bribery Letter. (Exhibit 3.) The deal was sealed.
(3) The formal commitment of De Witt (covenanted in the
"Consultant's" Contract) to the full payment of the $36,000 in
"Consultation" fees and the $10,000 in automobile was later confirmed and ratified over many months of actual payment. The
remaining unpaid debt of $24,600-of the total $46,000-needed
no further proof than the acknowledged part payment of the
$21,400 already made. (Exhibit 508, IV.) Once De Witt confirmed
the total amount due of $46,000 by actually paying John Alesch
$21,400, that partial remittance attested incontrovertibly to full
commitment to the remainder, the $24,600.
51. Id. at 502.

*
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(4) The facts surrounding De Witt's assumption of liability
for the $154,000 segment of the premium-bribe are equally confirmatory. This lump-sum, single-premium "Pension" fund was integral to the $600,000 premium-bribe. The amount was itemized
specifically in the Dull-Brown Bribery Letter. (Exhibit 4.)
Lest any doubt remain that the $154,000 "consideration
[was] the primary responsibility of the appointee [De Witt],"
De Witt waited till after the takeover of Le Mars to do the deed
personally. Make no mistake: This delay was no accidental happenstance. De Witt waited till after the takeover because the
Alesch Group insisted that De Witt wait. Because De Witt had
agreed to pay the full $600,000. Because that was essential to the
deal. Because the $154,000 was part of the premium-bribe. Because the Alesch Group was not-about to be guilty of looting Le
Mars. Note this last point well.
Thus on the day the $154,000 passed from De Witt to the
Alesch Group, De Witt was in charge at Le Mars. The deed was
done by De Witt: "BE IT RESOLVED that . . . in consideration
of the long and continued service . . . as Director . . . commenting on the first day of May, 1970 . . -.a Single Premium Annuity
. . . ." (Minutes, Le Mars Annual Meeting, April 21, 1970.) The
motion was made by Raymond Brown, seconded by George
Howes, both of the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee was true to its word, and the terms of the Bribery Letter.
De Witt did do the deed.
So in the end, the entire $600,000 premium-bribe was "the
primary responsibility of the appointee," De Witt. Of that,
$421,400 came in "a patent payment directly from the appointee," De Witt, and $178,600 "in a complicated series of moves
from the controlled corporation," Le Mars. But all were the responsibility of De Witt.

-To

Induce the Appointment-

Broken down : . . (4) to induce the appointment to
the office of control . . . .52
This Agreement shall not become effective unless
and until successors, as designated by [De Witt], have
been qualified as Directors of the Le Mars Mutual.
-Agreement to Sell Stock, Alesches
and De Witt, Exhibit A, 3, 4.

52. Id. at 497.
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The innermost essence of bribery, and correspondingly of the premium-bribe, lies in its purpose. . . .
. . .If the goal is not the appointment to the office,
the premium-bribe is absent. . . . To induce the incumbent [Alesches] to appoint must be, by definition,
the sole purpose of the considerati~n.~~

The De Witt intent to "induce the appointment[s]" to the
directorate of Le Mars was reduced to formal writing a t least
twice. Once, explicity, in the Agreement to Sell Stock. Twice,
again explicitly, in the Bribery Letter: The three segments, totalling $600,000, are "all subject to the election of Directors approved
by De Witt."
To the same effect were references passim in various letters
and depositions. Item: "There isn't any question that the overall
agreement was all a part of one overall transaction." (Burton
Dull, Deposition at 71.) Item: "I will bring the certified check
with me. [I]n turning over control of Le Mars Mutual on April
21 . . . ." (Raymond Brown to John Alesch, Exhibit 41.) Item:
"Well, the two transactions were tied together, all of them. There
is no question about that." (Burton Dull, Deposition a t 40.) And
more and more.
-Paid

Knowingly, Scienter-

Broken down

. . . (5) paid knowingly, s ~ i e n t e r . ~ ~

In accordance with the conversation which John
and I had with you, enclosed are copies of what we feel
is our understanding . . .
-Burton Dull to Raymond Brown,
Exhibit 19A.

.

Our Executive Committee are in complete agreement.
-Raymond Brown to Burton Dull,
Exhibit 3.

The real question is not going to be the simple one of
"scienter, paid knowingly," but rather "scienter, paid deliberately, callously, with long months of malice aforethought." The
full extent of moral culpability-of assent of intellect and freedom of will-was reiterated in the countless instances of calculated planning that characterized the Sale-of-Control PremiumBribery of De Witt and the Alesches.
53. Id. at 503-04.
54. Id. at 497.
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The fact of Premium-Bribery is simple. The law, complex.

b.

The triple turpitude.
In the entire control spectrum, the legitimacy of the
premium-bribe is probably the most basic, the most
vexing, and certainly the most recurrent question.55
For the avoydinge of corrupiron, Be it therefore enacted by the Kinge
. That yf any person bargayne or
sell any Office . . . everie suche person . . . shall ymediatlye . . . be adjudged a disabled Person in the
lawe. . . .
And be it also enacted
. That all and everie
suche Bargaynes . . . shalbe voide . . . .56

.

*.

..

The fact of the premium-bribe has been established. The five
essentials of the definition have been verified. With these factual
necessaries in hand, the positive argumentation resumes.
The painstaking study of Strict Trust has thus far progressed
through the Custodial Concept of Corporate Control and its immediate corollary, the Benefit-to-Beneficiary Rule. The Alesch
Group, in assuming complete dominion over Le Mars, correspondingly assumed complete responsibility for its well-being:
In one indivisible act the contrbleur accepts the absolute
stewardship of the entity and thereby acknowledges, and
accedes to, the mandatory norms of corporate excellence. At
that moment he becomes a strict trustee, with all the demands
of unswerving loyalty and devotion to corporation and shareholders. He assents unreservedly to every implication of the
benefit-to-beneficiary rule.57

The applicability of the Benefit-to-Beneficiary Rule extends
to every facet of the contr6leur's conduct of corporate affairs.
Necessarily the Rule is not limited solely to the context of the
Sale of Control. In its broadest application, the Rule specifies
three "major objectives: (1)the erection of the best possible corporate structure; (2) the employment of the most enlightened
managerial policy; (3) the selection of the most competent pers ~ n n e l . "Of~ these
~
three all-encompassing goals, the first has only
limited impact on Le Mars. The second certainly governs much
55. Bayne, The Sale-of-ControlPremium: The Intrinsic Illegitimacy, 47 TEX.
L. REV.
215, 216 (1969).
56. An Acte againste buyinge and sellinge of Offices, 1551-52, 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 16.
57. Bayne, supra note 55, at 220 (footnote omitted).
L.Q.49, 59 (1965).
58. Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Quandary, 51 CORNELL
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of the conduct of both the Alesch Group and De Witt. These two
are for later.
But the third, the Selection of Competent Personnel, affects
intimately the choice of a successor to John Alzsch. Of all the acts
of John Alesch, contrhleur, the most crucial by far was his appointment of De Witt as his successor. At this instant, the third
subduty of the Benefit-to-Beneficiary Rule has preeminent applicability:
As important as is the chairman, the chief executive officer, the
operating head, the board, nevertheless the role of the successor
to the contr6leur is transcendant. Those norms of selection of
personnel that governed the incumbent contr6leur during tenure, guide him as well in departing that tenure, in the proper
and beneficial transfer of control. The choice of a successor is
undeniably the crowning act of the contrdeur's career, as well
as his last, and hence invites the commensurate scrutiny of the
standards of a fiduciary.59

All this is an elemental deduction from the Benefit-to-Beneficiary
Rule. The entire future of Le Mars rested with De Witt. Yet, to
buy the appointment, De Witt passed a $600,000 premium-bribe
to the incumbent Alesch Group.
At this point the reasoning leads to the next major proposition: The premium-bribe is in its essence corrupt. "For the avoydinge of corrupih, everie suche Bargaynes shalbe voide." This
proposition supports the remainder of the Brief.
[Tlhe legitimacy, or illegitimacy, of the premium-bribe is focal
to every later sale-of-control analysis-the suitability of the prospective contrdleur [De Witt], the culpability of the incumbent
[Alesch Group], possible damages, the disposition and role of
the premium-bribe itself. . . .
. . . Here all the theories and principles push forward for
concrete dollars-and-cents application in day-to-day interplay."'

This one statement would seem to encompass most of the pending
issues.

The Suitability of the Successor
From the aspect of either contrdleur or successor,
therefore, the rule is clear: The benefit to beneficiary
and the suitability of the appointee are the only legiti59. Bayne, The Sale of Corporate Control, 33 FORDHAM
L. REV.583, 591-92 (1965).
60. Bayne, supra note 55, at 216-17.
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mate considerations at the time of appointment. Suitability is the sole final cause that may flow legitimately
into the selection of the new c ~ n t r d l e u r . ~ ~
All these Defendants, Howes, Smith, the Defendants of
De Witt, I said I never heard of these fellows, never even
heard of them.
-Clyde Eastman, Le Mars Director,
Deposition a t 59.
When we submitted our resignations I had no idea who
would replace us.
-John Vollmar, Le Mars Director,
Deposition at 23.

The heart of the corruption inherent in the premium-bribe, therefore, is the appointment of a new contr6leur for any reason other
than his suitability. With the Alesch Group, the "reason other"
was premium-bribe dollars. The suitability of "these fellows" was
far from the Alesch thoughts.
Interestingly, however, the blame lay equally on De Witt.
The Alesch Group was bribed. But De Witt did the bribing. And
De Witt had already agreed to the stewardship of Le Mars.
At that split conceptual second when the premium-bribe is
changing hands the fiduciary duty of a strict trustee rests with
exactly equal weight on the outgoing contrdleur and the incoming appointee. At this transitional moment corporate custody is
being entrusted by the one and accepted by the other. The
bonum commune of the entity rests in a delicate balance between incumbent and successor. Each consequently faces the
identical custodial obligation defining the suitability of the
successor-contr61eur.62

Henceforward, remember that De Witt and the Alesch Group had
conspired together, over many months, to pass and receive the
premium-bribe. Each had assumed the custody of Le Mars.
Wherein, therefore, lies the "corrupEon " inherent in the
premium-bribe? "The totality of the turpitude of the premiumbribe consists of three conceptually distinct elements caused by
separate breaches of fiduciary duty, each with its own peculiar
contribution and coalescing into a distinctive moral unit ."" Each
of these three elements will apply separately to different divisions
-

--

61. Id. at 221.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 221-22.
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of the Brief, as will appear apropos. This triple turpitude of
Premium-Bribery has been described as
(1) the perversion of the judgment of the incumbent contrbleur,
engendered by an appointment of a successor induced by a
cause other than suitability, (2) that is, for consideration illicit
in itself, (3) resulting in the appointment of a candidate unsuitable by reason of his own active role in the i n d ~ c e r n e n t . ~ ~

Each of these distinct elements must now be pulled out and explored separately, because each is intertwined with each, and all
three together comprise one indivisible act, Premium-Bribery .
But only one, the second, applies directly to the instant problem:
disgorgement of the premium-bribe dollars into the Le Mars
treasury. The first and third will be picked up later.

The Perversion, the Principal Illegitimacy
Moral turpitude is the deviation from acknowledged
norms of conduct. Any digression from the straight path
to the goal of a suitable successor is culpable. . . .

....

. . . This is perfectly true of the premium-bribe
perversion. No part of the illicit cash has any relation
whatsoever to the suitability of the s u c c e ~ s o r . ~ ~
Q . [Tlhe $500,000 wouldn't be paid unless there was
the replacement of the Board of Directors of Le Mars?
A. Well, the two transactions were tied together, all of
them. There is no question about that.
-Burton Dull, Deposition at 40.

Both the Alesch Group and De Witt had agreed to act in all
things for the benefit of Le Mars. Both recognized that the appointment of the all-powerful contrbleur entailed the maximum
potential of benefit-or of evil-for ~e Mars. If ever they were
bound "to act solely for the benefit of the companyw--as they
swore in the Le Mars Policy Statement-it was then.
Yet this sole objective was pushed aside. No longer was the
welfare of Le Mars the consideration. Rather, premium-bribe dollars supplanted suitability as the final cause motivating the parties. Both the Alesch Group and De Witt turned away from their
sworn promise.
64. Id. at 222.
65. Id. at 224.
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This forcible turning away is the perversion. Syllogistically:
(1)The suitability of the successor is the sole final cause
that may flow legitimately into the selection of the new
contr6leur. (2) The consideration of the premium-bribe
is totally irrelevant, foreign, antagonistic to suitability.
(3) Yet the premium-bribe consideration does flow as a
final cause into the selection of a successor.
Here is the quintessence of the p e r ~ e r s i o n . ~ ~

In so far as premium-bribe dollars supplant suitability, thus far
are the parties perverted. Not a single premium-bribe dollar is
legitimate. The premium-bribe is wholly illegitimate.
The prefix "per" carries the important concept of completeness
into the meaning of perversion. "Per" is the intensive, not the
prepositional, prefix and correctly expresses the idea of thoroughness, totality, as in "perfervid," "pellucid" and more aptly
in "perfect"-unsullied by any foreign substance, integral. This
is perfectly true of the premium-bribe perversion. No part of the
illicit cash has any relation whatsoever to the suitability of the
successor. It is totally foreign, unrelated, antagonistic to suitability. It is totally "other." As antagonistic, this cause enters
into the formation of the contr6leur's judgment of selection. As
completely foreign, with no admixture of suitability as a cause,
this illegitimate cause perforce supplants, to the total extent of
its influx, the legitimate one. As totally supersessive, therefore,
this causal influx is totally perverse-a perfect p e r ~ e r s i o n . ~ ~

This, then, is the principal element of the turpitude of the
premium-bribe. Principal, yes, but not sole.

The Illicit Consideration
The perversion of the contr6leur's judgment may be
the core of the premium-bribe illegitimacy, but what of
cold cash that constituted the consideration? After all,
as the New York court said in Caplan-Lionel, the "price
. . . being paid for . . . control . . . [is] the all important emolument of the transaction." Does this allimportant emolument add anything to the t u r p i t ~ d e ? ' ~
[Tlhe following will outline John's understanding of
what will be expected from him and what in turn De
Witt will do in consideration therefor.
-The Dull-Brown Bribery Letter,
Exhibit 4.
66. Id. at 223.
67. Id. at 224.
68. Id. at 233.
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Before, during, and after the extensive premium-bribe negotiations, every single party to the malefaction was being amply
and fully compensated for performing their respective duties.
Among their most obvious duties was the selwtion and appointment of a successor contr6leur for Le Mars. Yet, at this very
moment, De Witt was passing $600,000 to John Alesch, to this
top corporate executive, as a corporate official, because of his
official position, and pocketed personally, even though every
minute of time and ounce of energy had been dedicated to the
exclusive benefit of the beneficiary-shareholder. Most important . . . the money was paid for the performance of an official
corporate act, even though concededly that act was seriously
harmful to the corporate ~ell-being.~g

In a word, none of this $600,000 belonged to John Alesch. Every
penny was accepted "in compensation for corporate acts, performed pursuant to a corporate program, in fulfillment of a corporate duty, in the course of official business, during the regular
workweek, for which he was already amply rem~nerated."~"
Herein lay the second indivisible element of the triple turpitude:
disloyalty in personally pocketing dollars rightfully belonging to
Le Mars. "The chief illegitimacy of the [$600,000] rests in the
disloyalty inherent in the repudiation of the contrbleur's unqualified dedication of all of his endeavors to the general welfare of the
firm.
Yet the perfidy in taking the $600,000 had no intrinsic
connection with the perversion of contrbleur judgment. Either
could have been effected without the other. Each is a separate
constituent of the total turpitude.
(Interjection: The disloyalty of a steward is not the only
charge of turpitude levelled at the Alesch Group:
Completely apart from custody and the loyalty strictures of
a trustee, no employee from contrdleur to janitor can licitly be
paid twice for doing his job. The turpitude consequent on the
breach of the simple contractual quid pro quo is generally characterized as dishonesty, or in less refined circles as plain old
stealing. This particular aspect of the intrinsic illegitimacy of
the premium-bribe, stemming from the violation of commuta-

-

-

69. Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Disposition, 57 CALIF.
L. REV.615, 637
(1969).
70. Bayne, supra note 55, at 235.
71. Id. at 237.
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tive justice, is completely nonfiducial and unrelated, a t least in
its primary sense, to the custodial concept of corporate contr01.'~

This violation of commutative justice will serve as yet another
imperative for the disgorgement of the premium-bribe.)

The Unsuitability of a Premium-Bri ber
The turpitude engendered by successor unsuitability
stems from the uncomplicated fact that the corporation
is therewith burdened with all the potential damage and
present disadvantages of an incompetent in the most
important position in the firm.73
This Agreement shall not become effective unless
and until all of the present Directors of the Le Mars
Mutual have submitted their resignations and qualified
successors, as designated by [De Witt], have been
qualified as Directors of the Le Mars Mutual.
-Agreement to Sell Stock, Alesches
and De Witt, Exhibit A, 3, 4.

The third constituent of the triple turpitude has its peculiar
applicability later in the Brief. For now, however, it must round
out the total turpitude of the single indivisible act of PremiumBribery .
This third turpitude is simple: The Alesch Group and De
Witt conspired together to foist a known premium-briber on the
firm. John Alesch consciously and deliberately selected a new
contrdeur who was ready (1)to pass $600,000 in premium-bribe
and (2) to divert that $600,000 from the Le Mars treasury into the
personal pocket of its chief executive.
This joint imposition of a premium-briber on Le Mars is the
capstone of the illegitimacy:
In strict practicality, the crucial distinction for future saleof-control litigation lies in the built-in nature of the premiumbribe-induced unsuitability. No true premium-bribe under any
conditions whatsoever can be passed without engendering the
triple blemish of the perversion, the illicit consideration, and
the resultant unsuitability. To the extent, therefore, that an
appointee is prepared to twist the judgment and to divert the
corporate dollars, thus far is he already an unsuitable custodian.
As thus unsuitable he caps it off by imposing a premium-briber
72. Id. a t 237-38.
73. Id. a t 240.
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[himself] on the firm. Whatever further deficiencies he may
possess do not affect this ever-present built -in di~ability.~"

Note well: This premium-bribe-induced unsuitability of De
Witt says nothing about De Witt's propensity to loot, to embezzle, to steal the Alesch Agency. Those unsuitabilities are for another time.

The Coalesced Turpitude
Being so long so close to the trees one forgets that the forest
is an integral moral unit, the single act of premium-bribery. .
Correspondingly, the tripartite turpitude is only conceptually
divisible. True, each of its indispensable coconstituents-the
perversion, the illicit consideration, the premium- bribeengendered unsuitability-can be individually isolated in the
abstract. Indeed, the illicit consideration can even have an independent existence of its own. Each certainly is a distinct turpitude, with its own individuating notes and amendable to specific definition. In losing its identity in the new entity, moreover, each does not fully disappear but remains theoretically
identifiable.75

As "theoretically identifiable," each will henceforth serve as
the foundation for successive sections of the Brief. For now, the
second constituent: the Illicit Consideration.
3. ' Disgorgement
[Alny bonus received for such transfer of their office
[must] be returned to the c o r p ~ r a t i o n . ~ ~
"[Tlhe law will impress a trust in favor of the corporation upon the property, interests and profits so acquired. "77

Once the reasoning has progressed thus far, the law of the
land has been unanimous: disgorgement over to the injured entity
of the proven premium-bribe. The collected cases, the commentators, cold logic, have all concluded that the unearned recompense, the stolen emolument, the $600,000 in premium-bribe, belongs in law and justice to Le Mars.
74. Id. at 243.
75. Id.
76. In re Lionel Corp., N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 1964, at 14, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd sub nom.,
Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913, aff'd m e n . , 14 N.Y.2d
679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964).
77. Schildberg Rock Prods. Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 768, 140 N.W.2d 132, 137
(1966) (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del Ch. 255, 273, 5 A.2d 503, 511 (Sup. Ct. 19'39)).

,
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T h e Illicit Consideration
Although the total tort has a triple turpitude, only the
specific turpitude of the illicit consideration is referable
to the [$600,000]. Here is the sole rationale of the disposition.78

Now the importance of the triple breakdown of the turpitude
is manifest. The perversion of the contrbleur's judgment, the appointment of a premium-briber successor, both have later applicability. But for now, the unearned dollars are "the all-important
emolument of the transaction. "
Here, standing isolated, is one element common to the
premium-bribe, unearned recompense, without the perversion
of the officer's judgment or any question of an unsuitable successor. The malefaction is a clear case of illicit emolument,
without more. The chief executive officer . . . accepted
[$600,000] in compensation for corporate acts, performed pursuant to a corporate program, in fulfillment of a corporate duty,
in the course of official business, during the regular workweek,
for which he was already amply r e m ~ n e r a t e d . ~ ~

Cold logic mandates, therefore, that the $600,000 in unjust recompense be disgorged to Le Mars. This is the only tenable disposition of the premium-bribe dollars.
Recall, moreover, that the strictures of Strict Trust were not
alone in issuing this mandate of disgorgement:
Completely apart from custody and the loyalty strictures of
a trustee, no employee from contr6leur to janitor can licitly be
paid twice for doing his job. The turpitude consequent on the
breach of the simple contractual quid pro quo is generally characterized as dishonesty, or in less refined circles as plain old
stealing.80

Commutative justice issues a much more earthy mandate: return
stolen property.

The Law of Restitution
Thus a principal is entitled to a bribe received by his
agent from a third person, although the principal's
profit from the transaction, aside from the bribe, was
78. Bayne, supra note 69, at 637.
79. Bayne, supra note 55, at 235.
80. Id. at 237.
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the same as it would have been if no bribe had been
given (see Restatement of Agency, $403)

Predictably, the labors of the Restatement reduced this reasoning to succinct pronouncements. The Restatements of Trusts,
Agency, Restitution, all have similar mandates.H2
The most sophisticated and exacting rationale is the deft
blending of restitution with trust, and the conjunction in turn
of this blend with the basic tort action [of Premium-Bribery].
The law of restitution has a long and reliable history and complements admirably the benefit-to-beneficiary rule of trusts:
Where a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the
beneficiary receives or retains a bonus or commission or
other profit, he holds what he receives upon a constructive trust for the b e n e f i ~ i a r y . ~ ~

The Comment to the Restatement singled out the Alesch Group
and De Witt:
Bribes and Commissions. The rule stated in this Section is
applicable not only where the fiduciary receives something in
the nature of a bribe given him by a third person in order to
induce him to violate his duties as a fiduciary, but also where
something is given to him and received by him in good faith, if
it was received for an act done by him in connection with the
performance of his duties as f i d u ~ i a r y . ~ ~

With De Witt and the Alesches, the matter was a fortiori, since
certainly "good. faith" never entered the machinations. To the
contrary, calloused months of competitive Premium-Bribery
characterized the De Witt-Alesch conspiracy.

The Collected Cases
I am also of the opinion that [the Directors] are trustees for the plaintiff and the shareholders [of the London Mutual] on whose behalf he sues. There is a clear
admission that 5711., 8s., 7d. has been paid [for the Sale
of Control] . . . .85

Again predictably, neither cold logic nor the commentators
81. RESTATEMENT
OF RESTITUTION
§ 128, Comment f at 531 (1937).
82. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF AGENCY
§ 403 (1958); RESTATEMENT
OF RESTITUTION
§ 197 (1937); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TRUSTS§ 206, Comment k (1959).
OF RESTITUTION
9 197
83. Bayne, supra note 69, at 638-39 (quoting RESTATEMENT
(1937)).
OF RESTITUTION
§ 197, Comment a at 808 (1937).
84. RESTATEMENT
85. Gaskell v. Chambers, 122 Rev. R. 138, 140 (Ch. 1858).
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of the Restatements are divorced from the long line of judicial and
legislative pronouncements beginning in the earliest England and
reaching to the American 1970's. An exhaustive litany of cases
would be a vulgar exhibition. Pertinent samples over the years
and from various jurisdictions should buttress the logic and the
Restatements:
[Tlhe trustee derived the profit . . . from the [sale of the]
office itself. I shall therefore direct that the £75. be repaid
by Horsfield and dealt with as part of the assets [of the t r u ~ t ] . ~ "
The election of directors and the transfer of the management
and property of the corporation were official acts, and whatever
money he received from such official acts were moneys derived
by virtue of his office for which we think he should account [to
the Life Union M u t ~ a l ] . ~ ~
[Tlhe moneys or other secret profit which Marshall received by
selling out his trust, belonged, "not to him, but to the insurance
company," . . . .88
If the succession was worth $125,000 in the market, the sale (if
it were lawful) should have been made by the directors for the
benefit of the owners of the [Mutual Life], not of Gray. For
Gray had nothing legally saleable. . . . So the arrangement
. . . was a betrayal of trust.8v
[Hlis official position is not his individual property in any
sense, and he has no right, either directly or indirectly, to use it
for his own selfish ends; . . . all money thus made belongs either
to the corporation, or . . . in common to its shareholder^.^"

A secret profit realized by a director from an undertaking to
deliver the corporate control of a company inures to the corporation. Fletcher, Cyclopedia, "Corporations," vol. 4, $2321; 2
Thompson on Corporations, $ 1237.91
[I]t indisputably was a condition of the sale that all the officers
and directors then in office should forthwith resign . . . and
elect a new directorate chosen wholly by the purchaser of the
stock . . . .
-

86. Sugden v. Crossland, 65 Eng. Rep. 620, 621 (V.C. 1856).
87. McCiure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 81, 55 N.E. 388, 389 (1899).
88. Heineman v. Marshall, 117 Mo. App. 546, 556, 92 S.W. 1131, 1134 (1905).
89. Moulton v. Field, 179 F. 673, 675 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 219 US. 586 (1910).
90. Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 437, 91 A. 428, 432 (1914).
91. Keely v. Black, 90 N.J. Eq. 439, 443, 107 A. 825, 827 (Ch. 1919), reu'd on other
grounds, 91 N . J . Eq. 520, 111 A. 22 (1920).
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. . . [Olrdinarily . . . these officers and directors must
account to the corporation . . . for the sum and for . . . damages .g2
Hence to the extent that the price received by Feldmann
and his codefendants included such a bonus [for the Sale of
Control], he is accountable to the minority shareholders . . . .93
The rationale of the rule is undisputable: persons enjoying management control hold it on behalf of the corporation's stockholders, and therefore may not regard it as their own personal property to dispose of as they wish.94
[Alny bonus received for such transfer of their office [must)
be returned to the c o r p o r a t i ~ n . ~ ~
Even ratification by the beneficiaries would not save a fiduciary
from accountability for any amounts realized in dictating or
influencing the choice of a successor unless this was secured
with notice that the beneficiaries were entitled to the profit if'
they wished . . . .96
The sole appropriate remedy is a declaration that the consideration paid to the trustees by Lytton Financial Corporation
allocable to a transfer of control of the Association is an asset
held for its benefit in the hands of the trustees.97
The theory is not that all the shareholders are entitled to share
in the bribe but rather that one who sells an asset he does not
own must turn over the proceeds to the true owner. The true
owner is the corporation. The malefactor, according to
Rosenfeld, is the selling shareholder. He owes that part of the
proceeds which is the premium to the corporation that owned
the asset. As in the case of corporate opportunity, the opportunity diverted must be recompensed to the corporation, not to its

shareholder^.^^

Yet further support for disgorgement over to Le Mars of the
$600,000 premium-bribe will be found in the tortlcrime analysis.
-

- -

-

-

-

92. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 651, 659 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
93. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955).
94. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 575 (2d Cir. 1962).
95. In re Lionel Corp., N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 1964, a t 14, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.), aff 'd sub nom.,
Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913, aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d
679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964).
96. Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337, 1343 (2d Cir. 1971).
97. Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 371 F.
Supp. 306, 319 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
98. Gordon v. Fundamental Investors, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 41, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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B. Commercial Bribery
The criminal interdiction of modern state codes 'confirms the
public-policy abhorrence of the sale of office, expressed as early
as 1388 (if not earlier), with the statute of 12 Richard 2, k. 2,n
and reiterated in 1551 in 5 & 6 Edward 6, c. l6.lo0The presentday statutes add nothing new, but simply restate a truism:
Premium-Bribery is inherently corrupt:
[Briber:] Every person who shall . . . give to any officer, agent,
or trustee . . . any money . . . with intent to influence his . . .
judgment . . . shall, on conviction, be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten years, or fined not more than one
thousand dollars, or both.lol
[Commercial Bribing:] A person is guilty of commercial bribing . . . when he . . . agrees to confer any benefit upon any . . .
fiduciary . . . to influence his conduct . . . .102
[Gratuities and Tips:] It shall be unlawful for any . . . officer
. . . of a private corporation . . . to receive, for his own use . . .
any . . . bonus, or gratuity . . . connected with . . . [a] business transaction.lo3

And so in Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, etc., etc. The punishment for the crime of Commercial Bribery varies from state to
state, but the rationale is the same everywhere. Every criminal
code, moreover, condemns both briber and bribed equally.
The transition from crime to tort is effortless, and part of the
common law of every jurisdiction. The crime-derived tort may be
per se, prima facie, or inferential, but acknowledged tort it is."'"

The provisions of this contract, of course, will be the
means of [De Witt's] method of recouping its payment
to the owners of the stock of the Alesch Agency.
-The Dull-Brown Recoupment Letter,
Exhibit 19A.
99. No Officers shall be appointed for Gifts, & C., 12 Rich. 2, c. 2 (1388).
100. An Acte againste buyinge and sellinge of Offices, 1551-52, 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 16.
101. MISS. CODEANN. Q 97-11-11 (1972).
102. N.Y. PENALLAW4 180.00 (McKinney 19'75).
103. IOWACODEij 741.1 (1975).
104. See Hall v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 252 N.W.2d 421 (Iowa 1977).
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We don't intend to milk [Le Mars] for a t least five
years.
-Carl Smith, Executive Committee, to
Russell W. Sandy, Le Mars Supervisor,
Deposition a t 48.

Both orally and in writing, De Witt stated its calculated
intent to loot Le Mars. This admitted intent was supported by
an admitted motive: to "[recoup] its payment to the [Alesch
Group]" of the $600,000 in premium-bribe.
De Witt thus "milked" Le Mars in two stages. (1) From the
takeover of Le Mars, April 21,1970, to mid-1973, De Witt coerced
Le Mars under the Management Contract to purchase fabricated
"services" from De Witt's wholly owned Alesch Agency. This
totalled $190,000. (2) When the Insurance Department outlawed
this patent ploy, De Witt simply shifted the "services" from the
Agency to De Witt itself. For the next four years, 1973-1977, De
Witt forced Le Mars to accept $552,000 in multifarious "services"
from De Witt. Grand total: $742,000.

-Strict

Trust-

The corporate entity and the stockholders . . . are not
required to be ever on their guard and watchful lest
those trustees misapply, destroy, embezzle, steal the
corporate assets, or defraud them.Iu5
Equity holds them strictly accountable as trustees."'"
However, even if we were now to order an accounting,
we would not permit Sinskey to retain the reasonable
value of his services.lu7

This Brief has labored long to lay out the Doctrine of Strict
Trust: "The authorities are agreed that the officers and directors
of a company are trustees . . . in the transaction of the business
and care of property of the corporation . . . ."lUWntothis broad
Strict-Trust base, established by Guth, Dawson, Hoyt, Ontjes,
Schild berg, Holden, Holi-Rest, Meinhard, Borden, the courts
have erected the Custodial Concept of Corporate Control: "The
directors have the custody and control of the assets of the corpo105. Des Moines Bank & Trust Co. v. George M. Bechtel & Co., 243 Iowa 1007, 1081,
51 N.W.2d 174, 216 (1952).
106. Holden v. Construction Mach. Co., 202 N.W.2d 348, 358 (Iowa 1972).
107. Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478, 497 (3d Cir. 1976).
108. Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 369, 157 N.W. 929, 931 (1916).
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ration for the benefit of those to whom they belong . . . ."""The
Custodial Concept flows inexorably into the Benefit-toBeneficiary Rule: "They [directors and officers] . . . impliedly
undertake . . . to exercise the powers conferred solely in the interest of the corporation or the stockholders as a body or corporate
entity, and not for their own personal interests."llu
These elemental principles have specific applicability to the
Looting of Le Mars.

'

Conflict of Interest
I think a director can adequately serve two different
masters.
-William

Couch, Executive Committee,
Deposition a t 67.

I see no problem in representing both sides.
-George Howes, Executive Committee,
Deposition a t 52.
I did not see anything inherently contradictory in my
position of president of both [De Witt and Le Mars].
-Carman Smith, Executive Committee,
Deposition a t 50.

Perhaps the core concept of the law of Looting is the universal reprobation of Conflict of Interest. "One of the most familiar
doctrines of the law of trusts is that a trustee cannot purchase
from himself, or at his own sale. He cannot lawfully be the seller
and the buyer in the same transaction. . . . This doctrine rests
upon the ground of public policy.""l The legal consequences of
directoral Conflict of Interest are radical and pervasive. Impartial
directors in arm's-length dealings may resort to all manner of
defenses: good faith, business judgment, fairness, negligence,
good motives. But when a director deals with himself, sits on both
sides of a bargain, the law speaks categorically and undeviatingly.
Yet, throughout the seven years of enforced "services," t t e
Executive Committee dealt only with the Executive Committee:
To my knowledge, nobody represented Le Mars in purchasing
109. Hoyt v. Hampe, 206 Iowa 206, 208, 214 N.W. 718, 720 (1927).
110. Schildberg Rock Prods. Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 767, 140 N.W.2d 132, 136
(1966) (quoting 19 AM. JUR.2~ Corporatiom § 1272 (1965)).
111. In re Estate of Holley, 211 Iowa 77, 81-82, 232 N.W. 807, 809 (1930) (citations
omitted).

.
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the Management Services from De Witt through the Alesch
Agency.
-Carl Smith, Executive Committee, Deposition a t 18.
When the Management Contract was negotiated, there wasn't
anyone representing Le Mars.
. -Carman
Smith, Executive Committee, Deposition a t 52.
We never asked anyone a t Le Mars whether they felt our charges
were fair and reasonable.
-John Howes, De Witt Director, Deposition at 40.
Q. And it was the Executive Committee of Le Mars then . . .?
A. Well, the Executive Committee of De Witt, too.
Q. They were substantially the same people?
A. Yes.
-Raymond Brown, Executive Committee, Deposition a t 120.

Both the flagrant Conflict of Interest and the governing law are
equally patent. So, too, are the succeeding steps in the argumentation.

The No-Inquiry Rule
This doctrine [of Conflict of Interest] rests upon the
ground of public policy. The law does not stop to inquire
into the fairness of the sale, or the adequacy of price, but
stamps its disapproval upon a transaction which creates
a conflict between the self-interest and integrity of the
trustee. The trustee is clearly disabled from becoming
a purchaser of the trust estate, whether the cestui que
trust be an infant or an adult, and whether the sale be
public or private .'I2

As with so many basic moral concepts, the ultimate rationale
of the No-Inquiry Rule has historically been left unstated. So
universally embraced, yet so rarely explained:
Now it is clear why the courts-without perhaps full adversion-added the no-inquiry prescription. It is not a question of
good faith or fairness because there is never good faith or fairness when a trustee stands on both sides of a bargain. There is
no question of damages because there are always damages when
an employee performs service for one while in the pay of another. There is no question of fraud since the disloyalty is wrong
a t the outset. There need be no inquiry because the proof of the
112. Id. at 82, 232 N.W. at 809.
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very act of divided allegiance ends the matter. Whatever follows
belongs to the fund.li3

One of the more perspicacious insights into the No-Inquiry rationale comes from England's highest court:
So strictly is this principle adhered to, that no question is allowed to be raised as to the fairness or unfairness of a contract
so entered into. It obviously is or may be impossible to demonstrate how far in any particular case the terms of such a contract
have been the best for the cestui que trust which it was impossible to obtain.l14

This primitive Rule, moreover, is imposed pervasively, in every
Conflict context: "The doctrine applies, though the purchaser be
one of several cotrustees. . . . It matters not whether the sale be
made with or without the sanction of judicial authority. . . ."1 15
This pervasive applicability is understandable:
The prohibition that a trustee cannot be the seller and buyer in
the same transaction acts, not on the possibility that, in some
cases, the sense of duty may prevail over the motives of selfinterest, but it provides against the probability in many cases,
and the danger in all cases, that the dictates of self-interest will
exercise a predominant influence and supersede that of duty.""

Lest one might conclude that a different rule would obtain in the
case of directors, the law painstakingly confronts the issue. In the
specific context of a Conflict-of-Interest contract "[tlhe court
will not inquire into its profitableness to the trustee or prejudice
to the beneficiary. This rule is applicable to the acts of boards of
director^.""^ To which the court appended a long line of authority.
Precautionary Note: Not only was De Witt in bald Conflict
of Interest throughout the entire seven years of the imposed
6
services," but a t no time did De Witt mitigate its culpability by
even the slightest exculpatory disclosure. Secrecy emphasizes liability.
6

113. Bayne, supra note 7, at 583.
114. Aberdeen Ry. v. Blaikie Bros., 23 L.T.R. (n.s.) 315, 316 (H.L. 1854).
115. In re Estate of Holley, 211 Iowa 77, 82, 232 N.W. 807, 810 (1930) (citations
omitted).
116. Id.
117. Hoyt v. Hampe, 206 Iowa 206, 220, 214 N.W. 718, 725 (1927).
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"Voidable from the Outset"
"The policy of the law is to put fiduciaries beyond the
reach of temptation, by making it unprofitable for them
to yield to it. To that end an act by the fiduciary in
which personal interest and duty conflict is voidable at
the mere option of the beneficiary, regardless of good
faith or results. The court will not inquire into its profitableness to the trustee or prejudice to the beneficiary.
This rule is applicable to the acts of boards of directors."l18

Thus does the 1972 decision in Holden express the long tradition of voidability in the face of a Conflict-of-Interest contract.
Whether the "contract" between the Executive Committee and
the Executive Committee was oral or written, no matter. The
agreement "is voidable at the mere option of the beneficiary,
regardless of good faith." Holden is firm: "The court will not
inquire into its profitableness to the trustee or prejudice to the
beneficiary." To which, numerous citations.
One of the better statements of the Rule comes from Hoyt:
The directors have the custody and control of the assets of the
corporation for the benefit of those to whom they belong . . . .
A fiduciary may not, directly or indirectly, appropriate the trust
fund to himself without the concurrence of the cestuis with full
knowledge of the facts. . . . Such an appropriation would be
voidable a t the option of the cestuis, without any showing of
fraud, negligence, or prejudice.llg

These statements are reflective of the "voidable" rule across
the country. The classic expression of the rule comes from the
highest court of New York:
He stood in the attitude of selling as owner and purchasing as
trustee. The law permits no one to act in such inconsistent relations. It does not stop to inquire whether the contract or transaction was fair or unfair. It stops the inquiry when the relation is
disclosed, and sets aside the transaction or refuses to enforce it,
at the instance of the party whom the fiduciary undertook to
represent, without undertaking to deal with the question of abstract justice in the particular case. It prevents frauds by making them as far as may be impossible, knowing that real motives
118. Holden v. Construction Mach. Co., 202 N.W.2d 345, 357 (Iowa 1972) (quoting
Hoyt v. Hampe, 206 Iowa 206, 220, 214 N.W. 718, 724-25 (1927)).
119. Hoyt v. Hampe, 206 Iowa 206, 208-09,214 N.W. 718, 720 (1927) (citations omitted).
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often elude the most searching inquiry, and it leaves neither to
judge nor jury the right to determine upon a consideration of its
advantages or disadvantages, whether a contract made under
such circumstances shall stand or fa11.120

With this, the Court of Appeals of New York proceeded to explain
its position, again consistently with the universal rule:
The law cannot accurately measure the influence of a trustee
with his associates, nor will it enter into the inquiry, in an action
by the trustee in his private capacity, to enforce the contract in
the making of which he participated. The value of the rule of
equity, to which we have adverted, lies to a great extent in its
stubbornness and inflexibility. Its rigidity gives it one of its chief
uses as a preventive or discouraging influence, because it weakens the temptation to dishonesty or unfair dealing on the part
of trustees, by vitiating, without attempt a t discrimination, all
transactions in which they assume the dual character of principal and representative. 121

This early statement of the American tradition carries on through
the decades and finds a succinct expression of the rule in Pepper
v. Litton by the Supreme Court of the United States: "The essence of the test is whether or not under all the circumstances the
transaction carries the earmarks of an arm's length bargain. If it
does not, equity will set it aside."122This uniform rule has found
frequent reiteration in the federal courts. In 1954 the Sixth Circuit in Seagrave expatiated on the reason for the "voidability":
Although good faith on the part of the Directors and the
disclosure of the material facts eliminate the question of actual
fraud, equity will still act to enforce the fiduciary obligation
under circumstances amounting to constructive fraud. Constructive fraud refers to acts which may have been done in good
faith, with no purpose to harm the corporation, but which are
done by one who has placed himself in a position of conflict
between a fiduciary obligation and his own private interests. In
such a situation, by reason of the strict rule applicable to fiduciaries, equity will take appropriate action to prevent the harm
resulting from such actions, regardless of the good intentions of
the fiduciary.'*

The judicial tradition moves forward with a restatement of
120. Munson v. Syracuse, G . & C.R.R., 102 N.Y. 59, 73-74, 8 N.E. 355, 358 (1886).
121. Id. at 74, 8 N.E.at 358.
122. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939).
123. Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1954) (citations omitted).
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the "voidability" rule by the Sixth Circuit in the 1974 decision
in Ohio Dri11.lZ4Note that the Sixth Circuit has recourse to the
distinguished Learned Hand in the knowledgeable Second Circuit:
In Marcus v. Otis , . . Judge Learned Hand observed:
. . . The wrong is much simpler and more fundamental-the misappropriation of funds-and it is neither an
excuse that they later repaid what they had taken . . . ..
The bargain was voidable from the outset, no matter
how favorable the terms might be, and "Automatic" can
follow and reclaim the abstracted funds in any form
they may take, however enhanced in value.Iz5

Here succinctly is the solution for Le Mars: "The bargain was
voidable from the outset, no matter how favorable the terms may
be." So says the Sixth Circuit, quoting Learned Hand of the
Second Circuit. And finally: Le Mars "can follow and reclaim the
abstracted funds in any form they may take, however enhanced
in value." (How poignant that Learned Hand should anticipate
De Witt's self-condemning return of some $48,000 of the looted
sums. No matter. The return merely branded the unreturned
remainder with one large word: "Looted." This $48,000 refund
was scarcely founded on any moral compulsion. The Deposition
of William Couch, Executive Committee (of "two different masters" fame) immediately antedated the disgorgement. (Transcript a t 1286.))
The culmination of the tradition comes in the 1976 decision
of Borden u. Sinskey by a unanimous Third Circuit. Borden followed Guth u. Loft exactly, applied Strict Trust and the Benefitto-Beneficiary Rule precisely. "[Applying the doctrine first announced in Guth u. Loft, the court below] imposed a constructive
trust in favor of the plaintiff on Sinskey's stock . . . .In addition,
plaintiff was awarded . . . the profit . . . as well as all salaries,
director's fees and dividends received by him . . . ."126 But most
important, Borden is on all fours with the Looting in Le Mars.
Mr. Sinskey was in Conflict of Interest. Over the years he performed valuable services-not questionable "services"-as
president and director. Not only were all profits disgorged by
Sinskey, but even his hard-earned salaries:
124. Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 498 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1974).
125. Id. at 191 (quoting Marcus v. Otis, 168 F.2d 649, 654 (2d Cir.), modified, 169
F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1948)).
126. Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478, 486-87 (3d Cir. 1976).
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However, even if we were now to order an accounting, we would
not permit Sinskey to retain the reasonable value of his services.
Although defendants may be able to distinguish the facts of
Guth from those of the instant case, they cannot distinguish
away the rationale of that decision. . . . [A111 the salaries he
received from Pepsi-Cola while serving as Loft's chief Executive
. . . were stripped away because Guth had gained them . . . in
violation of his fiduciary duties. The court refused to allow him
to retain any of the profits or benefits derived from his misconduct in order to deter any disloyality on the part of a corporate
fiduciary.lZ7

Sinskey was denied even a quantum-meruit recovery, so inveterate and firm is the Rule.
In terms of dollar-and-cents recovery, therefore, De Witt
must disgorge to Le Mars every dollar thus extracted: $742,000,
without interest. Not only was every non-"contract" voidable,
but the court may not permit De Witt "to retain the reasonable
value of [its] services." Thus the nine-judge Third Circuit in
1976 summarizes the long tradition of Guth, Damson, Hoyt,
Ontjes, Schildberg, Holden, Holi-Rest, and Meinhard.
(Interjectory Note: The philosophy and law of the line of
cases culminating with the 1976 American Timber (which now
follow) are integral to this Looting study and are to be incorporated herein.)

Burton Dull and FriendsHowever, even if we were now to order an accounting,
we would not permit Sinskey to retain the reasonable
value of his services.128
[A111 the salaries he received .
because Guth had gained them
fiduciary duties.lZo

. . were stripped away
. . . in violation of his

But many ramifications of the law yet remain. Not only must
De Witt disgorge even "the reasonable value of [its] services"
but all the coconspirators who were privy to the years of Looting
must forfeit every penny received during the perpetration. No
elaborate syllogism is needed to conclude that thieves should
never receive a salary during the theft.
(Note: The legal principles here applicable to Looting have
127. Id. at 497-98.
128. Id. at 497.
129. Id. at 497-98.
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dollar-and-cents pertinency to the periods of Premium-Bribery,
Embezzlement, the Twice-Stolen Agency, and Disloyalty, and
will not be repeated apropos. A malefactor can scarce expect
remuneration during the malefaction.)
The work of Arthur Young & Company, auditors, uncovered
a t least some of the illicit compensation received by the conspirators over the years of the Looting. (Exhibit 508, IV.) As a beginning, Arthur Young & Company totalled $163,691 in wages and
directors' fees for the period 1970-1975. This sum went to defendants on both ends of the Le Mars-De Witt axis, and seemingly
spanned exactly the days of the Looting, at least until October
1975. Listed in this survey are all the principals, the ubiquitous
Executive Committee, Burton Dull (as director), John Alesch,
the Alesch Group, the Smith Group. The years 1976 and 1977
remain to be computed.
During this same 1970-1977 period-and for thirteen years
before under John Alesch-Burton Dull wore a second fiduciary
hat: general counsel of Le Mars. (What Burton Dull received
before 1970-beyond the "bonus" of $10,000 for "services" in effecting the Premium-Bribery-has not been fully explored.) But
certainly Burton Dull did receive $87,000 as counsel for his role
as the Le Mars liaison for De Witt. This minimum of $97,000
places Burton Dull among the conspirators wearing his second
hat.
Certainly the Guth, Schildberg, Holden, Borden tradition
would deal summarily with Burton Dull and Friends: "[Wle
would not permit Sinskey to retain the reasonable value of his
services. . . . [A111 the salaries [Guth] received . . . were
stripped away because [he] had gained them . . . in violation
of his fiduciary duties. . . . In order to deter any disloyalty on
the part of a corporate
The general principles of this
tradition would alone dispose of the Le Mars claim to Restitution.
But a subspecies of this tradition has expectably grown up in
specific response to the question of salaries and fees of faithless
fiduciaries. Both state and federal courts would require Burton
Dull and Friends to disgorge all monies, in any form, received
over the entire span of the Disloyalty. Thus the Southern District
in 1971, interpreting New York law: "Under New York law, a
disloyal employee forfeits his right to compensation for services
'and if he is paid without knowledge of his disloyalty he may be
130. Id.
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7

"131

Le Mars, therefore, may follow the funds wherever necessary.
The rule, moreover, is also expectably exacting and encompasses all compensation, even dollars otherwise justly earned.
Not even a quantum meruit. The "compensation" rule is clearly
a corollary of the Guth, Schildberg, Holden, Borden line. The
federal treatment of the law has been synthesized in Riffel" by
the Tenth Circuit. The Riffe Court, as do most of the courts, has
resort to the Restatement of Agency.
When a corporate officer engaged in activities which constitute a breach of his duty of loyalty, or if it is a wilful breach of
his contract of employment, he is not entitled to compensation
for services during such a period of time although part of his
services may have been properly performed. In the Restatement
(Second), Agency $ 469 the above doctrine is set forth, and this
is followed by the comment which states in part:
"An agent, who, without the acquiescence of his
principal, acts for his own benefit or for the benefit of
another in antagonism to or in competition with the
principal in a transaction is not entitled to compensation which otherwise be due him."133

The Tenth Circuit then expatiates on the all-pervasive rigor of
the rule:
The [Restatement] comment continues and states that the
agent is not entitled to compensation although the acts may not
actually harm his principal and even if he thinks his actions will
benefit the principal or he is otherwise "justified" in "so acting." See also Fletcher, Corporations (Perm. Ed.) § 2145; J. C.
Peacock, Inc. v. Hasko, 196 Cal.App.2d 353, 16 Cal.Rptr. 518,
88 A.L.R.2d 1430; United States v. Bowen, 290 F.2d 40 (5th
Cir.).134

The rule is so generally accepted that most courts, as did Riffe,
cite Fletcher on Corporations in support. The rationale of the
rule, of course, is embedded in the Guth, Schildberg, Holden,
Borden philosophy.
The most recent application of the rule, American Timber &
Dading Co. v. N i e d e r m e ~ e r , 'is~ ~also the most rewarding from
131. Frederick Chusid & Co. v. Marshall Leeman & Co., 326 F. Supp. 1043, 1061

(S.D.N.Y.1971) (citations omitted).
132. Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas v. Riffe, 406 F.2d 1061 (10th Cir. 1969).
133. Id. at 1062.
134. Id.
135. 276 Or. 1135, 558 P.2d 1211 (1976).
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the standpoint of ad hoc pertinence to Le Mars. Ben Niedermeyer
played the same role as Burton Dull and Friends. Ben was contr6leur of American Timber, in clear conflict of interest, and over a
span of ten years was disloyal to his firm. Furthermore the stakes
were high. 'In one four-year period alone, "Ben received a total of
$226,798 in salaries from"138American Timber. Even more to the
point:
[Tlhe evidence is also clear that the board knew that these
salaries, as well as those of the other officers, were being paid,
and the amount of these salaries is reflected on the books of the
corporation. We agree with the trial court's findings that these
salaries were reasonable, that the corporation has ratified them
through its acquiescence in the face of full knowledge of these
payments, and that it is now estopped from seeking their recovery on those g r 0 ~ n d s . I ~ ~

"Reasonableness," therefore, is not the issue. The reasonableness
of the "services" of Burton Dull and Friends is equally not the
issue. (Just as the reasonableness of the $742,000 in multifarious
"services" enforced on Le Mars was not the issue.)
The Supreme Court of Oregon in late 1976 faced the issue
squarely:
However, a more difficult question is posed by AT&T's contention that Ben should be required to refund his salaries to the
corporation as a matter of equity because of his numerous
breaches of his fiduciary obligations which resulted in a serious
diminution of the assets of the corporation. This is a separate
and independent basis for recovery of executive ~a1aries.I~~

Manifestly the Oregon court is not considering the question on a
quantum-meruit basis. The philosophy is founded in "equity because of his numerous breaches of his fiduciary obligations."
In this context of equity and fiduciary duty, a unanimous
Oregon court aligns itself with the general rule:
The general rule . . . is that a corporate officer who engages in
activities which constitute either a breach of his duty of loyalty
or a wilful breach of his contract of employment is not entitled
to any compensation for services rendered during that period of
time even though part of those services may have been properly
~erf0rmed.l~~
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1154, 558 P.2d at 1222.
at 1154-55, 558 P.2d at 1223.
at 1155, 558 P.2d at 1223.
(citations omitted).
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The American Timber court then specifies the "continuing
series of deliberate diversions of corporate funds, secret accounting manipulations, and other wilful breaches of Ben's fiduciary
duties, which culminated in the looting of corporate assets."14u
The proof of the pudding-for Ben and for Burton Dull and
Friends-came in the practicalities of thc adjudication. (Remember Ben's four-year salaries.) "Therefore, we concluded that Ben
should be ordered to return to the corporation all compensation,
whether in the form of salaries or bonuses, which he received from
AT&T after August 15, 1966, with interest."141 With that the Oregon court "remanded for an additional accounting in accordance
with this opinion."142This meant ten years of salaries.
This Brief is a "seamless web." The 1976 American Timber
must spread its philosophy throughout.

Whether there is a patent payrrent directly from
the appointee [De Witt] . . . or a ~3mplicatedseries
of moves from the controlled corporation [Le ,Mars],
one overriding principle prevails-the consideration
must be the primary responsibility of the appointee
[De Witt]

Here, perhaps, is the only area where the facts need painstaking reemphasis. The scene must be exactly set.
De Witt wanted desperately to buy control of Le Mars. Employers Mutual had offered the Alesches a premium-bribe of
$450,000. De Witt had to top this offer. Protracted negotiations
culminated in the Executive Committee response: "[C]omplete
agreement with . . . your letter." And that Bribery Letter detailed De Witt's bribe. This is of consuming importance. By
agreeing to this Bribery Letter, De Witt agreed to pass $600,000
to the Alesches, in the Agency "sale," "Consultation" fees, free
auto, "pensions." Unless De Witt gave the Alesches this $600,000,
no Sale of Control. By its firm agreement, therefore, De Witt
openly and irrevocably stamped the $600,000 as premium-bribe
dollars passing from De Witt to the Alesch Group. Proof has
already been established that these premium-bribe dollars must
be disgorged by the Alesch Group to Le Mars.
140. Id. at 1156, 558 P.2d at 1223.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1158, 558 P.2d at 1224.
143. Bayne, supra note 39, at 501.
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The Garden- Variety Bribery
[Tlhe following will outline . . . what in turn De Witt
will do in consideration [for control].
-The Dull-Brown Bribery Letter,
Exhibit 4.

If De Witt had had this $600,000 in its own till, De Witt
would have reached into the till, paid the $600,000 to the Alesch
Group, and taken over Le Mars. If that had happened, this lawsuit would be simpler. Under the Strict-Trust law of Sale of Control, the Alesch Group would then disgorge the premium-bribe to
Le Mars, and go home. De Witt, as it should have expected had
it thought the matter through, would then be out-of-till the entire
$600,000. That is the just dessert for "bribers" and "bribeds. "
The "bribed" disgorges dollars to the corporation. The "briber"
never sees the bribe dollars again.
The De Witt Variety
Our Executive Committee are in complete agreement
with the proposal as outlined in your letter.
-Letter, Brown to Dull, Exhibit 3.

The Alesch Group remains irrevocably liable to Le Mars for
the disgorgement of the full $600,000 in premium-bribe. But when
De Witt agreed to pay the Alesch Group the $600,000, De Witt
did not have the premium-bribe dollars in the till. Or at least not
all of them. True, part of the $600,000 came from De Witt's own
till. But some $178,600 did not. Either De Witt did not have the
money, or was afraid to use it, or was simply greedy and larcenous. No matter. The fact is that De Witt decided to steal $178,600
of the total $600,000 premium-bribe that it had promised the
Alesch Group in the Bribery Letter.
De Witt could have stolen the $178,600 from the local bank
(and thus made this explanation simpler), but it chose an approach not uncommon in Premium-Bribery: De Witt first stole
the $178,600 from Le Mars itself, and then handed over the stolen
money to the Alesch Group according to promise. "[Nlearly
every successful premium-bribe is sooner or later recouped from
the corporation. Often, however, the new appointee avoids the
circuity of a personal payment and later corporate recoupment by
an immediate raid on the corporate till."144The De Witt raid on
144. Id. a t 502.
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the Le Mars till netted: (1) some $10,000 in free car for John
Alesch, (2) "Pensions" of $154,000, (3) "Consultation" fees to
John Alesch of $14,600. So now De Witt must restore the $178,600
to Le Mars. Otherwise De Witt will get off scot-free without losing
its premium-bribe money, which it stole from Le Mars.
Note well: If De Witt had not accepted responsibility for full
payment of the premium-bribe, the Alesch Group would never
have delivered the Board. Translated into other words: The
Alesch Group was not prepared to accept the same old Employers
Mutual offer and be forced to loot Le Mars personally before
leaving office (and be liable for looting). The Alesch Group insisted that De Witt premium-bribe them in the full amount of
$600,000. Where De Witt got the dollars did not matter to the
Alesch Group. If Le Mars later sued De Witt, no matter to the
Alesch Group. And so, to beat out Employers Mutual, De Witt
agreed to the full $600,000 bribe-and stole the difference,
$178,600, directly from Le Mars, without the circuity of later
recoupment, as was necessary with the remainder.
Le Mars now has a right to the stolen $178,600-which is not
to be confused with the $600,000 premium-bribe to be disgorged
by the Alesch Group as trustees of Le Mars, under the law of
Restitution.

IV. THETWICE-STOLEN
AGENCY
And Mr. Alesch ran his Agency and also managed [Le
Mars].
-Melvin Gearke, Le Mars Officer,
Director, Deposition at 84.

Q. Why was Alesch Agency given 700 square feet in the
new building, utility-free space?
A. The Agency had always been with the Company. It
always, even though it was separate, it had always been
in the same building.
-Melvin Gearke, Le Mars Officer,
Director, Deposition at 84.
We wanted the business from the Alesch Agency itself,
which a good deal of it had been going into other insurance companies. So, we was interested in getting that
business in De Witt.
-Raymond Brown, Executive Committee,
Deposition a t 26.

That little "pup," the Alesch Agency, was stolen from Le
Mars: (1) by John Alesch over the period from 1950(?) to April
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21, 1970, and (2) by De Witt from April 21, 1970, to mid-1977.

Voluminous facts detail the grossest Conflict of Interest between: (1) Alesch as Le Mars and Alesch as Alesch Agency, and
(2) De Witt as Le Mars and De Witt as Alesch Agency. Both
malefactors had total control and custody of both Le Mars and
the Agency. At no time did either Le Mars or the Agency have a
viable life of their own.
Throughout this entire period, first John Alesch and then De
Witt successfully stole: (1) all the Agency Assets, (2) Insurance
Commissions, (3) Salaries, (4) Dividends and (5) in the case of
De Witt, Profits diverted from Le Mars Home Office business.
Fortunately the law of Corporate Opportunity is clear, categorical, and uniform. This law will be applied in Corporate Opportunity, Strict Trust, and Benefit to Beneficiary.

A.

Corporate Opportunity

"[Ilf there is presented to a corporate officer or director
a business opportunity which . . . is, from its nature, in
the line of the corporation's business and is of practical
advantage to it, is one in which the corporation has an
interest or a reasonable expectancy, and, by embracing
the opportunity, the self-interest of the officer or director will be brought into conflict with that of his corporation, the law will not permit him to seize the opportunity for himself.
L

The Doctrine of Corporate Opportunity has been explained
and applied with undeviating regularity since the days of Guth
v. Loft and before. Every norm of Schildberg is verified in the
Alesch and De Witt usurpations. Certainly the ownership of the
Agency was within Le Mars' "line of business." De Witt conceded
as much by "buying" the Agency from John Alesch. That Le
Mars had "an interest or a reasonable expectancy" in notable
benefits from the Agency is beyond cavil.
By any test, that little "pup" was indeed the "Twice-Stolen
Agency." To dilate would be supererogatory.

B. Strict Trust
The directors have the custody and control of the assets
145. ~ c h i l d b e rRock
~ Prods. Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 768, 140 N.W.2d 132, 137
(1966) (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 272-73, 5 A.2d 503, 511 (Sup. Ct.
1939)).
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of the corporation for the benefit of those to whom they
belong . . . .148
"[Directors] impliedly undertake . . . to exercise the
powers conferred solely in the interest of the corporation
or the stockholders as a body or corporate entity, and
not for their own personal interest."IJ7

The law of Corporate Opportunity is simply a species of the
overall law of Strict Trust. Most courts have acknowledged that
the doctrine is nothing other than a specific application of Strict
Trust in a special context. Thus the painstaking construction
thus far of the Strict-Trust foundation may now be used for the
superstructure of Corporate Opportunity. ,
The doctrine of "corporate.opportunity" is not new to the
law and is but one phase of the cardinal rule of undivided loyalty
on the part of fiduciaries . . . . Our own consideration . . . is
mainly in Ontjes v. MacNider, . . . 232 Iowa 562. . ., which
quotes a t length with approval from Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del.
Ch. 255. . ., a leading case in this area of the law.IJn

At this juncture, recall the early argumentation and go forward
to the Twice-Stolen Agency.

C. Benefit to Beneficiary
"And, if, in such circumstances [Conflict of Interest],
the interests of the corporation are betrayed, the corporation may elect to claim all of the benefits of the transaction for itself, and the law will impress a trust in favor
of the corporation upon the property, interests and profits SO acquired."14@

The age-old and ever-fresh Strict-Trust doctrine-with its
implicit corollaries, the Custodial Concept of Corporate Control,
Conflict of Interest, the Benefit-to-Beneficiary and No-Inquiry
Rules-now finds application to the Twice-Stolen Agency.
(Note: The application of Strict Trust to Corporate Opportunity should enhance the other divisions of this Brief. Here
Strict Trust has never been bedeviled by the "disintegrating erosion" occasionally found elsewhere in corporate law.)
146. Hoyt v. Hampe, 206 Iowa 206, 208, 214 N.W. 718, 720 (1927).
147. Schildberg Rock Prods. Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 767, 140 N.W.2d 132, 136
(1966) (quoting 19 AM. JUR. 2~ Corporatiom # 1272 (1965)).
148. Id. at 768, 140 N.W.2d at 137 (citations omitted).
149. Id. (quoting Guth v . Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 273, 5 A.2d 503, 511 (Sup. Ct.
1939)).
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The Inveterate Rule
"The general rule is that a director or other corporate
officer cannot acquire an interest adverse to that of the
corporation . . . [Sluch acquisition will be taken to
be for the benefit of the corporation. * * *. 'They cannot have or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest
in conflict with their duty as trustees.' "15@

.

'

Schildberg has stated the universal Corporate-Opportunity
Rule: Any act, transaction or contract performed under a
Conflict-of-Interest disability is voidable by the beneficiary, regardless of good faith. Countless courts over the decades have
buttressed the Rule by resort to Cardozo's Meinhard:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another,
while the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty.
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio
of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.
As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and
inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of
the courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of
undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of particular
exceptions.151

This "tradition that is unbending and inveterate" has never been
undermined by "the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions."

State Law
It is the policy of the law to put fiduciaries beyond the
reach of temptation by making it unprofitable to yield
to it. Accordingly an act by the fiduciary in which personal interest and duty conflict is voidable a t the option
of the beneficiary, regardless of good faith.152

The Rule is all-embracing. Nothing is excused. The total
value of the assets stolen, dividends, salaries, commissions, prof-

OF

150. Id. at 767, 140 N.W.2d at 137 (quoting 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDLA
OF THE LAW
PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS
# 861 (rev. perm. ed. 1965)).

151. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
152. Schildberg Rock Prods. Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 766, 140 N.W.2d 132, 136
(1966).
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its, whatever, all without exception must be disgorged to the
injured beneficiary. The Rule is categorical:
The doctrine of "corporate opportunity" is not new to the
law and is but one phase of the cardinal rule of undivided loyalty
on the part of fiduciaries. . . . Our own consideration of the
quoted term as such is mainly in Ontjes v. MacNider, . . . 232
Iowa 562, 579. . ., which quotes a t length with approval from
Guth v. Loft, Inc., . . . a leading case in this area of the law.
". . . And, if, in such circumstances [Conflict of Interest], the
interests of the corporation are betrayed, the corporation may
elect to claim all of the benefits of the transaction for itself, and
the law will impress a trust in favor of the corporation upon the
property, interests and profits so acquired.?7153

Here is the culmination: "[T]he.law will impress a trust in favor
of the corporation." The law first voids the transaction and then
sequesters all "the property, interests and profits so acquired" for
the benefit of the entity. The uniformity of the Rule is referable
to the almost universal reliance on the prototypal Guth u. Loft.
The statements set forth in the case of Guth v. Loft . . .
disclose the general principles that apply to a corporate officer
and director in connection with their duties and relations to the
corporation of which they are an officer. . . .

. . .

We have quoted quite extensively from this case inasmuch
as it is our conclusion that this late and well-reasoned expression of the Delaware court summarizes the general holdings of
the various jurisdictions and the several texts and authorities
which we have c0nsu1ted.l~~

Among the most modern state applications of the Rule, the
1971 MonacolS from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, is aptly
illustrative. All of the prerequisites were met. Identical parties on
both sides of the deal, patent injury to the helpless beneficiary,
with only the law for protection. Pennsylvania (using Cardozo's
Meinhard and citing Guth v . Loft) quotes from an earlier Pennsylvania case to state the standard rigid rule:
"[Officers and directors] . . . cannot, either directly or indirectly, utilize their position to obtain any personal profit or
advantage . . . . [I]f he does so, the corporation may elect to
claim all the benefits of the transaction. Nor is it material that
-

-

153. Id. at 768, 140 N.W.2d at 137 (citations omitted).
154. Ontjes v. MacNider, 232 Iowa 562, 577, 579, 5 N.W.2d 860, 868-69 (1942).
155. Seaboard Indus., Inc. v. Monaco, 442 Pa. 256, 276 A.2d 305 (1971).
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his dealings may not have caused a loss or been harmful to the
corporation . . . ."156

Every opinion, whether state or federal, adds further insights into
the genius of Strict Trust.
Today's world of corporate enterprise, with all its variations
and complexities of control, management and finance, and the
public's extensive participation in corporate ventures, renders it
more imperative than ever before that corporate directors and
officers adhere to the highest standards of responsible fiduciary
conduct. If our competitive market economy is to operate in the
best interests of shareholders and society in general, we can
condone no intentional violations of corporate fiduciary duties.
Only in this way can the necessary confidence in corporate institutions so essential to the vitality of our economic and social
way of life be maintained.15'

Monaco affirmed the lower court. The fiduciaries "were ordered
to file accountings and to return to the corporation all monies
received."158
The 1972 Holden decision trod the same ground: "Therefore,
Warren must be held strictly accountable to CMC for the Chamberlain stock or its fair market value, and for all increases, income, proceeds or dividends realized therefrom."15g
In Illinois in 1973 the court (quoting without citation from
Schildberg?) highlighted the universality of the Rule:
The doctrine of corporate opportunity is not new to our law.
It is only one phase of the cardinal rule that requires undivided
loyalty from corporate fiduciaries. In other words, one who is a
fiduciary to a corporation may not acquire, in opposition to it,
any property or tangible expectancy in which it has an interest

....

160

Citing a line of Illinois cases, the court stated the Benefit-toBeneficiary Rule:
Directors and officers of a corporation are fiduciaries. They
are the trustees of its business and property. In this capacity,
they are subject to the general rule of trusts and trustees that
-

-

156. Id. at 261-62, 276 A.2d at 309 (quoting Lutherland, Inc. v. Dahlen, 357 Pa. 143,
151, 53 A.2d 143, 147 (1947)) (citations omitted).
157. Id. at 264, 276 A.2d at 310.
158. Id. at 257, 276 A.2d at 306.
159. Holden v. Construction Mach. Co., 202 N.W.2d 348, 358 (Iowa 1972).
160. Kerrigan v. Unity Sav. Ass'n, 11 Ill. App. 3d 766, 773-74, 297 N.E.2d 699, 70405 (1973), aff'd in part, reu'd on other grounds in part, 58 Ill. 2d 20,317 N.E.2d 39 (1974).
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they cannot, in their dealings with the business or property of
the corporation, use their relation to it for their own personal
gain. lsl

Interestingly, Kerrigan dealt with the appropriation of the insurance business of the plaintiff.
In the 1974 Miller,la the Supreme Court of Minnesota
aligned itself with the "inveterate rule": "If such a business opportunity is usurped for personal gain, it is equally well recognized that the opportunity and any property or profit acquired
becomes subject to a constructive trust for the benefit of the
corporation. Guth v. Loft, Inc. . . ."163
This Brief has already adverted to the identity of the law of
Agency, Strict Trust, Restitution:
This principle, usually referred to as the doctrine of corporate
opportunity, is derived essentially from fundamental rules of
agency concerning the duty of utmost good faith and loyalty
owed by a fiduciary to his principal and also from the law of
constructive trusts embodying equitable principles of unjust
enrichment .Is4

Borden and the Federal Cases
Consequently, [the district court] imposed a constructive trust in favor of the plaintiff on Sinskey's stock in
the . . . bank. In addition plaintiff was awarded a
money judgment encompassing, among other things,
the profit Sinskey derived on his dispositi6n of the
Edgewater stock as well as all salaries, director's fees
and dividends received by him in connection with the
above banks.165

The best and most authoritative federal applications of Corporate Opportunity come from Redmont, la6 handed down by the
Second Circuit in 1973, and Borden by the Third Circuit in 1976.
Both are on all fours with Le Mars and both enunciated the
unvarying Rule. Thus, the Second Circuit in Redmont;
"Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their
position of trust and confidence to further their private inter161. Id. at 774, 297 N.E.2d at 705.
162. Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 222 N.W.2d 71 (1974).
163. Id. at 219-20, 222 N.W.2d at 78.
164. Id. at 220, 222 N.W.2d at 78.
165. Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478, 486-87 (3d Cir. 1976).
166. Abbott Redmont Thinlite Corp. v. Redmont, 475 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1973).
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ests. . . . The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish
loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest. . . .
If an officer or director of a corporation, in violation of his
duty as such, acquires gain or advantage for himself, the law
charges the interest so acquired with a trust for the benefit of
the corporation, at its election, while it denies to the betrayer
all benefit and profit . . . ."167

Again the Second Circuit has resort to Guth and Meinhard,
among others.
But the apex has been reached in Borden u. Sinskey. It is
herewith stated for the record that Borden will prove to be the
most important single opinion in the field of corporate philosophy
in decades, surpassing Perlman v. Feldmann, Diamond v.
Oreamuno, and even Guth u. Loft. Borden not only enunciates
and applies the traditional Rule with unabashed thoroughness,
but supports its decision with invaluable commentary and insight.
So important is Borden, so pat with Le Mars, that the parallel would without more solve most problems posed by this Brief.
Sinskey was John Alesch, and of course, later, De Witt. Sinskey controlled Corpamerica, just as John Alesch and De Witt
had total custody of Le Mars. Corpamerica, as Le Mars, was
owned by the public.
Corpamerica was a bank holding company. Its business was
to acquire banks. Three choice little Jersey bank opportunities
appeared on the horizon. All three banks, Carteret, Edgewater,
and Perth Amboy, would fit perfectly into Corpamerica's plans,
just as the Alesch Agency would have been an excellent augment
to Le Mars.
But Sinskey, as did John Alesch and De Witt, had his own
designs. In a word, Sinskey himself, personally, took over the
three little Jersey banks, while the Sinskey-dominated Corpamerica stood mute on the sidelines. Corpamerica was as helpless
as Le Mars.
Corpamerica's champion was not a policyholder-owner, but
rather a chapter X trustee under the Bankruptcy Act. In a direct
action, trustee Borden sought a disgorgement of (1) all stock in
the three banks, (2) all profits earned, (3) all salaries, (4) all
director's fees, and finally (5) all dividends received by Sinskey
167. Id. at 88 n.3 (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270-71, 5 A.2d 50'3,
510 (Sup. Ct. 1939)).
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throughout the entire period. The Third Circuit in 1976 spoke
with a loud voice on behalf of Le Mars:
The above events led the district court to the conclusion
that fiduciary obligations had been violated to "an extraordinary degree" and it therefore entered judgment for the
plaintiff on his state law claims. More specifically, the court
below held that Carteret, Edgewater, and Perth Amboy were
corporate opportunities rightfully belonging to Corpamerica.
Consequently, it imposed a constructive trust in favor of the
plaintiff on Sinskey's stock in the [banks]. In addition, plaintiff was awarded a money judgment encompassing, among other
things, the profit Sinskey derived on his disposition of the
[banks'] stock as well as all salaries, director's fees and dividends received by him in connection with the above banks.16x

That was the New Jersey District Court. The Third Circuit, on
appeal, affirmed unanimously. More than that, the Third Circuit
first denied a rehearing, and then denied a second request for a
rehearing, this time en banc. Nine circuit judges in all.
The Third Circuit introduced its affirmance in Borden with
a solidifying nexus with the past: "Applying the doctrine first
announced in Guth v. Loft, . . . the court below held that the
Carteret, Edgewater, and Perth Amboy banks constituted
'corporate opportunities' that belonged in all fairness to Corpamerica."lm With this the Borden court stated the CorporateOpportunity Rule exactly as did Schildberg. The court then
treated the specific holdings below and approved each in turn.
But the most insightful commentary in Borden centers on
the thoroughness of the Third Circuit's application of Strict Trust
and the Benefit-to-Beneficiary and No-Inquiry Rules. The parallel to Le Mars (not only regarding the Twice-Stolen Agency, but
also the Premium-Bribery, Restitution for coerced "services,"
Disloyalty) is parlously close to inspired.
Once the court ordered Sinskey to disgorge all assets, profits,
personal salaries, personal director's fees, dividends, everything,
Sinskey begged for a t least a quantum-meruit allowance for all
the work he had expended over the many years as president and
director of each of the banks. Sinskey had actually worked hard
for Carteret, Edgewater, and Perth Amboy. To the contrary, his
work was minimal for Corpamerica. (In this, John Alesch differed
--

-

-

168. Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478, 486-87 (3d Cir. 1976).
169. Id. at 489 (citation omitted).
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from Sinskey, since John Alesch did work for Le Mars.) Sinskey
argued:
[Tlhat even if Sinskey could not retain those salaries, he
should have been awarded the reasonable value of the services
rendered. . . . Consequently, - [Sinskey asserts] that it is inequitable to require Sinskey to turn over the full amount of his
salaries without offering him any compensation for the valuable
services he performed. [Sinskey] then ask[s] this Court to
order an accounting to determine the reasonable value of such
services.170

With this, the Third Circuit applies with traditional logic the
exacting norms of the Strict-Trust Corporate-Opportunity Doctrine: "Since [Sinskey's] claim is, in essence, one for credits, we
might find that [the] failure to offer evidence on this issue a t
trial is fatal. However, even if we were now to order an accounting, we would not permit Sinskey to retain the reasonable value
of his services.
The Third Circuit next explains the rationale of the Rule and
dissects Guth u. Loft. The Third Circuit noted that Guth had had
to pay over all his Pepsi Cola salaries, earned while serving as
Loft's chief executive officer. Guth personally had stolen Pepsi
Cola out from under Loft, the public company Guth controlled.
Borden emphasized that Guth was forced to disgorge his Pepsi
Cola salaries (as Sinskey his bank salaries and as John Alesch and
De Witt all benefits from the Alesch Agency) not because Loft
(that is, Corpamerica and Le Mars)
had fairly compensated him during that period. Rather, they
were stripped away because Guth had gained them through his
usurpation of the Pepsi-Cola opportunity in violation of his fiduciary duties. The court refused to allow him to retain any of the
profits or benefits derived from his misconduct in order to deter
any disloyalty on the part of a corporate fiduciary. As the court
stated:
If an officer or director of a corporation, in violation of
his duty as such, acquires gain or advantage for himself,
the law charges the interest so acquired with a trust for
the benefit of the corporation, . . . while it denies to the
betrayer all benefit and profit. The rule, inveterate and
uncompromising in its rigidity, does not rest upon the
narrow ground of injury or damage to the corporation
170. Id. at 497.
171. Id.
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resulting from a betrayal of confidence, but upon a
broader foundation of a wise public policy that, for the
purpose of removing all temptation, extinguishes all
possibility of profit flowing from a breach of the confidence imposed by the fiduciary relation. 5 A.2d at 510
(emphasis added). 172

With this, the Third Circuit in Borden capped off its opinion by
affirming the lower court: "We, therefore, find no error in the
order of the District Court directing Sinskey to pay Corpamerica
all salaries received from Carteret, Perth Amboy and Edgewater.
If any point could be characterized as the climax of this
Brief, certainly this analysis and adjudication in 1976 of the
Third Circuit in Borden would be that climax. Here was a unanimous court supporting a federal district court, denying en banc
a rehearing. The philosophy and rationale of Borden could well
form the basis for the instant court's adjudication of all the major
questions of this Brief: Premium-Bribery, Looting, Corporate
Opportunity, the Twice-Stolen Agency. And now Disloyalty.
(Recall, moreover, the powerful support of the 1976
American Timber decision, handed down by a unanimous Supreme Court of Oregon.)
The doctrine . . . is not new to the law and is but
one phase of the cardinal rule of undivided loyalty on
the part of fiduciaries. 174
[It] follows, then, that the chiefest breach of loyalty would be the faithlessness of the steward. . . .
There is a fundamental repugnance in serving two masters. . . . Without more, just being on the other side is
[a breach of loyalty]. . . .175

As for Disloyalty, all defendants are divided into: (1) the
Alesch Group, with custody of Le Mars from the beginning to
April 21, 1970, and (2) De Witt and the Smith Group, the custodians thereafter. At no time whatsoever did Le Mars breathe a
breath of its own. One Group or the other always controlled its
172.
173.
174.
( 1966).
175.

Id. at 497-98.
Id. at 498.
Schildberg Rock Prods. Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 768, 140 N.W.2d 132, 137
Bayne, supra note 7, at 577-78.
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breathing. Both Groups were trustees of Le Mars's well-being.
At that split conceptual second when the premium-bribe is
changing hands the fiduciary duty of a strict trustee rests with
exactly equal weight on the outgoing contr8leur and the incoming appointee. At this transitional moment corporate custody is
being entrusted by the one and accepted by the other. The
bonum commune of the entity rests in a delicate balance between incumbent and successor. Each consequently faces the
idential custodial obligation defining the suitability of the
successor - contr6leur

As such trustees, every member of both Groups betrayed their
trust and were false to their signatures of loyalty on the Le Mars
Policy Statement of April 21, 1970.
With this comes a subtle point. Each defendant has been
guilty of Premium-Bribery, Embezzlement, Looting, Stealing the
Twice-Stolen Agency. For these Torts and Crimes each defendant
H , Compensawill accordingly be mulcted in specific ~ a m a ~ e both
tory and Punitive. But beyond these detailed derelictions, each
defendant was guilty, deliberately, thoughtfully, over months
and years, of another distinct malefaction: Each breached his
Trust, eroded the fabric of the entity entrusted to his custody and
care.
The results of this erosion are incalculable, or better, are
calculable only with thoughtful meditation on the manifold,
baneful effects of years of subversion, conflict of interest and
betrayal. Disloyalty itself might well be the worst sin of all.
It follows, then, that the chiefest breach of loyalty would be
the faithlessness of the steward. . . . There is a fundamental
repugnance in serving two masters. This is what Christ meant
when he said, "He who is not with me is against me." . . . It is
not a question . . . of illicit gain, but of simply being "against
me." Sworn allegiance has been broken by the very act of serving a second master. Basic loyalty is an elemental virtue and
goes to the heart of human nature. Without more, just being on
the other side is inconsistent with true honor and devotion.li7

The key concept here is the harm done to Le Mars by the Disloyalty itself, irrespective of the other injuries inflicted independently by a disloyal person.
176. Bayne, supra note 55, at 221.
177. Bayne, supra note 7, at 577-78 (footnotes omitted).
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Basic loyalty becomes vividly realistic when reduced to two
simple human participants, father and son, priest and penitent,
attorney and client, husband and wife. The anguish and shock
of a son, a penitent, a client, a wife, at the slightest intimation
of infidelity are most forceful expressions of the innermost essence of the virtue of loyalty. Merely, moreover, because the
innocent and trusting party happens to be the millions-plus
shareholders of A.T.& T. does not diminish an iota the naturallaw demands of the utmost in loyalty. Here the requirement is
"not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensiti~e."'~~

This is what Schildberg meant when it referred to "the cardinal
rule of undivided loyalty on the part of fiduciaries."17Y

Disloyalty, the Wrong Itself
[A]n allegation of damages [for fiduciary breaches] is
not a prerequisite to a recovery.'8c

The astute Second Circuit in Schein v. Chasen was analyzing
with approval the famous Diamond v. Oreamuno. Handed
down in 1969 by New York's highest court, Diamond has the
finest judicial exposition (with the possible exception of the Third
Circuit's Borden v. Sinskey) of the rationale of the Disloyalty
Damages.
Diamond was a case of first impression and dealt specifically with the use of inside information to the detriment of the
corporate beneficiary. But, as the New York court said: "This, in
turn is merely a corollary of the broader principle, inherent in the
nature of the fiduciary relationship, that prohibits a trustee or
agent from extracting secret profits from his position of trust."lx2
Diamond had all the prerequisites for Strict Trust. Here again is
the quintessence of Disloyalty:
It is true that the complaint before us does not contain any
allegation of damages to the corporation but this has never been
considered to be an essential requirement for a cause of action
founded on a breach of fiduciary duty. . . . This is because the
function of such an action, unlike an ordinary tort or contract
178.
(1928)).
179.
(1966).
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 578 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546
Schildberg Rock Prods. Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 768, 140 N.W.2d 132, 137
Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 824 n.9 (2d Cir. 1973). See id. at 823-24.
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494,248 N.E.2d 910,301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
Id. at 497-98, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
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case, is not merely to compensate the plaintiff for wrongs committed by the defendant but, as this court declared many years
ago (Dutton v. Willner, 52 N.Y. 312, 319 . . .), "to prevent
them, by removing from agents and trustees all inducement to
attempt dealing for their own benefit in matters which they
have undertaken for others, or to which their agency or trust
relates. "la

One must, however, read Diamond closely. In strict exactitude, Disloyalty always and everywhere inflicts very real injury
on the beneficiary. Disloyalty itself (over and above the
Premium-Bribery, the Embezzlement, the Looting, the Stealing
of the Twice-Stolen Agency, malefactions unrelated to Disloyalty
itself beyond the fortuity of being the handiwork of an otherwise
disloyal steward) inflicts double damages on the helpless entity.
First, the Disloyalty wounds the beneficiary through the very
infidelity itself. "Without more, just being on the other side" is
an actionable wrong. How calculate the extent of injury? How
estimate the damages suffered in the betrayal itself? These calculations are difficult, b u t "mere difficulty in ascertaining and
measuuring damages does not alone constitute a cause for denial
of recovery."184These intangible, difficult-to-evaluate Damages
were in mind when Diamond said: Damages have "never been
considered an essential requirement" in a breach of trust. Consider the anguish of a son, a wife.
Second and more readily discernible, Disloyalty does produce very visible scars. This the Diamond court also knew, and
ticked off some of the scars from Disloyalty's wounds:
In addition, it is pertinent to observe that, despite the lack
of any specific allegation of damage, it may well be inferred that
the defendants' actions might have caused some harm to the
enterprise. Although the corporation may have little concern
with the day-to-day transactions in its shares, it has a great
interest in maintaining a reputation of integrity, an image of
probity, for its management and in insuring the continued public acceptance and marketability of its stock. When officers and
directors abuse their position in order to gain personal profits,
the effect may be to cast a cloud on t.he corporation's name,
injure stockholder relations and undermine public regard for the
corporation's securities. As presiding Justice Botein aptly put it,
in the course of his opinion for the Appellate Division, "[tjhe
183. Id. at 498, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81 (citations omitted).
184. Holden v. Construction Mach. Co., 202 N.W.2d 348, 364 (Iowa 1972).
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prestige and good will of a corporation, so vital to its prosperity,
may be undermined by the revelation that its chief officers had
been making personal profits out of corporate events which they
had not disclosed to the community of stockholders."1n5

'

New York's highest court might well be summarizing the calculable harm inflicted by all defendants on hapless Le Mars.
The most recent and equally apt expression of the subtle (or,
in the case of Le Mars, are they really subtle?) nuances of Disloyalty Damages has come from the Third Circuit in the predictably
timeless Borden v. Sinskey. The familiar facts of Borden again
carry all prerequisites of Strict Trust. The Third Circuit superimposed its own explanation on that of Guth v. Loft:
The court refused to allow him to retain any of the profits or
benefits derived from his misconduct in order to deter any disloyalty on the part of a corporate fiduciary. As the [Guth] court
stated:
"If an officer or director of a corporation, in violation of
his duty as such, acquires gain or advantage for himself,
the law charges the interest so acquired with a trust for
the benefit of the corporation . . . while it denies to the
betrayer all benefit and profit. The rule, inveterate and
uncompromising in its rigidity, does not rest upon the
narrow ground of injury or damage to the corporation
resulting from a betrayal of confidence, but upon a
broader foundation of a wise public policy that, for the
purpose of removing all temptation, extinguishes all
possibility of profit flowing from a breach of the confidence imposed by the fiduciary relation."186

The key words are italicized: Damages do "not rest upon the
narrow ground of injury or damage to the corporation resulting
from" Disloyalty.

We are aware that our conclusions may result in very
serious consequences to defendants, notwithstanding
their freedom from evil motives. To sustain, however,
their dealings with the company would be subversive of
elementary principles governing fiduciary relationships
185. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 499, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912-13, 301
N.Y.S.2d 78, 81-82 (1969).
186. Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478, 498 (3d Cir. 1976) (emphasis altered).
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in general and the management of corporations in particular, and would open the door to the grossest frauds
by corporate managers.Ix7

Since dissimilarities exceed similarities, Damages must be
considered separately: Compensatory Damages and Punitive
Damages.

A.

Compensatory Damages

The corporate entity and the stockholders, in particular,
may presume that these trustees will perform their duties with the diligence, honesty and the utmost good
faith, inherent and implicit in their functions. They are
not required to be ever on their guard and watchful lest
those trustees misapply, destroy, embezzle, steal the
corporate assets, or defraud them.lxx

New York's highest court in Bosworth u. Allen, in a Sale-ofControl case on all fours with Le Mars, sets the tone:
[Tlhe directors of a corporation are charged with the duties of
trustees and bound to care for its property and manage its affairs in good faith, and for a violation of that duty resulting in
waste of its assets, injury to its property, or unlawful gain to
themselves, they are liable to account in equity the same as
ordinary trustees. The corporation has the right to call upon
them to account, not only for all the property intrusted to their
care, but also for all moneys furtively made by them at its
expense. It is the peculiar province of courts of equity to supervise the execution of trusts and to call trustees to an accounting
for their management of trust estates, and especially for every
violation of their primary duty not to deal with trust property
for their own advantage. . . . Equitable jurisdiction extends to
all culpable acts and omissions of the directors, by which the
pecuniary interests of the corporation are or may be injured. If
they are treacherous to its interests and appropriate its property, or intentionally waste its assets, or take money for official
action, or "sell out" by resigning and thus giving control to
others, they are liable to account in equity to the corporation

....

189

187. Hoyt v. Hampe, 206 Iowa 206, 221-22, 214 N.W. 718, 725 (1927).
188. Des Moines Bank & Trust Co. v. George M. Bechtel & Co., 243 Iowa 1007, 1081,
51 N.W.2d 174, 216 (1952).
189. Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157, 165-66, 61 N.E. 163, 165 (1901) (citations
omitted).
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At varying times and circumstances, every single defendant was
a Trustee of the assets and interests of Le Mars.

Joint and Several Liability
All persons conspiring or co-operating with or aiding
and abetting the officers or directors of a corporation in
defrauding the corporation are equally liable with
them.lgO

Every defendant, from beginning to end, was on notice that
De Witt was passing a substantial premium-bribe to the Alesch
Group to buy control of Le Mars as part of an indivisible conspiracy to loot, embezzle, and steal. "In a single equitable action the
court may go to the bottom of the wrong, and work out, in such
form as the facts require, all the relief called for by the conspiracy
of the defendants against the corporation towards which they stood as trustees."1g1The rule has long been indisputably clear:
Directors and their abettors are subject to joint and several liability for every act integral to the conspiracy. As Beehtel put it:
"Conspiracy may be established by circumstantial evidence and
may be inferred from concert of action, declarations and conduct."lg2Beehtel added several opinions in support. The law has
never been controverted:
It is axiomatic that directors and officers of a corporation
are jointly as well as severally liable for mismanagement, willful
neglect or misconduct of corporate affairs if they jointly participate in the breach of fiduciary duty or approveof, acquiesce in,
or conceal a breach by a fellow officer or director.lM

Thus the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. So, too, the corporatewise Second Circuit in 1973 in Schein: "Indeed, the general rule
has always been that 'one who knowingly participates in or joins
in an enterprise whereby a violation of a fiduciary obligation is
effected is liable jointly and severally with the recreant fiduciary.' "I" In the most recent 1976 Gould decision the Third Circuit reiterated the rule:
190. Des Moines Bank & Trust Co. v. George M. Bechtel & Co., 243 Iowa 1007, 1082,
51 N.W.2d 174, 217 (1952).
191. Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157, 168, 61 N.E. 163, 166 (1901).
192. Des Moines Bank & Trust Co. v. George M. Bechtel & Co., 243 Iowa 1007,1082,
51 N.W.2d 174, 217 (1952).
193. Seaboard Indus., Inc. v. Monaco, 442 Pa. 256, 263, 276 A.2d 305, 309 (1971)
(citations omitted).
194. Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1973) (quoting Oil & Gas Ventures-First 1958 Fund Ltd. v. Kung, 250 F. Supp. 744 (D.D.C. 1966)) (citations omitted).
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This duty they negligently fail to perform. Where two or more
persons fail to perform a common duty each is liable for the
entire harm resulting from the breach. Restatement of Torts $
878 (1939). As joint tortfeasors they are jointly and severally
liable for the plaintiffs' entire damage which they have inflicted.
Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225
U.S. 111, 132, 32 S. Ct. 641, 644, 56 L. Ed. 1009, 1023 (1912);
Prosser, Law of Torts, 314-315 (4th ed. 1971).IY5

Joint and several liability is patent. Only appropriate apportionment of Damages remains.

Liability Without Sharing
One who knowingly and intentionally participates in
effecting a fraud is liable even though he did not share
in the fruits of the wrongdoing.IY6

The gravamen is the infliction of injury, not a share of the
spoils. Thus, De Witt, the briber, is equally responsible with the
Alesch Group, the bribed, for the disgorgement over to Le Mars
of the premium-bribe dollars. Thus also, the Board of De Witt is
equally liable with De Witt for the Restitution of the tainted
dollars extracted from Le Mars for years of coerced "services." In
neither of these examples did any of the defendants pocket any
dollars personally.
Casey points out that he received no part of the premium
received by the favored defendants . . . and he contends that
it was error to hold him liable to the plaintiffs for their share of
the premium . . . . This is, however, not an action for accounting for premium received but rather a suit to recover the damages suffered by the plaintiffs as the result of the defendants'
wrongful acts. The fact that the plaintiffs' damages may be
measured by a proportion of the premium received by the favored defendants does not make the judgment recovered any the
less an award to compensate the plaintiffs for the loss which
they suffered from the wrongful conduct of Casey and any other
defendants who may be found liable.IY7

With this background the Third Circuit in the 1976 Gould decision.went on in specific answer to the present Damages question:
195. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 778 (3d Cir. 1976).
196. Des Moines Bank & Trust Co. v. George M. Bechtel & Co., 243 Iowa 1007,1082,
51 N.W.2d 174, 217 (1952).
197. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 778 (3d Cir. 1976).

326

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I979

This duty they negligently failed to perform. Where two or more
persons fail to perform a common duty each is liable for the
entire harm resulting from the breach. Restatement of Torts 5
878 (1939). As joint tortfeasors they are jointly and severally
liable for the plaintiffs' entire damage which they have inflicted. . . . [Alnd this is true even though one of the tortfeasors held liable has received no benefit from his wrongdoing. . . . It follows that Casey is liable in damages, both severally and jointly with any other defendants held liable, for the
loss suffered by the plaintiffs.Ig8

This universal rule, stated by the Third Circuit in the 1976 Gould,
is consonant with Bechtel and the numerous opinions in support.
In specific reference to most defendants, the court must heed
the Sixth Circuit in the 1974 Ohio Drill decision. When directors
place themselves in a conflict of interest, all question of good faith
and good motives evanesces.
In Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389, 397 (6th Cir.
1954), this Court in considering the extent to which equity will
go in upholding a fiduciary obligation stated:
Although good faith on the part of the directors and
the disclosure of the material facts eliminate the question of actual fraud, equity will still act to enforce the
fiduciary obligation under circumstances amounting to
constructive fraud. Constructive fraud refers to acts
which may have been done in good faith, with no purpose to harm the corporation, but which are done by one
who has placed himself in a position of conflict between
a fiduciary obligation and his own private interest. In
such a situation, by reason of the strict rule applicable
to fiduciaries, equity will take appropriate action to prevent the harm resulting from such actions, regardless of
the good intentions of the fiduciary.lYY

Thus all defendants face joint and several liability irrespective of
a share in the Premium-Bribery, the Looting, the Embezzlement,
the Twice-Stolen Agency, and regardless of good motives or good
faith.

Consequential Damages
The loss of money by the corporation subsequent to the
conspiracy, [the Sale of Control,] and in consequence
198. Id. (citations omitted).
199. Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 498 F.2d 186,192 n.12 (6th Cir. 1974) (citations
omitted).
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thereof through the wrongful acts of the defendants' successors, placed in office by treachery, was the natural,
and therefore the expected, result of the conspiracy itself .200

The law of "Proximate Causality" is elemental. When directors set in motion known and danger6us"forces, those directors are
held to an obvious liability for all foreseeable consequences of
their conspiracy.
The value of the assets wasted and the amount of expense
incurred as the direct and natural result of the [Sale of Control] conspiracy must be accounted for by the defendants, because those assets were intrusted to their care and protection as
trustees, and, having broken their trust they are liable for all the
proximate consequences. Through an action for an accounting
a court of equity has power to discover and fix the value of all
assets improperly withheld pursuant to the conspiracy, and of
all property lost and damages caused by the wrongful acts of the
defendants, and to compel them jointly and severally to pay the
aggregate amount over to the plaintiff. Through the conspiracy
and the overt acts in execution thereof, the defendants violated
their duty as trustees, and equity will award complete relief in
a single action for all the consequences of such violation . . . .201

Thus spoke New York's highest court. In another specific Saleof-Control litigation, a federal court trod the same ground:
[I]t may be said that the owners of control are under a duty
not to transfer it to outsiders if the circumstances surrounding
the proposed transfer are such as to awaken suspicion and put
a prudent man on his guard-unless a reasonably adequate investigation discloses such facts as would convince a reasonable
person that no fraud is intended or likely to result. Thus, whatever the extent of the primary duty may be, circumstances may
be sufficient to call into being the duty of active vigilence and
inquiry. *02

This rule is nothing other than the logical application of Tort
"Proximate Causality" to the recondite area of Sale of Control.
Schoolboy acumen would tell any director that every premiumbribe is scheduled for early recoupment. The most outrageous
naivete could never exonerate any of the defendants from the
ready conclusion that Le Mars was about to be "milked" to a very
appreciable degree.
200. Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157, 167, 61 N.E. 163, 165 (1901).
201. Id. at 167, 61 N.E. 165-66.
202. Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22,25 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
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From a careful reading of the voluminous evidence in this
case, I have become convinced that facts and circumstances
leading up to the [Sale of Control] . . . were sufficient to indicate to any reasonable man in his position that the Boston group
were acquiring the control of the corporation by improper means
and for an improper purpose.203

In a third, equally cogent, Sale-of-Control case, again on all fours
with Le Mars, a New York court reiterated the accepted rule. As
with Le Mars, Gerdes is a primitive Sale of Control for a substantial premium-bribe:
These defendants contend however that these losses to the
corporation should not be charged against them because they
represent a consequence "not reasonably foreseeable by them";
that they should not be held accountable because they could not
anticipate the looting which occurred. Even the premise on
which this argument proceeds may be questioned. It is certainly
arguable that these defendants should have foreseen, as a t least
a possible result of their surrender of possession of the corporation's assets, that a conversion might follow. However, under the
law as it stands they must be held responsible for the damages
which naturally flow from their wrongdoing, even though the
precise result could not have been foreseen.2u4

Bosworth, Insuranshares, and Gerdes are classic Sale-ofControl cases, cited by most courts faced with Premium-Bribery.
A study of these three cases alone could provide an adequate
analysis of the philosophy and implications of the Sale of Control.
To hold a trustee liable only for the profit he has received from
the surrender of his trust and relieve him from all responsibility
for the ensuing loss would establish a principle permitting trustees to gamble on the outcome of their acts of malfeasance with
nothing to lose but the gain received. The dissipation of the
corporate assets can be traced directly to the wrongdoing
against the corporation by [De Witt and the Alesch Group],
and hence they must be held liable for the resulting

The Insuranshares court asked a question clearly directed to
the defendants in Le Mars:
Why were the purchasers willing to pay so much for control? I
should think this question might well have occurred to one who
was selling it. . . .
203. Id.
204. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 30 N.Y.S.2d 755, 772 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
205. Id. a t 773.
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. . . There was simply too much of the sort of thing described for this transaction to pass as a perfectly normal stock
sale. I think that the circumstances were such as to indicate to
any reasonable person . . that there was more than a possibility of fraud and consequent injury to the corporation in the sale.
That being so, there plainly was a duty upon the sellers to make
a genuine effort to obtain and verify such information as they
reasonably could get about . . . the character, aims and responsibility of the purchasers, or, in the absence of adequate information, to refrain from making the sale.*06

.

In one pregnant sentence, New York's highest court in
Bosworth sums up the solution to the instant question of Damages: "In a single equitable action the Court may go to the bottom
of the wrong, and work out, in such form as the facts require, all
the relief called for by the [Sale-of-Control] conspiracy of the
defendants against the corporation toward which they stood as
trustees."207This mandate leaves the court with the pedestrian
chore of attributing .and apportioning the Damages among the
defendants. The joint and several liability has been established.
That liability must be imposed without regard for good motives
or good faith, and irrespective of a share in the loot.

The Apportionment of Damages
This duty they negligently failed to perform. Where two
or more persons fail to perform a common duty each is
liable for t h e entire harm resulting from the
breach. . . . As joint tortfeasors they are jointly and
severally liable for the plaintiff's entire damage which
they have inflicted. . . . [Alnd this is true even
though one of the tortfeasors held liable has received no
benefit from his wrongdoing. . . . It follows that Casey
is liable in damages, both severally and jointly with any
other defendants held liable, for the loss suffered by the
plaintiff^.^^

The norms for Damages attributable to each defendant must
now be applied to the five major malefactions.
206. ~nsuransharesCorp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 26-27 (E.D.
Pa.
1940).
207. Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157, 168, 61 N.E. 163, 166 (1901).
208. Gould v. American-HawaiianS.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761,778 (3d Cir. 1976) (citations
omitted).
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1. Prernium-Bri bery
This money they could not lawfully receive for themselves. They received it as the price of the transfer of' all
the corporate assets to the custody of irresponsible third
parties, and the law, in order to protect the corporation,
treats it as its property, and therefore, money which it
is entitled to recover from all the defendants. . . . The
loss of money by the corporation subsequent to the conspiracy, and in consequence thereof, through the wrongful acts of the defendants' successors placed in office by
their treachery, was the natural, and, therefore, the expected result of the conspiracy itself.
The value of the assets wasted and the amount of'
expense incurred as the direct and natural result of the
conspiracy must be accounted for by the defendants,
because those assets were intrusted to their care and
protection as trustees, and having broken their trust
they are liable for all the proximate consequences."'!'

The malefaction, Premium-Bribery, has induced two distinct categories of liability: (1)Restitution of the premium-bribe
itself, and (2) Damages directly consequent on the PremiumBribery.
Restitution. The various members of the Alesch Group are
liable for the disgorgement to Le Mars of the total $600,000
premium-bribe. This liability is founded on the law of Restitution
and Unjust Enrichment. The disgorgement is totally unrelated to
any other Damages, but is solely the result of Strict Trust applied
to Conflict of Interest. Moreover, De Witt and the Smith Group
are also jointly and severally liable for the full disgorgement.
Damages. The Tort of Sale-of-Control Premium-Bribery is a
distinct malefaction. Apart completely from the premium-bribe
dollars themselves, this malefaction inflicted palpable harm on
Le Mars. For many years, policyholders and prospective policyholders of Le Mars have become increasingly aware that both
incumbent and predecessor management of Le Mars were guilty
of flagrant Premium-Bribery. Bribery is not a recondite or esoteric crime. The man on the street can taste and touch it. The
harm to the reputation, prestige, good will, business, of Le Mars
has been very real indeed. Defendants' liabiliy, therefore, is
equally real.
209. Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157, 167, 61 N.E. 163, 165 (1901).
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2. Looting
However, even if we were now to order an accounting,
we would not permit Sinskey to retain the reasonable
value of his services . . . . "The rule, inveterate and
uncompromising in its rigidity, does not rest upon the
narrow ground of injury or damage to the corporation
resulting from a betrayal of confidence . . . ."210

De Witt looted Le Mars in two stages: (1)Under a Management Contract Le Mars paid $190,000 to De Witt via De Witt's
wholly-owned Alesch Agency. (2) Without a contract, De Witt
charged Le Mars directly for $552,000 in coerced "services."
Restitution. At the time of these contracts, both written and
oral, De Witt sat on both sides of the "negotiations." In this
Conflict-of-Interest situation, the law of Restitution, Unjust Enrichment, Strict Trust, Agency, all univocally mandate a disgorgement of all monies. The "contracts" were voidable at the
option of Le Mars. De Witt may not even "retain the reasonable
value of'' its "services." In addition to De Witt's liability, all
other defendants are jointly and severally liable as well. The
Alesch Group as Trustees are liable for all proximate and foreseeable consequences of their Sale of Control to premium-briber
successors. So, too, the Smith Group as coconspirators.
Damages. Over and above the mere restoration of illicit monies, De Witt, the Alesch Group and the Smith Group are all
jointly and severally liable for the harm inflicted on Le Mars
resultant on the Looting: disruption of business, lowering of employee morale, injury to reputation, et cetera, et cetera.
3. Embezzlement
Often, however, the new appointee [De Witt] avoids
the circuity of a personal payment and later corporate
recoupment by an immediate raid on the corporate till
[of Le Mars].*ll

In order to pay to the Alesch Group the total premium-bribe
dollars, De Witt was forced to steal (1) $154,000 directly from Le
Mars for the "pensions," (2) $14,600 for part of John Alesch's
"Consultant's" Contract, (3) $10,000, a t least, for the free auto
for John Alesch. These three items were integral parts of "what
210. Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478, 497-98 (3d Cir. 1976) (quoting Guth v. Loft,
Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Sup. Ct. 1939)).
211. Bayne, supra note 39, at 502.
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in turn De Witt will do in consideration" for getting control of the
Le Mars Board.
As with Premium-Bribery and Looting, so too with Embezzlement. Restitution is mandated. De Witt must return $178,600
directly to the Le Mars treasury. Over and above the restoration
of this amount, all parties are jointly and severally liable for
Damages to the integrity of Le Man.
4.

The Twice-Stolen Agency
[Sinskey] assert[s] that it is inequitable to require
[him] to turn over the full amount of his salaries without offering him any compensation for the valuable
services he performed. . . .
. . . [W]e [do] not permit Sinskey to retain the
reasonable value of his services. . . . "The rule, inveterate and uncompromising in its rigidity, does not rest
upon the narrow ground of injury or damage to the
corporation resulting from a betrayal of confidence. . . ."212

The Alesch Theft. Beginning sometime in the early 1950's,
the Five Alesches systematically stole the assets, commissions,
salaries, and profits of its captive Alesch Agency. Under the law
of Restitution, all these monies, plus interest, must be returned
to Le Mars. Further, all directors and especially Milton Tappan,
longtime president of Le Man, and Burton Dull, counsel, are
jointly and severally liable as trustees of Le Mars. As with the
Premium-Bribery, Looting, Embezzlement, all parties are liable
for Damages over and above the restoration to Le Mars of all the
fruits of the Usurpation of a Corporate Opportunity.
The De Witt Theft. From the date of the takeover of Le
Mars, April 21, 1970, De Witt in its turn systematically stole the
assets, commissions, salaries, profits (and, in addition, the Le
Mars Home Office business) of the Alesch Agency. The liability
of all De Witt defendants tracks exactly the liability of the Alesch
Group, both as to Restitution and independent Damages.
5. Disloyalty
[A]n allegation of damages for fiduciary breaches is not
a prerequisite to a recovery.213
212. Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478, 497-98 (3d Cir. 1976) (quoting Guth v. Loft,
Inc., 23 Del Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Sup. Ct. 1939)).
213. Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 824 n.9 (2d Cir. 1973). See id. at 823-24.
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[It] follows, then, that the chiefest breach of loyalty would be the faithlessness of the steward. . . .
There is a fundamental repugnance in serving two masters. This is what Christ meant when he said, "He who
is not with me is against me." . . . It is not a question
. . . of illicit gain, but of simply being "against me."
Sworn allegiance has been broken by the very act of'
serving a second master. Basic loyalty is an elemental
virtue and goes to the heart of human nature. Without
more, just being on the other side is [harmful] . . . .2 1J

The Damages inflicted by every single defendant, irrespective of Premium-Bribery, Looting, Embezzlement, the TwiceStolen Agency, are ponderable and calculable by a court deeply
familiar with the myriad instances of Disloyalty strewn across the
volumi.nous record. No one better than the court, after assimilating the details, weighing the testimony, can conclude to the great
harm inflicted on Le Mars by some twenty years of betrayal,
infidelity, and disloyalty. Where would Le Mars be today-even
assulming the mandated Restitution for Premium-Bribery, Looting, Embezzlement, Usurpation of Corporate Opportunity-had,
first the Alesch Group and then De Witt and the Smith Group,
been loyal and steadfast in the constant prosecution of Le Mars'
best interests and welfare?
In specific reference to the estimation of the Damages peculiar to Disloyalty (a most delicate, and perhaps most important,
chore), and in general reference to the overall Damages assessment, this court must be fearlessly true to the tradition of all
conscientious courts:
We are aware that our conclusions may result in very serious
consequences to defendants, notwithstanding their freedom
from evil motives. To sustain, however, their dealings with the
company would be subversive of elementary principles governing fiduciary relationships in general and the management of
corporations in particular, and would open the door to the
grossest frauds by corporate managers.215

B. Punitive Damages
It appears to me that everything is shaping up just as
we anticipated and I am sure that this venture can and
214. Bayne, supra note 7, at 577-78 (footnotes omitted).
215. Hoyt v. Hampe, 206 Iowa 206, 221-22, 214 N.W. 718, 725 (1927).
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will be advantageous and profitable to all parties concerned.
-Burton Dull, Esq., Le Mars Counsel,
to Raymond Brown, Esq., De Witt
Counsel, Executive Committee, Exhibit 19A.
It would seem to me that this pup corporation [the
Alesch Agency] could be used for perhaps some other
things in the business between the two companies [Le
Mars and De Witt].
-John Alesch to Raymond Brown, Exhibit 63.

Little controversy surrounds the question of Exemplary
Damages. Some few references will aid the court.

Individual Liability
Q. Would you tell the Court whether or not you have
been threatened by any Officer or Director of Le Mars
Mutual with loss of your employment because of your
testimony in this case?
A. Yes.
-Donald Coats, Transcript at 1908.

Every defendant is personally liable for Punitive Damages,
irrespective of possible corporate liability: " '[A] director, officer
or agent of a corporation . . . cannot escape liability on the
ground that in committing the tort he acted as a director, officer,
or agent of the corporation, or on the ground that the corporation
may also be liable.' "21Thus,each member of the Smith Group
is subject to Punitive Damages, as is also De Witt itself.

Corporate Liability
The fund raising for Westmar College started . . . .
[Tlhe Agency has written [Westmar] business with
the understanding that the Agency donate [sic] at least
50 percent of the commissions back to the College. I took
the liberty of continuing the [rebate] donations of the
Agency and Le Mars as in the past. This amounted to
$1,250 from each, the Agency and Le Mars.
-John Breese, Le Mars Officer and
Director, to the Executive Committee,
Exhibit 331.
216. American Universal Ins. Co. v. Scherfe Ins. Agency, 135 F. Supp. 407,415 (S.D.
Iowa 1954) (quoting 19 C.J.S. Corporations 9 845 (1940)).
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Every requisite of Exemplary Damages is verified in the case
of De Witt. Every malefaction was carefully thought out, discussed, approved by the Board through its Executive Committee.
Every malefaction was directly related to De Witt's business and
was "subsequently ratified and confirmed with full knowledge of
the facts."217De Witt's ratification was both formal, by explicit
approval of the Board, and informal, by the acceptance of the
spoils.
Culpability
Q. What did Mr. Gearke tell you?
A. He told me that he had no choice but to let me go.
Q. Did he give you a reason?
A. Yes. He said that I had been discussing the litigation then in prospect, and in fact, [against] the Le
Mars Mutual Insurance Company.
Q. And is that the sole and only reason he gave for
your termination?
A. Yes, it was.
-William Downs, Transcript at 567.

The judicial thinking on Punitive Damages has coalesced in
the now-famous 1973 Holi-Rest:
In Holden, supra, 202 N.W.2d at 359 we said:
"[Iln a stockholder's derivative action an equity court
may, in its discretion, award exemplary damages upon
a showing that some legally protected right has been
invaded, such as an intentional act of fraud or other
wrongful conduct. . . .

....

. . . [A]n intentional act of fraud in a court of
equity includes all acts, omissions and concealments
which involve a breach of either legal or equitable duties, trust or confidence, justly reposed, which are injurious to another or by which an undue or unconscionable
advantage is taken."218
The horror stories spread over these pages go far beyond the demands of Holi-Rest, Holden, and Epperson. Further dilation
would be offensive.
One comment, however, should be particularly cogent. Even
a cursory reading of the concise facts in Holi-Rest will immedi-

217. Ashland v. Lapiner Motor Co., 247 Iowa 596, 601, 75 N.W.2d 357, 360 (1956).
218. Holi-&st, Inc. v. Treloar, 217 N.W.2d 517, 525-26 (Iowa 1974).
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ately convince that "Treloar's flagrantly wrongful acts" were
child's play compared to the protracted, deliberate, and calloused
machinations of the Alesch Group, De Witt, and the Smith
Group.
Treloar's flagrantly wrongful acts, omissions and concealments have been injurious to the corporation and its stockholders. Without question, his self-dealing has caused the corporation losses not only in the sums above specified but in undetermined amounts which under' this record cannot be ascertained.
We hold Holi-Rest is entitled to exemplary damages from Treloar in the amount of $25,000.*19

Note further that the 1973 Holi-Rest, for acts best described as
innocent compared to the depredations against Le Mars, exacted
Punitive Damages against a single officer in an amount in excess
of 25 percent of the Compensatory Damages. This most modern
application of Exemplary Damages should be a minimum in the
case of Le Mars.

The Rationale
After considerable discussion by all [9] Policyholders
in attendance . . . a Management Contract . . . for the
operation of Le Mars by Alesch, Inc. [was approved].
-Recessed Meeting of Le Mars Policyholders,
April 21, 1970, Exhibit 601 B.

I [John Alesch] have been elected Chairman of the
Board, and Chief Executive Officer, and will continue
as General Manager of Le Mars, the same as I have in
the past.
-De Witt Newsletter, July 1970, (to
Le Mars Agents and Employees),
Exhibit 503(2).

The fourfold purpose of Exemplary Damages is aimed directly a t each defendant in this case, from John Alesch (through
his estate) and his cohorts in Le Mars on to Raymond Brown,
Esq., and his in De Witt. Punitive Damages are awarded: (1)"as
a punishment for the particular party involved," (2) "as a warning and example . . . to all other who may offend in like manner," (3) "[as] a salutary protection to society and the public in
general," (4) "[as] adding to the complainant's award. "220 The
219. Id. at 526.
220. Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 100-01, 66 N.W.2d 841, 844-45 (1954).
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imposition of Exemplary Damages on every single defendant will
justly achieve each of these four objectives.

The question of indemnification by the corporations for
officer and director attorney fees is governed by $
469A.4(19), The Code, and ultimately depends upon the
outcome of the

Fortunately, the Supreme Court of Iowa has already ruled on
the liability for any disbursement of any kind by Le Mars to any
attorneys defending any of the defendants in this action. The
court so ruled pursuant to a motion in this litigation. This ruling
includes all attorneys' fees, expenses, any sums spent by the defendants in aid of their cause against the Le Mars they maltreated.
The court in the earlier Le Mars was acting pursuant to the
explicit Iowa Code: "[Nlo indemnification shall be made in respect of any claim, issue, or matter as to which such person shall
have been adjudged to be liable for negligence or misconduct in
the performance of his duty to the corporation . . . ."nZ At least
the most innocent defendant is guilty of Negligence in the performance of his directoral duties. Every single defendant, therefore, must support his own defense. All monies disbursed must be
fully restored.

In strict practicality, the crucial distinction for future sale-of-control litigation lies in the built-in nature
of the premium-bribe-induced unsuitability. No true
premium-bribe under any conditions whatsoever can be
passed without engendering the triple blemish of the
perversion, the illicit consideration, and the resultant
unsuitability. To the extent, therefore, that an appointee is prepared to twist the judgment and to divert
the corporate dollars, thus far is he already an unsuitable custodian. As thus unsuitable he caps it off by imposing a premium-briber [himself] on the firm. Whatever further deficiencies he may possess do not affect
this ever-present built-in disability.223
221. Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co. of Iowa, 230 N.W.2d 905, 916 (Iowa 1975).
222. IOWA CODE8 496A.4(19)(6) (1977).
223. Bayne, supra note 55, at 243.
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De Witt and the Smith Group are calculating premiumbribers. "Whatever further deficiencies [they] may possess do
not affect this ever-present built-in disability." Never will De
Witt or the Smith Group successfully gainsay this blemish of
Premium-Bribery .
But De Witt and the Smith Group do "possess" many
"further deficiencies," over and above the Premium-Bribery . The
other four major malefactions were deliberate, consciously excogitated, over months and years. The Looting, the Embezzlement,
the Usurpation of Corporate Opportunity, the Disloyalty, all were
further forceful proof of Successor Unsuitability. Under no conditions could the court continue to entrust Le Mars to such malefactors. The only question is how to assure the total removal of
De Witt and the Smith Group.

The Court-Supervised Election
ORDERED that this Court shall appoint a new interim independent Board of Directors for Equity Funding Corporation of America.224
Federal Judge Charles E. Stewart Jr. Friday signed
a consent order providing for court appointment of a
new board of directors . . . .225
Mr. Waszkowski has been approved by the court as
chief executive officer . . . .226

The all-encompassing powers of the equity court-so vividly
implemented by Holi-Rest-mandate a court-fashioned remedy
to meet the peculiar exigencies surrounding Le Mars. Here is an
insistent need for a watchful court in prosecuting the entrustment
of Le Mars to a wholly new and honorable group of Directors.
Indefinite retention of jurisdiction is a necessary concomitant of
a court-supervised election. Holden stated the underlying philosophy: "Wherever a situation exists which is contrary to the principles of equity and which can be redressed within the scope of
judicial action, a court of equity will devise a remedy to meet the
224. SEC v. Equity Funnding Corp. of America, 11973 Transfer Binder] FED.SEC.

L. REP. (CCH) 11 93,917 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
225. International Controls Reaches an Accord with SEC; Court Will Appoint a New
Board, Wall St. Journal, Mar. 19, 1973, at 10, col. 1.
226. SEC Taps Waszkowski To Head Clinton Oil-In Partial Settlement of Suit He's
Designated as President; Four Others Named for Board, Wall St. Journal, Mar. 22, 1973,
at 28, col. 1.
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situation, though no similar relief has been given before."227Examples after examples, especially in recent days, have stumbled
one over the other in which courts have ousted malefactors and
then, toward future protection, devised foolproof machinery to
guarantee a brand new, impartial Board. Among the most recent
and appropriate is Phillips.
Phillips Petroleum
The conduct of the individual defendants constituted a breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, theft and looting.228

As with Equity Funding and Le Mars the federal court was
faced with an essentially corrupt Board. As did the court in
Equity Funding, Federal Judge Curtis handled the turnover of
control in two stages. First the Phillips court personally named
six nationally known persons (among them Harold Williams, now
Chairman of the SEC) to fill the vacuum created by the ousted
malefactors.
After this preliminary stage, the court provided surety for the
future:
The newly elected Board of Directors shall a t its first meeting appoint a Nominating Committee, consisting of a t least
three members and composed entirely of independent outside
directors, which shall have sole authority to recommend to the
Board of Directors the nominees to be presented to the voting
security holders.22B

With this the court closed its order with a sage precedent for Le
Mars-a two-year retention of jurisdiction: "Phillips may, after
March 31, 1978, petition the Court for an order terminating jurisdiction, and the Court may, pursuant to such petition, make such
an order if it finds Phillips has fully complied with the Final
Judgment."23oMinor differences with Le Mars cannot blunt the
efficacy of Phillips as an approach consonant with Holden: "[A]
court of equity will devise a remedy to meet the situation."
227. Holden v. Construction Mach. Co., 202 N.W.2d 348, 363-64 (Iowa 1972) (citations omitted).
228. Notice to Stockholders of Phillips Petroleum Co. Concerning Hearing on Confirmation of Settlement, Wall St. Journal, Feb. 23, 1976, at 13, col. 1 (involving a settlement
approved without opinion in Gilbar v. Keeler, No. 75-611-EAC (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 1976)).
229. Id.
230. Id.
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IV. THESPECIAL
MASTER
[Tlhe court in which any action is pending may appoint a special master therein. As used in these rules the
word "master" includes a referee, an auditor, an examiner, a commissioner, and an a s s e s ~ o r . ~ '

Iowa has not adopted Rule 53 of the Federal Rules. This is
probably just as well, since the court is thereby spared any technical limitations and has a free, equitable hand to "devise a remedy to meet the situation."
No divination is needed to conclude that the intricacies of
this litigation have yet to be fully untangled. In several areas the
court, sitting as a special master, or aided by a special master of
particular expertise, must now implement the court's forthcoming conclusions of law. Some holdings will not require any specialized enforcement. But many aspects of the five major malefactions do demand detailed study and exact implementation.
The special master, guided by the court's directives and the
findings of fact, may now effectuate the conclusions of law
through intensive investigation, hearings if necessary, and whatever remains to give full force and effect to the court's adjudication. This tandem effort by court and special master will effectively tie all the loose ends together.
Detailed suggestions to the court would seem to be out of
order. A cursory review of the pages of this Brief gives ample
indication of the work of a special master. The apportionment of
Restitution, joint-and-several liability, the manifold accounting
problems, the computation of interest, the complexities of the
Twice-Stolen Agency. Even more onerous will be the separation
of Le Mars from De Witt. Untangling the interrelated operations
alone will be a considerable task. The conclusion of the Oregon
court in t h e 1976 American Timber decision is p a t :
"[Rlemanded for an additional accounting in accordance with
this opinion."23z
The same special master might conceivably monitor the
selection of independent directors. The required competence
here, however, is markedly different from the accounting-oriented
tasks elsewhere, and might well require a person of peculiar talents.
231. FED.R. CG. P. 53.
232. American Timber & Trading Co. v. Niedermeyer, 276 Or. 1135, 1158, 558 P.2d
1211, 1224 (1976).
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My Dad started De Witt. My Father was President. My
brother was President. I was President and now my son
is President.
-Carl Smith, Executive Committee,
Deposition a t 7, 18.

Q. Well, as a normal thing, a t your annual meeting,
what percentage of your policyholders actually attend?
A. Very few.
Q. And there is no requirement for a quorum?
A. No.
-Raymond Brown, Deposition a t 84.
These mutual insurance companies arose on the back of
their founders.
-Milton Tappan, Le Mars Director,
Deposition a t 29.

The Custodial Concept of Corporate Control, the salutary
power of the Guth, Holden, Borden tradition, the thoroughness
of American Timber, have all had long acceptance in the overall
field of corporation law. Now it falls to this court to confirm their
efficacy by specific application to the narrow area of the mutual
insurance company. Here will be a sign to the nation, and a first
step toward the removal of that curse of corporate control so long
afflicting the mutual company.

